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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the opinions of financial statements' preparers and their 
external auditors on the implementation of accounting standards for Islamic banks in Sudan. A 
major interest of this study is to examine these issues in the setting of an emerging market 
economy, namely that of Sudan. Sudan represents a critical case in testing whether the theoretical 
propositions developed in Western countries (e. g., the USA) can help explain the opinions of 
preparers and auditors on new accounting standards. The number of Islamic banks and audit 
firms in Sudan is still limited, a matter that renders the choice of a sampling approach quite 
problematic. A single (embedded) case study, with cross-sectional comparisons, provides an 
alternative approach that offers generalisations about the relevant theoretical propositions. 
Questionnaires, interviews and examination of documents were used as methods of data 
acquisition. 
The findings of the present study support the propositions relating to the cost of compliance and 
the listing status. This supports the view that the opinions on, and attitudes towards, the 
disclosure standard in Sudan are driven by variables similar to those in the USA. The findings 
also support the size proposition pertaining to measurement standards, which considers size as 
proxy for political costs. The ownership proposition, in which public (state) ownership is related 
to political costs, is also supported. Hence, opinions and attitudes towards measurement standards 
could largely (but not altogether) be explained by the same variables identified in the prior 
research literature. As for the audit risk, the findings do not support the two theoretical 
propositions included in this study. Unlike the case in the USA, auditors' opinions in Sudan on 
the implications of audit risks associated with the implementation of the accounting standards are 
not explained by the same variable (i. e. proportion of receivables to total assets). The finding 
however, is subject to the problem of sparse data. Apart from the problem of sparse data might be 
explained by the fact that there are only five auditors in the present study. Another reason might 
be that training and regulation are predominant in the USA professional bodies (e. g., AICPA), 
whereas the Sudanese professional bodies (e. g. SCCA) do not consider training and regulation in 
the context of auditing Islamic banks in Sudan. 
iv 
Despite the limitations associated with possible social desirability bias and the limited number of 
banks and audit firms, the findings provide evidence for AAOIFI to work with other interested 
parties (e. g. the CBS and KSE) in order to have its present and future accounting standards fully 
implemented as mandatory requirements in Sudan. Moreover, the findings spell out certain 
implications for the CBS as the country's banking regulatory body. The CBS may accordingly 
find it useful to assess the implementation of accounting standards issued by AAOIFI. 
Implementing the AAOIFI's accounting standards will improve the regulatory system established 
to supervise the Islamic banking sector in Sudan. The results also have implications for 
professional bodies in Sudan. The SCCA may find it useful to assess those implications for audit 
risk associated with the implementation of the standards. Such implications should be considered 
in decisions about formulating new training and audit programmes. 
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PART 1 Historical Background 
Chapter 1 
Introduction and Background to the Research 
1.1 Introduction 
The present section deals with the identification of the problem, research objectives and the 
significance of the research study. 
1.1.1 Identification of the problem 
This thesis is concerned with the opinions about, and attitudes to, the implementation of new 
accounting standards on the part of preparers and external auditors (EAs) of financial statements. 
More specifically, it is concerned with attitudes and opinions in the context of Islamic banks in 
Sudan. Attitudes of preparers to new or proposed accounting standards have received substantial 
coverage in the accounting research literature. This coverage has taken place in Western countries 
(e. g., the USA). A major interest of this thesis is that it examines the same issues in the setting of 
a less-developed economy, namely Sudan. Another major interest is that the preparers in this case 
are the managers (MGRS) of Islamic banks. And the accounting standards in questions deal with 
issues that arise because Islamic banks engage in transactions using Shari 'a compliant financial 
instruments, which are categorically different from those used by conventional banks. 
The standards also have the backing of the Central Bank of Sudan as the supervisor of the banking 
sector in Sudan. The sector operates according to Islamic Shari'a's rules and principles. 
Therefore, the improvement of the transparency of financial reporting, by means of appropriate 
accounting standards, is intended to extend Shari'a compliance into the financial reporting 
processes, which is also a new development. Additionally, this thesis also considers the opinions 
of external auditors EAs on audit risk associated with new and proposed accounting standards, an 
important topic on which relatively little research literature exists. In general, a number of 
theoretical propositions have been advanced to explain and predict the behaviour of preparers to 
I 
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new or proposed accounting standards in Western countries. With regard to the EAs, the 
normative professional literature on the evaluation of audit risk and business risk suggests some 
theoretical propositions regarding likely EAs' opinions and attitudes. The present research study 
attempts to see how far the theoretical propositions can help explain the behaviour of MGRs of 
Islamic banks and EAs in Sudan. 
Generally speaking, the implementation of a new set of accounting standards is likely to 
encounter potential problems, as in the case of accounting standards issued by Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). AAOIFI's accounting 
standards do constitute a new set of standards for Islamic banks. Their implementation will 
generate a number of problems. It follows that some specific questions need to be addressed, such 
as: 
- To what extent do MGRs of Islamic banks display positive or negative attitudes towards, and 
opinions on, the implementation of AAOIFI's accounting standards and why? 
- How do the Islamic banks differ in their actual implementation of AAOIFI's accounting 
standards and why? 
- How do the EAs evaluate the implications for audit risk associated with the implementation of 
AAOIFI's accounting standards and why? 
- What are the main findings of this study that could be addressed in future research? 
1.1.2 Research objectives 
The research study attempts to achieve the following four general objectives: 
1- to examine Islamic bank MGRs' opinions on, and attitudes towards, the implementation 
of AAOIFIs' accounting standards. 
2- to compare and contrast the implementation of AAOIFI's accounting standards in a 
number of Islamic banks in Sudan. 
3- to examine EAs' evaluation of the implications for audit risk associated with the 
implementation of AAOIFIs' accounting standards. 
2 
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4- to explore issues relating to the findings of the present study, which could be addressed in 
future research. 
1.1.3 Significance of the study 
The present study is expected to be significant in terms of the following: 
1- The present study contributes to the understanding and knowledge of Islamic banking and 
finance, with particular reference to the regulation of financial reporting. 
2. It is intended to assist the CBS as the country's banking regulatory authority to establish a 
package of remedies for addressing problems that may result from the implementation of 
AAOIFI's accounting standards. 
3. It is also intended to support AAOIFI's efforts to have its accounting standards 
implemented through persuasion of regulatory authorities such as central banks and 
monetary agencies in other countries, where Islamic banks operate. 
4. It is further intended to improve the understanding and awareness of EAs with regard to 
audit risk in the context of auditing Islamic banks. 
1.2 Emergence of Islamic banking system 
Hamoud (1985, p. 19) states that `Caravans used to make two trips north and south to and from 
Mekka; these journeys were known as the summer and winter trips and were mentioned in the 
Qura'n (Sourah 106, verse 2)'. Various forms of primitive deposit and utilization of money 
appeared in pre-Islamic Mekkan society. The Mekkans knew two methods of utilization of 
money, namely (1) giving money in commenda for a share of profit; and (2) lending based on 
usury ( the meaning of usury will be stated in section 1.3 below), which was common in pre-Islam 
among the Arabs and between the Arabs and Jews. Islam is a revealed religion of compassion and 
guidance to rectify the deviations in belief, to establish justice, and to guide human life into 
righteousness and goodness. The importance of financial institutions increased in the early stage 
3 
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of Islam, with particular reference to the rule of the Amoian and Abasian', during which time 
accounting principles evolved in accordance with Islamic precepts (Atia, 1989, pp. 59-60). During 
the rule of the Ottoman Empire, the Islamic State experienced some institutional stagnation (Ali, 
2001). This stagnation had an adverse effect on the development of an Islamic system of 
accounting concepts and techniques relating to financial institutions and instruments, which, from 
the 17th century AD, emerged vigorously in European countries and in North America. In the 
process of this development in the West, those financial institutions and instruments that are 
based on interest played a principal role in the market economy. By contrast, there was no 
parallel development of Islamic financial instruments (based on strict Quranic doctrines) to avoid 
usury. Consequently, Muslims seriously came to face the problem of choosing between financial 
services that involved interest, and foregoing the use of such financial services. With the turn of 
the twentieth century came the discovery of oil in the Arab world and most of the international 
powers came to exploit this newfound wealth. Subsequently, during the second half of the 20`h 
century, Muslim scholars started making efforts to develop acceptable modes of finance and 
institutions to offer them. Those efforts gained further momentum following the rise of the oil 
price in the 1970s, a situation which created the need for "recycling petro-dollars". Most of that 
"recycling" was actually performed by North American and European banks, using interest- based 
instruments. 
The establishment of local savings banks in Egypt in 1962 was the first attempt to put Islamic 
banking theory into practice. However, that experience was abandoned later in 1968. Then Nasir 
Social Bank was founded in 1971 as an Islamic financial institution. A number of other Islamic 
countries also witnessed the birth of various Islamic banks. Subsequently, an agreement was 
reached and signed by 23 Islamic countries in August 1974, approving their participation in the 
capital of the Islamic Development Bank2. 
In Sudan, the banking sector, before independence in 1956, consisted of seven foreign banks. 
The Bank of Sudan was established in 1959 in accordance with a Special Act. Up to 1977 savings 
and time deposits' returns and all advances granted by banks to their clients were interest-bearing 
modes. During the period of 1977-1983 the banking sector passed through conventional Western 
1 The rule ofAmoian (661-750 AD) and Abasian (750-1258 AD) was established after Islamic Khalafa 
4 
Chapter 1 Introduction and Background to the Research 
banking with the exception of initiatives by pioneers in the Islamic banking field, such as Faysal 
Islamic Bank, Tadamun Islamic Bank, Sudanese Islamic Bank, Export Development bank 
(formerly West Islamic Bank) and Al-Baraka Bank. In 1983 the Bank of Sudan required all 
banks and other similar financial institutions to abolish interest on all types of business 
transactions and to comply with alternative Islamic modes of finance. The total number of banks 
in 1997 reached 28 (including 4 foreign banks) with 658 branches3 (Awatif et al. 1997). 
However, some problems and difficulties arose during the implementation of the new modes of 
finance. To overcome these problems the Bank of Sudan issued in-depth directives on the 
concept of Islamic modes of finance. In this regard, sustained efforts were made to further and 
develop various Islamic modes of financing, including Murabaha and Murabaha to the Purchase 
Orderer, Salani sale, Istisn 'a and Ijarah4. According to the 1991 Banking Regulation Act the 
Higher Shari 'a Supervisory Board (HSSB) was established in March 1992 with the responsibility 
to issue Fatwas [Shari'a formal legal opinion or rulings] and review contracts governing all 
business transactions for the central bank as well as commercial banks. Subsequently, each 
Islamic bank in Sudan has been required to form a Shari'a Supervisory Board (SSB) in order to 
ensure that all its banking transactions are executed strictly according to Islamic doctrine. The 
banking policy (1999-2000) addresses the revision of the 1991 Act in order to realize proper 
Shari'a compliance by Islamic banks. Moreover, the policy is concerned with the issuance of the 
Central Bank Mudaraba Certificate (CMC)5 in order to ensure their juristic correctness. 
2 See, Al-Masarif, Beirut, 9"i year No. 190 September 1974. 
3 At the time of writing this thesis, a branch of a foreign bank was voluntarily liquidated and two national banks are 
under liquidation 
4 These modes of finance will be discussed in section 1.4 below. 
5 CMC has been launched as alternative to interest-bearing government securities in order to improve a commercial 
bank's liquidity. Meanwhile, the banks may realize profit through auction of certificates. 
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1.3 Meaning of riba (usury) 
Linguistically riba (usury) means "increase and growth". The purely linguistic meaning of riba is 
thus the increase of an amount of money due in consideration for the extension of credit terms on 
a loan6. The Holy Qua an explicitly and emphatically prohibits riba: 
Those who eat riba [usury] will not stand (on the day of resurrection) except like the standing of a person beaten by 
Satan leading him to insanity. That is because they say `trading is only like riba, ' whereas Allah has permitted trading 
and forbidden riba. So whosoever receives an admonition from his lord and stops eating riba shall not be punished for 
the past [deeds], but whosoever returns to riba, such is the dweller of fire. 
In the Sunna [sayings and deeds of the Prophet Mohammed (God's prayers and peace be upon 
him)], it was reported that "However, every usury of pre-Islam is abolished, you are entitled to 
take your capital so that you do not oppress others and you are not oppressed' (Hamoud, 1985, 
p. 48). The banning of usury is also related to the exchange or sale of certain kinds of goods, 
namely commodities, and metals used as money. In this regard, Abu Hurira reported that: "Gold 
for gold, weight for weight, similar for similar; silver for silver, he who increases or asks for an 
increase commits usury" 8. 
As mentioned by Islamic jurists, the banning of usury is derived from the Holy Qura'n, Sunna and 
Ijmah (consensus) among Islamic scholars. Accordingly, Hamoud (1985, p. 65) points out the 
adverse effect of usury on individuals and society. He argues that it is not possible to restrict the 
social injury of usury (riba) to dealers therein only, because the direct detrimental effects will 
cause damage and evil to the whole society. According to Abu Huraira, the Prophet (God's 
prayers and peace be upon him) said: "There comes a time on people when they eat usury, he who 
does not eat it will be hit by its dust"9. 
6 See Mohedin Sharaf AL-Nawawi: Tahzeeb Alazinan Walawgat, section 2, part I (Egypt, Cairo Printing House). 
Surah 2 Al-Bagarah, verse 275. The interpretation of the meaning of this verse is quoted from a summarized 
version of AI-Tabari, Al-Q rtubi and Ibn Kathir with comments from Sahih Al-Bukharri. Translation was given by 
Al-Hila'li and Khan, Dar-us-Salam Publications, Rayadh-Sudi Arabia, 1996. 
8 See Sahih Muslim, the interpretation of this Hadaith was given byAl-Nawawi., part II 
9 The interpretation of this Hadaith was given in Sahih E1-Bukharri, part I. 
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In short, there seems to be a complete consensus among all schools of Islamic thought that the 
term riba (usury) stands for interest in all its types and forms (Hamdi, 1986, p. 155). In this 
respect, the majority of modern Fugaha (Islamic scholars) interpret riba as being equivalent to 
interest (Karim, 1999, p. 34). More precisely, riba is a pure return (or rent) on money per se, 
where neither business risk is borne nor other goods or services are provided. Islam permits 
returns from financing in the context of transactions in real assets (See sections 1.4.3 and 1.4.4 
below). 
1.4 Islamic modes of finance as an alternative to usury-based modes 
Islamic banks are established according to a set of fundamental principles; the most important of 
which are those of profit and risk sharing, joint venture and permissible forward contracts. These 
are set out in accordance with Islamic Shari'a's rules and principles. An Islamic bank does not 
deal with riba. Instead, it mobilizes funds, among other methods, under a system of profit-and-risk 
sharing through Mudaraba contracts (whether restricted or unrestricted). In the act of using those 
funds an Islamic bank employs a number of financial instruments, which are described below. The 
first two (Mudaraba and Musharaka) are partenership or profit-and-loss sharing modes of finance, 
the next three are credit-based instruments, and the last two are forms of leasing. 
1.4.1 Mlldaraba finance 
Mudaraba is a form of partnership in which one or more partner(s) provide(s) funds to another to 
invest in a project. The provider of the funds is known as Rabb-ul-mal, and the other, who 
manages the investment, is known as Al-Mudarib (AAOIFI, 1993a). One of the main conditions 
of the Mudaraba contract is the separation of ownership from management. There are special 
characteristics of Mudaraba that distinguish it from other financial instruments (e. g., 
Musharaka). These are: 
1. In a Mudaraba contract, the management of the invested funds is the exclusive 
responsibility of the Mudarib; while in a Musharaka contract, all partners may participate 
in the management of the business. 
7 
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2. In Mudaraba, one party provides the funds and the other party provides the effort; 
whereas in Musharaka all partners provide funds. 
3. If any profit is realized in a Mudaraba, Al-Mudarib receives a Mudarib's share (as a 
pre-determined percentage)10 from the returns on the invested funds. However, in case 
of loss, Rab-ul-final bears the loss, provided that it was not due to misconduct or 
negligence on the part of the management (AI-Mudarib). By contrast, in a Musharaka, 
all parties to the contract bear the loss according to their share in the invested funds. 
4. Assets acquired by Muclaraba finance are in the sole ownership of Rab-ul-mal. By 
contrast, in a Musharaka, the partners jointly own the assets acquired by Musharaka 
finance. 
There are two types of Mudaraba contract: unrestricted (discretionary) and restricted Mudaraba 
a. Unrestricted Ahnlaraba: 
Under this type the investment account holders (IAHs) authorize the bank to invest their funds in 
a manner which the Islamic bank deems appropriate without laying down any restrictions as to 
where, how, and for what purpose the funds should be invested (AAOIFI, 1996b). According to 
the terms and conditions of a Mrularaha contract, the IAHs are permitted to withdraw their funds 
at short notice subject to some loss of the profit share. Moreover, the bank in its capacity as 
Mudarib is entitled to receive a share of the profit when the invested funds generate a return. Yet, 
in case of loss, the bank receives no remuneration or share as Mudarib (Karim, 1995 and Archer 
and Karim, 1997). However, the bank may have the right to deduct a certain percentage from the 
net profit on IAH's funds in order to create a reserve. This reserve is primarily used to meet 
potential losses on IAHs' funds and it is also used to compensate IAHs during periods of low 
profit on the invested funds. The bank may also forego part of its profits or Mudarib share in 
favour of IAHs in order to offer a competitive rate of return (Archer et. al., 1998). 
10 The Mudarib's share is determined by the bank's management policy (normally ranges from 10% to 20%). 
8 
Chapter 1 Introduction and Background to the Research 
b. Restricted Mudaraba: 
With this type the IAHs impose certain restrictions as to where, how and for what purpose their 
funds are to be invested (AAOIFI, 1993b and 1996b). A bank (as Mudarib) uses IAHs' funds 
according to the terms and conditions specified in a restricted Mudaraba contract. Moreover, the 
Islamic bank is restricted from commingling its own funds with the restricted investment account 
funds. In both restricted and unrestricted Mudaraba, Al-Mudarib cannot indemnify IAHs for any 
loss incurred, except when negligence or misconduct on the part of management has occurred 
(Archer, et al. 1998). 
1.4.2 Musharaka finance (profit/loss sharing instrument) 
Musharaka is a foml of partnership involving two or more parties. Each party contributes to the 
capital of the partnership equally or in varying proportions so as to invest in a joint venture. In 
Musharaka each party bccomes a part-owner of the acquired assets and is entitled to his due share 
of profits. However, each partner also bears the loss in proportion to his contributed capital. 
There are three types of Musharaka (AAOIFI, 1996c), namely; 
a. Constant Musharaka: 
Constant Musharaka is defined as "Musharaka in which the partners' shares in the capital 
remain constant throughout the period as specified in the contract". 
b. Diminishing Musharaka: 
In diminishing Musharaka, one partner agrees to transfer gradually to the other party its 
share in ill-Mushai"aka. Therefore, as a partner's share declines, the other partner's share 
increases until the latter becomes the sole owner of the venture. 
c. Equity Joint Venture: 
An equity joint venture is defined as: "Musharaka in which an Islamic bank owns shares or units 
representing an equity stake in another fine's capital" (Ibid. 1996a). 
9 
Chapter 1 Introduction and Background to the Research 
1.4.3 Bai Alrrajjai (Deferred sale) 
Al-Bai Muajjal is described as a sale under which the price of the item involved is payable on a 
deferred basis, either in a lump sum, or in installments. This mode could be of considerable use to 
supply credit to industry and agriculture, as well as to finance domestic and import trade. 
Although the latter node is considered to be permissible under Islamic Shari'a rules and 
principles, some commentators argue that it is not advisable to use it widely and indiscriminately 
in view of the impending risk of opening a back door for dealing in an interest-based system 
(Hamdi, 1986, p. 158). For instance, Murabaha may degenerate into a loan for which a charge is 
made with the asset never actually becoming the property of the bank. This transaction is in fact a 
loan made in return for an interest charge and thus represents a form of Haram (non-permissible) 
transaction. Safeguards would, therefore, need to be devised to restrict the use of this mode of 
finance. In this regard, the Bank of Sudan, in consultation with HSSB, has asked Islamic banks 
and similar financial institutions to restrict Murabaha sales in order to avoid such transactions. 
There are three types of Bai Muajjal. These are: Murabaha, Salan: and Istisna'a 
Murabaha and Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer: 
A Murabaha is defined as: "a sale of commodity at cost plus an agreed profit mark-up". 
Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer is defined as: ' A sale in which two parties or more negotiate 
and promise each other to execute an agreement according to which the orderer (i. e., the client) 
asks the purchaser (i. e., the bank) to purchase an asset of which the latter takes the legal 
possession' (AAOIFI, 1996a). 
The client promises the batik to purchase the asset from it. The two parties would conclude a sale 
when the orderer takes possession of the asset from the bank. However, the purchase orderer's 
promise may or may not be binding on him to conclude the sale. There are thus two types of 
Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer, namely binding and non-binding promise (See Appendix 1 
below). 
The salient characteristics of Murabaha that distinguish it from a loan or overdraft facility consist 
of the following: 
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a) The bank pays the supplier and should therefore acquire legal ownership of the asset (asset 
becoming the property of the bank). 
b) The bank should inform the orderer about the price at which it purchased the asset, and 
stipulate an amount of profit mark-up in addition to the cost of the goods. 
In order to ensure a smooth settlement of debts due to the bank, some Shari'a scholars allow a 
fine to be imposed on delinquent clients, provided that the amount of the fine is not included in 
the income statement of the Islamic bank, and is eventually donated to charity. Moreover, from 
the viewpoint of modern Islamic scholars (jurists), solvent debtors should be subject to 
punishments for non-payment, including the confiscation of the goods or assets, and the necessary 
civil and criminal procedures should be taken against defaulters". This is because delays and 
defaults without genuine reasons (procrastination in payment by a solvent debtor) would not only 
be a breach of trust, but would also jeopardize the success of Murabaha as an alternative to the 
interest-based mode of finance. However, the assets supplied in a Murabaha contract provide 
collateral for the debt, and may be re-possessed by the bank (creditor) in the event of default. 
Salam: 
Salam is defined as "purchase (or sale) of goods for deferred delivery in exchange for immediate 
payment"12. 
The validity of a Salnnº contract depends on certain conditions which include the following: 
1. The purchase price should be known. 
2. The receipt of the Salam payment should take place where the contract is established. 
11 See AAOIFI, "Juristic rules of Murabaha and Murabaha to the Purchase Ordeerr, 1996, Bahrain. 12 See AAOIFI,, FAS 7 and see also Ahmed Ali Abdallah, Juristic rules of Salam contract, 1996, Bahrain. 
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3. The commodity (A1-muslam fihi) should be subject to strict identification so as to negate 
lack of knowledge of its kind, type, quality and amount. 
4. Al-muslam fihi should be subject to specification and it should be recognized as a debt. 
Istisna 'a: 
Istisna'a is defined as: 
'A sale contract between al-mustasni' (the ultimate purchaser) and al-sani' (seller), whereby al-sani' - based on an 
order from al-mustasni'- undertakes to have manufactured or otherwise acquired al-masnoo (subject matter of the 
contract) according to specification and sell it to al-mustsni' for an agreed upon price and method of settlement 
whether that be in advance, by installments or deferred to a specific future time' (AAOIFI, 1998b). 
In other words, the purchaser asks the seller to supply a specific product for an agreed upon price 
and method of payment. The conditions of validity of Istisna'a, include the following: 
1. Al-n, asnoo must be known and specified to the extent of removing any lack of knowledge 
of its kind, type, quality and quantity. 
2. A future delivery date should be fixed. 
3. The price of al-nrasnoo should be known. 
Salam and Istisna'a are forms of working capital finance. Salam was originally introduced for the 
agricultural and horticultural producers as a form of crop pre-financing, while Istisna'a is 
introduced for financing work-in-progress inventories in manufacturing or construction. Both 
Salam and Istisna'a can be used in a parallel mode. That is, the bank (financier) may enter into a 
forward contract [i. e. the goods are already sold to a third party for immediate payment, thus 
hedging the goods' price risk]. However, any such forward contract must be legally independent 
of the original contract. 
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1.4.4 Ijarah (leasing) 
Ijarah is defined as `the transfer of the services of an asset for an agreed upon consideration'. 
Some Fugaha (jurists) have defined Ijarah as `Ownership of the right to the benefits of using an 
asset in return for consideration' (AAOIFI, 1997c). Ijarah is an alternative way of financing fixed 
assets. According to Islamic scholars Ijarah has three elements: 
1. Two parties: a lessor (the owner of the leased asset), and a lessee (the party who receives 
the services of the leased asset). 
2. A contractual form that includes an offer and consent. 
3. The subject of the Ijarah contract, which includes the rental amount and the services 
which, are transferred to the lessee. 
There are two types of Ijarah, namely: 
Operating Ijarah: 
This is an Ijarah contract that does not end up with the transfer of ownership of the leased assets 
to the lessee. 
Ijarah Muntahia Bittamleek: 
An Ijaral: contract stipulates that the transfer of ownership of the leased asset to the lessee. 
Differences between a conventional lease and an Islamic Ijarah (lease) are summarized below. 
1. Contracts in a conventional lease can be altered, while in an Islamic lease they cannot be 
subject to alteration. 
2. In a conventional finance lease, the economic substance of the situation is that the lessee 
has an asset and a matching liability, although the legal form is that the ownership of the 
asset remains with the lessor [i. e. substance over form]. By contrast, in Islamic Ijarah, 
the lessor retains the responsibility of ownership [i. e. the legal form and possession of the 
leased asset remain with the lessor]. So that the lessor is responsible for maintaining the 
13 
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]eased asset and carrying out all repairs that would make it available for use, as well as 
for its insurance. 
1.5 Summary and concluding remarks 
The application of Shari 'a to business transactions has resulted in the emergence of a number of 
Islamic banks in some Islamic countries (e. g., Sudan), where central banks have required all 
Islamic banks and other financial institutions to abolish interest. Unlike conventional banks, 
Islamic banks are established with the mandate to carry out their financial transactions in 
accordance with the rules and principles of Islamic Shari'a. This influences the capital structure 
and investment activities of Islamic banks in various ways. Islamic banks mobilize funds through 
investment accounts on the basis of a profit-and-loss sharing mechanism in place of the interest 
based- modes. As alternatives to lending funds and charging interest thereon, Islamic banks use 
various instruments of Islamic finance, including partnership or profit-and-loss sharing modes 
(Mudaraba and Musharaka financing), credit based instruments (e. g., Murabaha, Salam and 
Istisna'a), and leasing (Ijarah). 
Although each of the above Islamic modes of financing, as used by Islamic banks, has some 
characteristics, which resemble those of financial instruments used, by conventional banks, each of 
the Islamic instruments of finance has specific juristic rules that have no parallels in the 
conventional financial instruments. AAOIFI's work should be seen as complementary to that of 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). In many ways they have similar aims, 
namely the improvement and international harmonization of financial reporting rules and practices 
in the interest of transparency and comparability in an increasingly global financial marketplace. 
However, international accounting standards (IAS) do not consider the specificity of Islamic banks 
and the financial instruments as used by them (see Chapter 2 below). Hence, in Islamic banking, 
the use of IASs as a means for achieving international harmonization of financial reporting is 
unlikely to be long effective. This provides a rational justification for AAOIFI's work in 
regulating financial reporting by Islamic banks by reference to accounting standards that address 
the unique characteristics of Islamic financial instruments. 
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Chapter 2 
International Accounting Self-Regulatory Bodies: 
A Comparison Between the IASB and AAOIFI 
2.1 An overview of accounting regulation 
Issues of financial accounting regulation have preoccupied both practitioners and academics for a 
number of decades in Western countries, in particular the United States of America (USA) and the 
United Kingdom (UK). As a result, intensive research and numerous studies (e. g., empirical 
research and the work of standard setting bodies) have been carried out for the last seven decades. 
Bromwich (1992, p. 250) states that the system of accounting regulation varies between countries 
and has undergone changes over the years. For example, France and Germany have largely 
depended on a statutory system; whereas Australia and Canada have employed a mixed system, 
i. e. a combination of statutory and self- regulatory systems. On the other hand, the UK (in 
particular before the 1981 Companies Act) and the USA provide examples of self-regulatory 
systems. Notwithstanding, the respective statutory systems and governmental mechanisms 
directly or indirectly influence the USA and the UK systems. Specifically, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) delegates part of its regulatory power to the Financial Accounting 
Standard Board (FASB), and thus has an influence on it. 
A regulatory system can take one of the following forms. 
a) The separation model, in which banks are not allowed to conduct securities business or 
to own securities firms. 
b) The universal banking model, in which banking and securities businesses are freely 
combined within the banking entity. 
c) The firewall model, in which banking and securities operations within the same banking 
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group undertake their business through different legal entities separated by "firewalls". 
Islamic banking is a form of the universal banking model. In other words, Islamic banking deals 
with commercial and investment business, but in accordance with the rules and principles of 
Islamic Shari 'a. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: 
Section 2 provides information about IASB and AAOIFI. Section 3 shows similarities and 
differences between the IASB's and AAOIFI's frameworks. A comparison between IASs and 
AAOIFI's accounting standards is presented in section 4. Section 5 provides summary and 
concluding remarks. 
2.2 Information about IASB and AAOIFI 
The present section presents the basic information about International Accounting Standard Board 
(IASB) and Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) in 
the following order. 
2.2.1 IASB 
IASB is an independent, private self-regulatory body, founded in 1973 as the International 
Accounting Standard Committee (IASC) 13. The main objectives of the IASB as stated in its 
constitution are: 
a. to formulate and publish in the public interest, accounting standards to be observed in the presentation of 
financial statements, and to promote their world-wide acceptance and observation. 
b. to work generally for the improvement and harmonization of regulation, accounting standards and 
procedures relating to the presentation of financial statements. 
As of September 2002, the members of IASB were 154 professional accounting bodies in 112 
16 
Chapter 2 International Accounting Self-Regulatory Bodies 
countries14. The IASB ensures that IASs are developed only through an international due process, 
which involves the worldwide accountancy profession, the preparers and users of financial 
statements. In 1995, the IASC entered into an agreement with International Organization of 
Security Commissions (IOSCO), which states that: IOSCO would consider endorsing IASs for 
cross-border capital raising and listing purposes in all global markets once a core set of standards 
had been completed. In 1999, the IASC achieved its target of issuing new or revised accounting 
standards covering all the items agreed with IOSCO (Alexander and Archer, 2000, chl). The 
IOSCO and many stock exchanges accepted IASs for cross-border listing purposes; however, 
notable exceptions were the USA and Canada. 
It might be argued that the financial crisis, which began in certain Asian countries (e. g. Indonesia) 
and spread to other regions of the world, showed the need for credible, comparable and 
transparent accounting information to help sound decision making by investors, lenders and 
regulatory authorities. Yet, the IASB as an international self-regulatory body has no statutory 
power to enforce its standards. The board relies on the quality of its pronouncements to persuade 
governments, stock exchanges and other regulatory bodies to back the implementation of its 
accounting standards. 
2.2.2 AAOIFI 
AAOIFI, formerly known as Financial Accounting Organization for Islamic Banks and Financial 
Institutions, was established in accordance with the agreement of association, which was signed 
by Islamic financial institutions in 1990. The AAOIFI was registered as an international self- 
regulatory body in 1991 in the State of Bahrain. The main objectives of AAOIFI as stated in the 
its constitution (see Article IV) are: 
13 The name and constitution of IASC were changed in 2000. 
14 Source: http: // iasc. org. uk/frame/cenl. htm. 
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a. to develop accounting and auditing thought relevant to Islamic financial institutions. 
b. to disseminate accounting and auditing thought relevant to Islamic financial institutions and its 
applications through training, seminars, publication of periodic newsletters, carrying out and 
commissioning of research. 
c. to prepare, promulgate and interpret accounting and auditing thought relevant to Islamic financial 
institutions. 
d. to review and amend accounting and auditing thought relevant to Islamic financial institutions. 
The organization structure of AAOIFI consists of a general assembly of 75 Islamic institutions 
from 16 countries. The AAOIFI has a board of trustees and a board of accounting and auditing 
standards, each consisting of 15 members, a Shari 'a Board consisting of not more than 15 part- 
time members, an executive committee, and a secretary-general who is a full-time executive and 
heads the general secretariat. 
As in the case of the IASB, the AAOIFI has an extensive due process that governs the production 
of its accounting and auditing standards, however the due process includes checking of Shari 'a 
juristic suitability of the proposed standards by the Shari 'a committee. The AAOIFI invites 
interested parties to express their opinions on the proposed statements and standards before their 
final approval. The AAOIFI also holds two public hearings in two different countries to discuss 
exposure drafts. 
As of September 2002, AAOIFI had promulgated two statements on objectives and concepts of 
financial accounting for Islamic financial institutions, eighteen financial accounting standards, 
four auditing standards, four governance standards, thirteen Shari 'a standards, and two code of 
ethics for accountants and auditors, and for employees. Moreover, the AAOIFI has issued one 
statement on capital adequacy for Islamic banks. The total number of AAOIFI's authoritative 
pronouncements was 44 (AAOIFI, 2002). 
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Like the IASB, AAOIFI, as a self-regulatory body, has no power to enforce its respective 
standards. The AAOIFI depends on the quality of its pronouncements to persuade governments, 
central banks, monetary authorities, and stock exchanges to support the implementation of its 
accounting standards in some Islamic countries. However, it would not be an easy job for 
AAOIFI to have all Islamic countries adhere to its standards because of existing different 
legislation and regulatory requirements. 
2.3 The IASB's and AAOIFI's conceptual frameworks15 (CF) 
The IASC (1989) developed a framework for the preparation and presentation of financial 
statements (hereafter the Framework). The Framework provides general guidelines for future 
accounting standards. It also aims to support national standard-setting bodies in developing 
national accounting rules that comply with the IASs. The Framework includes the objective of 
financial statements, basic assumptions and principles such as the accrual basis, the going concern 
assumption, and four qualitative characteristics of information in financial statements, which are 
understandability, relevance, reliability and comparability. The framework also includes the 
concept of capital and capital maintenance (IASC, 1989). 
AAOIFI followed a similar approach to that of the FASB's conceptual framework in starting its 
standard-setting by promulgating two statements on the objectives and concepts of financial 
accounting for Islamic banks and financial institutions. More specifically, AAOIFI's Framework 
(AAOIFI, 1993) provides general rules for accounting standards for Islamic banks and financial 
institutions. The Framework covers the Objectives of Financial Accounting for Islamic Banks 
and Financial Institutions (hereafter the Statement of Objectives). AAOIFI's framework also 
covers the Concepts of Financial Accounting for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions 
(hereafter the Statement of Concepts). The Statement of Concepts (SFA 2) defines the basic 
elements of financial statements, which are included in the following sets: 
1) Statement of financial position, 2) income statement, 3) statement of changes in owners' equity 
or statement of retained earnings, 4) statement of cash flow, 5) statement of changes in restricted 
IS AAOIFI's conceptual framework means its two Statements on Objectives and Concepts of Financial Accounting 
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investment, 6) statement of sources and uses of funds in Zakat, and 7) statement of sources of 
funds in the Quard fund (AAOIFI, 1993b pars 21-64). 
AAOIFI's Statement of Concepts also cites four basic accounting assumptions, which include 
going concern, the accounting unit concept, periodicity, and the stability of the purchasing power 
of the monetary unit concept (ibid. pars 65-80). The Statement of Concepts defines accounting 
recognition of revenues, expenses, gains and losses in the bank's income statement and 
recognition of profits and losses in the statement of changes in restricted investments (ibid. pars. 
81-86). As for measurement of financial instruments, cash equivalent value and historical cost 
(par 95) are most commonly adopted in the Statement of Concepts (see pars 89-94 and 95). 
AAOIFI's Statement of Concepts also cites five main qualitative characteristics: relevance, 
reliability, comparability, consistency and understandability (ibid. pars. 103-122). 
2.4 Comparison of IASs to AAOIFI's accounting standards 
At present, financial reports prepared for shareholders and other users involve principles and 
procedures that can vary widely from one country to another, and sometimes even within a 
country. Financial reports, therefore, lack comparability. This creates the need for international 
accounting standards, in order to achieve the goal of the improvement and harmonization of 
financial reporting rules and practices. 
IASs are intended to be applicable to all commercial, industrial and the business enterprises in the 
public and private sectors, with the exception of IAS 30 "Disclosure in the financial statements of 
banks and similar financial institutions", which applies to banks and similar financial institutions 
(Dalton, 2000). While IASs are not issued to be applicable to the products of Shari 'a compliant 
transactions, AAOIFI's accounting standards are specifically designed to disclose the products of 
transactions based on the rules and principles of Islamic Shari'a. For example, IAS 30 does not 
apply to the products of free-interest financial transactions as reflected in the financial position of 
an Islamic bank. 
for Islamic Financial Institutions. 
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Although some IASs deal with financial instruments that are the conventional alternatives of those 
dealt with by AAOIFI's accounting standards, the two sets of the standards are in some cases 
incompatible. More specifically, Murabaha and Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer standard 
(FAS 2) deals with accounting treatments of Murabaha credit-sale instrument. The accounting 
treatments are not compatible with the requirements of lAS 18 "Revenue", (for more details see 
2.4.2 below). There are also IASs for which there are no comparable accounting standards issued 
by AAOIFI, one reason for this is that the financial statement items covered by IASs do not 
address any issue of Shari 'a requirements. Thus, AAOIFI has not needed to issue separate 
accounting treatments for such items such as property, plant and equipment (e. g. IAS 16). 
Another reason is that the types of conventional financial instruments covered by the IASs do not 
appear in the financial statements of Islamic banks, as they can result only from Haram'6 (non- 
permissible) transactions, such as borrowing costs, e. g. lAS 23 "Borrowing costs". 
2.4.1 IAS 30 and AAOIFI's disclosure standard (FAS 1) 
IAS 30 requires specific disclosure of accounting policies; the contents of statement of financial 
position and the income statements or of accompanying notes to them; and off balance sheet 
items, including contingencies and commitments. FAS 1 "General presentation and disclosure in 
financial statements of Islamic banks standard" requires general disclosures in the financial 
statements; presentation and disclosure of statement of financial position, the income statement, 
cash flow statement, the statement of changes in owners' equity or statement of retained earnings, 
statement of cash flow, statement of changes in restricted investment, statement of sources and 
uses of funds in Zakat, and statement of sources of funds in the Quard fund (AAOIFI, 1993). 
The main differences, which distinguish FAS 1 from IAS 30, include: 
1- The financial statement items that are presented in IAS 30 are largely the product of 
interest financial instruments and do not feature in the financial statements of Islamic 
banks. Conversely, the financial statement items presented in FAS 1 are largely the 
16 The author's own italics. 
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results of free-interest financial instruments and do not feature in the financial statements 
of conventional banks. 
2- Islamic banks are required to disclose earnings or expenditures prohibited by Shari 'a, if 
any, in the notes to financial statements. AAOIFI emphasizes the important role of the 
religious and external auditors in testing whether an Islamic bank comply with Shari'a's 
rules and principles. IAS 30 does not specifically address the issue of prohibited 
earnings by Shari 'a or any religious aspect. 
3- Unlike IAS 30, FAS 1 presents the equity of unrestricted investment accounts, which 
requires separation from liabilities and owners' equity, because unrestricted investment 
accounts are not liabilities but are a form of limited term equity instrument with residual 
claims. Moreover, FAS I includes additional financial statements, which meet the 
perceived information needs of certain groups of users. These are statement of changes 
in restricted investment accounts, statement of sources and uses of funds in Zakat and 
charity fund, and statement of sources and uses of Quard fund (see Appendix 2 below). 
2.4.2 IASs and AAOIFI's measurement standards 
As stated above, Islamic banks mobilize and use funds through free-interest financial instruments, 
which have technical aspects (accounting and juristic rules) that are different from those of 
conventional financial instruments. IASs are not designed to be applicable to the results of 
Shari 'a compliant transactions. The major differences between IASs and AAOIFI's measurement 
standards are discussed below. 
1 Murabaha and Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer (Murabaha) standard 
It might be stated that the issue of revenue recognition under Murabaha (FAS 2) falls within the 
scope of [AS 18 "Revenue". The IAS 18 requires the separation of a trading profit margin from a 
financing charge for credit, which is an interest-based instrument. The profit is recognized when 
the asset is made available for sale to the buyer (IAS 18 pars. 14-19), while interest is recognized 
on a time proportion basis over the credit period (IAS 18 par 30 (a)). By contrast, in a Murabaha 
sale, the seller's profit mark-up is not divisible into two components, a profit margin and charge 
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for credit, since the latter would be a form of riba, which is prohibited by Islamic Shari 'a. 
Therefore, the accounting treatments for profit recognition fairly reflect the substance of Shari 'a 
compliant transaction for which the splitting of the mark-up as required for interest financial 
instrument would be inappropriate, even if it were in principle feasible. Hence the Murabaha 
accounting treatment of profit recognition is incompatible with IAS 18. 
2 Musharaka Financing standard 
Musharaka financing (FAS 4) is a form of equity or profit and loss (free-interest) financial 
instrument. It is unique to Islamic banking. The profit and loss sharing rules of Musharaka 
require an accounting treatment that may not be compatible with IASs. IAS 31 allows either of 
the treatments set out in IAS 28 pars 6 and 7, namely the equity method or cost method, while LAS 
39 par 70 requires the cost method for an investment for which a fair value cannot be reliably 
determined. As for joint ventures, which are subject to joint control, IAS 31 is applicable for 
Musharaka financing. IAS 31 does not allow the cost method in such cases however it allows the 
equity method. FAS 4 pars. 14 and 16 requires a partner's share of undistributed profits in the 
Musharaka to be accounted for as an account receivable and not presented in the partner's capital 
in the Musharaka. This is necessary in order to apply the Shari 'a rules for the sharing of losses. 
The equity method requires the share of undistributed profits to be included in the carrying 
amount of the investment. The carrying amount of the investment presented on the balance sheet 
may be split into two components: the cost element (partner's capital for FAS 4 requirements) 
and the share of undistributed profits (a Musharaka account receivable for FAS 4 requirements) 
Hence, FAS 4 is compatible with IAS31. 
3 Ijarah and Ijarah Muntahia Bittamleek 
As mentioned earlier in the present chapter, the principle of economic substance over legal form is 
a paramount aspect of reliability. In the AAOIFI's Framework, the distinction between economic 
substance and form is not applicable, insofar as "form" corresponds to Shari 'a compliance. For 
example, the differing approaches of IASB's and AAOIFI's framework can be seen in the 
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accounting treatments of leases. IAS 17 (IASC, 1997) distinguishes between operating leases and 
finance leases. A finance lease is a lease that transfers to the lessee substantially all the risks and 
rewards incident to ownership of the assets. An operating lease is a lease other than a finance 
lease (IAS 17, par. 3). AAOIFI points out that according to the Shari'a the lessor must retain 
certain risks incident to ownership of the leased asset. Hence there is no Shari 'a equivalent of a 
finance lease. These differences affect accounting treatments. In the case of finance lease, the 
lessee treats the leased asset as its own property (fixed assets) and recognizes the corresponding 
liability for lease payment, while the lessor recognizes an account receivable for the lease 
payments. All Shari 'a, -compliant leases are operating leases according to this criterion and thus 
there is no compatible between IAS 17 and FAS 8. However, the implementation of a new 
approach (February 2000), as suggested by G4+117 Discussion Paper, could result in a revision of 
IAS 17. This would remove the distinction between operating and finance leases. The property 
right of the lessee inherent in operating lease and the corresponding financial obligation should be 
reflected in the lessee's financial position. Hence to comply with such a revised IAS 17, Islamic 
banks, as lessors, would have to recognize Ijarah as a financial asset, not a fixed asset. Such an 
amendment in the sense of the discussion paper it would not be compatible will AAOIFI's FAS 8. 
2.5 Summary and concluding remarks 
As mentioned in chapter 1 above, many Islamic banks in a number of Islamic countries have 
followed either IASs or national accounting standards. However, the nature and activities of 
Islamic banks are substantially different from those of conventional banks. Islamic banks are 
required to comply with Islamic Shari 'a rules and principles in all their financial and other 
dealings. Specifically, the items in Islamic banks' financial statements do not correspond in a 
number of cases to the items specified in a conventional bank's financial statements. This is 
because the financial statement items mentioned in FAS 1 are largely the results of Shari 'a 
compliant transactions and are not presented in the financial statements of conventional banks. 
That is to say, Islamic banks mobilize and use funds through free-interest financial instruments, 
which have technical aspects (accounting and juristic rules) that are different from those of 
17 G4+1 includes representatives of accountancy body in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, UK and USA together 
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conventional financial instruments. 
Unlike the IASB's Framework, the AAOIFI's Framework does not distinguish between substance 
and legal form insofar as "form" corresponds to a Shari 'a requirement and is therefore part of the 
substance of a transaction, (e. g. revenue recognition in Murabaha). Moreover, the AAOIFI 
approach does not consider the distinction between operating leases and finance leases (FAS 8) as 
IASB (IAS 17) does. It appears that the accounting treatments of finance lease are not compatible 
with those of AAOIFI's FAS 8. 
A comparison between the two sets of the standards highlights the essential differences, which 
result from the specifities of Shari 'a compliant transactions. Neither IAS nor national accounting 
standards (NAS), which were or have been adopted by most of Islamic banks, have dealt with the 
specificity of Islamic banks. Thus, the use of lAS or NAS in order to realize international 
harmonization of financial reporting would not be effective for financial reporting made by 
Islamic banks. As an alternative to IASB, AAOIFI provides unique standards for regulating 
financial reporting by Islamic banks, in order to make their financial statements more comparable. 
In this regard, the CBS and Monetary Agencies in Bahrain and Jordan require Islamic banks to 
comply with AAOIFI accounting standards. Some Islamic banks in other countries such as 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia have also started voluntarily to comply with AAOIFI accounting 
standards. 
The implementation of the accounting standards as a new phenomenon would be expected to 
receive considerable attention from professionals such as preparers of financial statements (e. g., 
managers) and external auditors. The implementation of AAOIFI's accounting standards raises a 
number of issues similar to those raised by the implementation of any new set of accounting 
standards. These issues include the reception of the standards by financial statements' preparers 
and auditors, whose opinions and attitudes may have an important bearing on the success of the 
implementation. It is the purpose of this thesis to examine preparers' and auditors' opinions 
about, and attitudes towards, the implementation of AAOIFI's accounting standards in Sudan, in 
the light of previous academic work (theoretical and empirical) on such matters. 
with IASB. 
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Part II: Literature Review 
Chapter 3 
The Agency Theory Model and MGR's Reaction to New Accounting 
Disclosure and Measurement Standards 
3.1. Introduction 
The aim of the present chapter is to review the literature relevant to agency theory and the 
attitudes of firms' MGRs towards new standards regulating accounting disclosure and 
measurement. Given a wide scope of discretion, agents (MGRs) might choose the best 
alternative accounting measurement and disclosure to improve their own personal welfare. 
Actions taken by MGRs might or might not be in the interests of principals (shareholders). To 
limit agents' discretion, standard-setting bodies have introduced standards regulating disclosure 
and measurement. Thus, agency theory is relevant to the introduction of regulatory disclosure 
and measurement standards. 
First, adequate disclosure, by means of regulation, improves transparency in financial reporting 
that enable outsiders (providers of funds) to observe MGR's actions and to have better financial 
information, which can help, make useful economic decisions. 
Second, the implementation of measurement standards limits MGR's discretion in manipulating 
the financial results of the business enterprise and hence reduces agency problems. 
In general, accounting standards are issued to regulate the financial reporting process. More 
specifically, new or proposed accounting standards are used as control measures to limit 
preparers' discretion in financial reporting and thus mitigate any conflict of interest between 
those who prepare the financial statements of an enterprise and those who receive them 
(shareholders and other users). In other words, one function of financial reporting is to monitor 
firms' MGRs as to where they act in the interest of providers of funds (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). In the present chapter, agency theory (AT) is used to identify and explain agency 
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relationships in the firm; where the reaction of the firm's MGR to new and proposed accounting 
standards is assumed to be based on self-interest. Positive accounting theory attempts to 
research those factors influencing the attitudes of MGRs towards new and proposed accounting 
standards. 
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows: 
Section 2 discusses agent problems that are considered in the agency literature. Section 3 
presents the main factors that determine the reactions of firms' MGRs to new accounting 
regulations. Section 4 focuses on the effect of the variables on the implementation of accounting 
disclosure standards. Factors influencing the attitudes of firms' MGRs toward accounting 
measurement standards are identified in section 5. Section 6 provides summary and concluding 
remarks. 
3.2 Agency theory Model (AT) 
Delegation of decision-making authority is the most important feature of the modem business 
enterprise. Owners of the business delegate authority to professionals. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976, p., 309): 
An agency relationship is defined as a contract under which one or more persons [(principal(s)] engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making 
authority to the agent. 
Thus, such delegation might give rise to conflict of interest between agents and principals. As 
discussed in the existing economic literature, AT focuses on the relationship between a single 
principal (shareholder) who provides capital and consequently possesses a claim on the value of 
the firm and an agent (MGR) whose efforts are needed to improve the market value of the firm. 
As noted in the finance literature, AT also deals with the relationships of different groups of 
principals (e. g. shareholders and lenders). 
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The economic and financial analyses of AT are based on two fundamental assumptions (Barnea 
et. al. 1986, pp. 25-26). 
1. All individuals are assumed to choose actions that maximize their own personal welfare. 
As a consequence, principals delegate decision-making authority to agents, and the 
latter use this power to improve their own personal welfare. Actions chosen by the 
latter to achieve this goal might or might not be in the interest of the former. 
2. Individuals are assumed to be rational and capable of forming unbiased expectations 
relating to the impact of agency problems and the associated future value of their 
wealth. 
There are three types of agency problems that are considered in the agency theory literature18. 
These are: 
1. Partial ownership of the firm by the owner-MGR might provide an incentive to 
consume non-pecuniary benefits or perquisites beyond that which a 100% owner would 
consume. 
2. The existence of debt finance under limited liability provides an incentive to 
shareholders to engage in high-risk projects that transfer wealth from lenders to 
shareholders. Debt finance under limited liability might motivate shareholders to forgo 
new profitable investments, which benefit only lenders. Debt finance might also reduce 
the market value of the firm when disputes between shareholders and lenders are 
resolved through the process of costly bankruptcy. 
3. There is a problem of information asymmetry. The problem emerges when the MGR, 
assumed to be acting in the interests of existing principals, attempts to attract new 
capital from outsiders (new providers of capital). The MGR possesses inside 
information on the future value of the firm, but he cannot convey all the necessary 
information to the market because of a moral hazard problem. 
AT is relevant to the situation of an Islamic bank. For example, the financial statement-preparer 
is accountable to various categories of investors including IAHs whose returns on their invested 
funds must be calculated on a profit-and-loss-sharing basis. Islamic profit-and-loss-sharing 
18 For example, see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Barnea et. al.., 1985 and Archer, et. al., 1998 
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investment accounts run on the basis of a Mudaraba contract. According to a Mudaraba 
contract the IAHs receive their share of the profits or bear their share of the losses, while the 
bank as Mudarib receives a Mudarib's share (commission) in the profits generated from the pool 
of the assets in which the funds are invested. The method of profit calculations involves the 
allocation of profit or loss on the pool of the assets between shareholders and IAHs. These profit 
and loss calculations are not observable by IAHs, i. e., information asymmetry (Archer and 
Karim, 1997, pp. 98-99) 
However, Archer, et. al., 1998, p., 155) mentioned that: 
AT is concerned with, among other things, how to develop a proper system of ex ante incentives as well as 
examining the set of ex ante conditions that produce goal congruence (or reduce the divergence) between the 
interests of shareholders and those of management through appropriate specification of the employment contract. 
The shareholders can protect their interests through the effectiveness of bonding and monitoring 
covenants to reduce the agency problem. In this regard, Leftwich et. al., 1981, pp., 56-57) 
pointed out that: 
Of course, the holders of outside capital are aware of the potential agency problems and anticipate the behaviour of 
agents when they price their claims. Agents have the incentive to devote resources to reduce the divergence 
between their actual behaviour and that desired by the principal. The principal can constrain and monitor the agents' 
behaviour and the agents can offer to impose certain restrictions on their own behaviour through bonding 
arrangements, rather than have holders of outside capital price the claims to reflect all the anticipated divergence. 
In other words, the MGR (agent) agrees to enter into `bonding' arrangements, which bind him to 
act in the shareholders' interests. Moreover, `monitoring' arrangements such as periodic 
financial statements permit shareholders to observe MGR's actions or to check whether 
`bonding' arrangements are being followed. 
It can be stated that there is an issue of the users' right to be provided with the information in 
financial statements and notes. In practice, users' rights to access information need to be 
balanced against preparers' (agents) desire for privacy (Ijiri, 1975). If the preparer restricts 
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monitoring arrangement on the grounds of privacy, he must accept the potential residual loss in 
the market value of the firm. 
The role of accounting standards and auditing as monitoring devices is to control MGRs' actions 
as to whether they act in the interests of the provider of funds. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
cited some examples of the role of accounting and auditing as monitoring arrangements. 
Lending arrangements between firms' MGRs and their banks (lenders) often require firms to 
maintain interest coverage ratios above a certain level. This generates demand for accounting 
earnings to determine whether the interest coverage is met. The EA of the firm contracts with 
debtholders to report any observed breach of restrictive covenants (e. g., the interest coverage 
ratio covenant). Audited earnings numbers are also used in a bonus plan. In other words, a 
MGR (agent) might pay additional costs (bonding costs) to ensure that he will not harm the 
existing principals or they will be compensated if he does that's. 
3.3 Main factors influencing MGR's reaction to new accounting regulations 
3.3.1 Signaling problem 
Signaling theory assumes that firms have incentives to disclose information voluntarily to the 
stock market even if there are no disclosure requirements. This is because they need to raise 
their capital at low cost. Following Lev (1988), Wolk and Tearney (1997, p., 16) argued that: 
The ability of the firm to raise capital will be improved if the firm has a good reputation with respect to financial 
reporting. In addition, good reporting would lower a firm's cost of capital because there is less uncertainty about 
firms that report more extensively and reliably; therefore, there is less investment risk and a lower required rate of 
return. 
A listed company with high profit motivates its MGR to provide greater information because it 
increases investors' confidence, which in turn, improves its market value (i. e., reduces agency 
costs of equity) and makes external financing easier and cheaper. Therefore, the market induces 
19 See Jensen and Meckling, (1976), Watts and Zimmerman (1986), Kelly (1983) and Archer and Karim (1997) 
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all companies with good results to send signals to the market. Moreover, firms whose share 
prices are undervalued have an incentive to expend additional resources to signal that fact. By 
contrast, those firms whose share prices are overvalued would implicitly signal that fact by 
disclosing no additional information (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, pp. 165-166). 
The signaling hypothesis, thus, is that a firm with better financial performance is willing to 
comply with the stock market's requirements for information. This will reduce information 
asymmetry between the insiders (preparers) and outsiders (users). By contrast, a firm with poor 
financial performance is unwilling to comply with market requirements for information which in 
turn tends to increase information asymmetry between preparers and users of financial 
statements, and hence prevents a residual loss in the market value of the firm. 
Positive accounting research attempts to provide an explanation and prediction of MGR's 
reaction to new accounting regulations by using various economic variables. The discussion of 
the following issues draws heavily on Jensen and Meckling (1976), Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986) and Kelly (1983). 
3.3.2 Compensation Plan Model 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) assumed that the management of a firm whose MGRs are also part- 
owners would have an increasing tendency to maximize their own welfare (e. g. amounts of pay 
and perquisites) at the expense of the welfare of the firm's owners as their proportional 
ownership decreased. As discussed in the Jensen and Meckling's study (1976), the effectiveness 
of both bonding and monitoring arrangements would reduce agency costs. MGR's total 
compensation from firms consists of wages, incentive compensation (cash bonuses and stock or 
stock option) and non-pecuniary income including perquisites. However, MGR's manipulation 
of reported earnings would not be entirely restricted, as long as bonding and monitoring 
measures are costly. Therefore, earnings-based bonus plans can be used to explain and predict 
MGR's reactions to new accounting standards. This has led researchers [e. g., Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) and Dhaliwal (1982)] to hypothesize that, other things being constant, MGRs 
of firms with bonus plans are unlikely to favour new or proposed accounting standards that 
reduce reported earnings. 
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3.3.3 Political Costs Model 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) assumed that like private individuals, politicians and bureaucrats 
in the political process maximize their utilities. Under this assumption, the political process is 
described as `a competition for wealth transfer'. Taxes and regulation have the effect of 
transferring wealth to individuals via government services, subsidies, protective tariffs and 
monopolies. The nature of the political process may vary from one society to another. 
Moreover, politicians may be motivated by high reported earnings to regulate monopolistic 
firms. For example, as reported in Watts and Zimmerman (1986), the published reported profits 
influenced politicians and regulators to take actions against firms with high profits (e. g., the US 
oil industry firms at the time of crisis, 1970 -1974). This has led researchers (e. g. Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) to assume that firms with large size (e. g., total assets) are politically more 
sensitive than firms with small size. Some positive accounting researchers (e. g., Watts 
Zimmerman, 1978) have used firm's size as proxy for political costs. It is therefore 
hypothesized that the MGRs of firms with large total assets are more likely to lobby against new 
or proposed accounting standards that increase reported earnings than MGRs of firms with small 
total assets. In short, accounting numbers are used to define or govern various agency 
relationships between interested parties (e. g. agency costs of equity and debt). The incentives 
provided by the political process (to reduce reported earnings) are in direct opposition to the 
incentives given by management compensation plans (to increase reporting income). 
3.4 MGR's reactions to the implementation of accounting disclosure 
standards 
Cerf (1961) investigated the effect of certain characteristics of firms on the extent of disclosure 
in financial statements by firms. The most frequent of these characteristics have been firm size 
and listing status. The methodology used was the disclosure index of 31 weighted items on 
disclosure in 527 American firms. He postulated that the firm's size (in terms of total assets) and 
listing status were likely to explain differences in the firms' disclosure frequency. The findings 
from Cerf's study showed that firm's size (in terms of total assets) and listing status were 
significantly and positively associated with disclosure frequency. 
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Singhvi and Dcsai (1971) studied the impact of certain variables on the frequency of disclosure. 
They hypothesized that the variables mentioned below are likely to explain some variations in 
the frequency of disclosure in the financial statements of firms in the USA and UK. The 
independent variables include; 1/ Firm's size (total 1989 revenues), and 2/ Listing status. 
(NYSE/ASE vs. NASDAQ) 
It was found that disclosure frequency was associated with firms' size for both USA and UK 
accounting disclosures. With regard to listing status, timely disclosures were more frequent on 
the NYSE/ASE than NASDAQ. As expected, disclosure frequency was positively correlated 
with firm size and listing status (Singhavi and Desai, 1971, p., 92)). In short, the results from 
Singhvi and Desai's study indicate that listing status, and firm's size were statistically and 
significantly associated with the frequency of disclosure. 
Leftwich et. al. (1981) investigated cross sectional-variations in the frequency of interim 
financial reporting by listed firms on the stock exchange. They hypothesized that the firm's asset 
structure and use of other monitoring measures (e. g. stock exchange's requirements) are likely to 
explain the difference in disclosure frequency. The independent variables (e, g, firm's size and 
listing status) were examined in relation to the cross-sectional variations in the frequency of the 
external financial reporting. 
The findings from the Leftwich et. al. (1981) study showed that listing status was the only 
variable found to be statistically and significantly associated with the frequency of interim 
reporting. However, Leftwich et al's (1981) study had little success in explaining the cross- 
sectional variations in the frequency of financial reporting. This was because, overall results 
were not strong and the study encountered several methodological problems. 
Frost and Pownal (1994) investigated the effect of certain variables on the periodic accounting 
disclosures in the financial statements by USA and UK firms in 1989. This study was based on 
periodic accounting disclosure of 107 firms. Firms were selected from both the USA (NYSE and 
ASE) and UK. They hypothesized that firm's size and listing status were likely to be associated 
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with disclosure frequency. The findings from the Frost and Pownal study showed that firm's 
size (total assets) and listing status were significantly and positively associated with the 
frequency of disclosure (Frost and Pownal, 1994, pp., 85-100). 
The limitation of the above studies (see the summary of findings in table 3.1 below) suggests that 
other explanatory variables need to be considered, such as information costs. This variable 
might be used to explain variations in MGRs attitudes towards the new disclosure requirements. 
Table 3.1: Summary of the prior studies' findings of disclosure frequency 
Author(s) Independent variables Results 
Cerf (1961) Listing status 
»» 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) Listing status 
39 Firm's size 
S 
Firm's size S 
S 
S 
Leftwich et. all (1981) Total fixed assets/firm value NS 
99 59 Listing status S 
Frost and Pownal (1994) Firm's size (total assets) 
99 
S 
Listing status S 
S: statistically significant. NS: Not statistically significant. 
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3.5 MGR's reactions to new and proposed measurement standards 
A number of empirical studies were conducted and within each study various independent 
variables were tested in relation to the attitudes of the firm MGRs towards new or proposed 
accounting measurement standards. The present section discusses some examples of these 
studies. 
3.5.1 Lobbying positions in the FASB's discussion of General Price Level adjustment 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argued that the major effects of a general price level adjustment 
(GPLA) on a firm's reported earnings took place through depreciation and gain and loss on the 
net monetary assets. In inflationary periods, asset costs on GPLA basis rises, and the GPLA 
depreciation is larger than the historical cost depreciation, thus reducing the firm's reported 
income. Net monetary assets are defined as the difference between the firm's monetary assets 
(e. g. receivables and loans) and its liabilities. Under GPLA, in inflation, if the net monetary 
assets are positive the firm recognizes a holding loss, and if they are negative the firm recognizes 
a holding gain. 
Accordingly, Watts and Zimmerman (1978) assumed that corporate MGRs lobby only if they 
expect the benefits of lobbying to exceed the cost. Thus, MGRs of politically sensitive firms are 
likely to lobby in favour of GPLA, if GPLA reduces reported earnings, while they oppose 
GPLA, if it would increase their firms' reported earnings. As regard, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) identified the independent variables, which are likely to influence MGR's attitudes 
towards the proposed accounting measurement standards. The independent variables include: 
1. Total assets size as a proxy for political costs. 
2. Membership of politically sensitive industry. 
3. Bonus plan 
Given the proposed accounting measurement standard, MGR's position depended on the size of 
the firm (the magnitude of the political costs) and whether the proposed accounting standard 
(GPLA) decreased or increased the firm's reported income. The benefits and costs of the 
proposed accounting standard were expected to vary with the firm size. The sample size of the 
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study was 53 firms. The position of one firm could not be determined, and 18 were classified as 
supporting the proposed measurement standard, and 34 were classified as opposing. 
The findings of Watts and Zimmerman's (1978) study indicated that firm's size (in terms of total 
assets and sales revenue) was found as the only statistically significant variable which explained 
the firms' lobbying position. That is to say, firms with large total assets opposed the proposed 
standard (GPLA) when income was increased (See Table 3.2 below). The findings of this study 
confirm the relationship between size and MGR's attitudes toward the GPLA. Hence the most 
important factor explaining managerial voting behaviour on GPLA is the firm size. However, 
the test of significance for the bonus plan is found to be statistically insignificant because the 
GPLA would have no direct effect on the compensation plan. 
Table 3.2: The findings of Watts and Zimmerman's study (1978) 
Independent variables GPLA 
Firm's size (total assets) S 
Membership of politically sensitive industry NS 
A bonus plan NS 
S: statistically significant. NS: Not statistically significant. 
3.5.2 Lobbying positions on the FASB's proposed standard for interest costs 
Before the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, firms had freedom of choice between capitalization 
and expensing of interest costs on funds borrowed to construct assets not yet producing revenue. 
The shift from capitalization to expensing of interest costs would reduce the firms' incomes in 
the short term. Dhaliwal (1982, pp., 255-265) investigated the lobbying positions on the FASB's 
discussion memorandum on Statement No. 34 relating to accounting for interest costs. 
Large firms (measured by total assets) were predicted to oppose interest capitalization, since 
higher reported earnings attract the attention of politicians and regulators, thereby resulting in 
tax, political and regulatory costs to the large firms. Moreover, firms with bonus plans were 
anticipated to support interest capitalization in so far as higher reported earnings would increase 
income and bonus. 
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Dhaliwal's sample was 30 firms opposing capitalization and 14 firms opposing expensing 
interest costs. Financial data was obtained for 1977, the year of discussion memorandum period 
of the standard. The results of the Dhaliwal's study showed a statistically insignificant 
difference for firms' size and bonus plan. 
Table 3.3: The findings of Dhaliwal's study (1982) 
Independent variables Lobbying against mandated accounting change 
Firm size (total assets) NS 
A bonus plan NS 
S: statistically significant. NS: Not statistically significant 
3.5.3 Corporate lobbying and changes in financing or operating activities 
Kelly (1982, pp. 153-173) investigated corporate lobbying and changes in financing or operating 
activities for the FASB's standard on foreign currency translation. The main effect of change 
from FAS 8 to FAS 52 was to reduce volatility in reported earnings, since currency translation 
gains/losses were taken directly to equity capital under FAS 52. Agency costs were used to 
explain MGR's oppositions to the exposure draft of the FAS 52 and subsequent financing and 
operating decisions. This led Kelly to hypothesize that fine, which lobbied against the standard, 
would also make financing or operating changes after its passage. 
Kelly's sample was 52 U. S firms. 14 firms lobbied against the standard; 16 firms lobbied for the 
standard; whereas 2 firms did not show their positions on the standard. The findings of the Kelly 
study showed no statistically significant association between MGRs' reactions to the proposed 
measurement standard and their actions with regard to financing and operating changes. On the 
other hand, the findings indicated that firms that had greater proportions of incentive 
compensation, large size (total assets), and lower proportional management ownership undertook 
lobbying activities. Only firms with large size (total assets) were significantly associated with 
financing and operating decisions to overcome the impact of the accounting change. 
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Table 3.4: The findings of Kelly's study (1982) 
Literature Review 
Independent variables Lobbing for or against 
the proposed standard 
Financing or operating changes 
Total assets S S 
Incentive compensation/ total 
management remuneration 
S NS 
A bonus plan S NS 
Management percentage ownership S NS 
S: statistically significant. NS: Not statistically significant 
3.6 Summary and concluding remarks 
The analyses of the previous studies did not provide clear conclusions, as they focused on 
different models, constructs and variables. Explanations for selecting firm's characteristics were 
examined including agency costs, political costs, information asymmetry, signaling, 
compensation plan and capital needs. Positive accounting research over the years has examined 
the determinants of MGRs' reactions to the implementation of regulatory disclosure and 
accounting measurement standards. A number of empirical studies were conducted and within 
each study various independent variables were tested in relation to the MGRs' positions towards 
regulating disclosure in financial reporting and new or proposed accounting measurement 
standards. 
As for regulatory disclosure, the most frequently used independent variables have been firm's 
size and listing status. For example, firm's size, (as measured by total assets or market value of 
the firm), was statistically found to be significantly and positively associated with the frequency 
of disclosure. Listing status was also found to be significantly and positively associated with the 
frequency of disclosure (e. g. Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman's (1981)). With regard to new 
and proposed measurement standards the bonus plan variable received a little support (e. g., 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, Dhaliwal, 1982 and Kelly, 1982). Total assets and membership of 
a politically sensitive industry as proxy for political costs produced modest support (e. g., Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1978, Dhaliwal, 1982 and Kelly, 1982). The limitations of the findings suggest 
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other independent variables such as information costs, which might be used to explain variations 
in the MGRs' attitudes towards, and opinions on, new set of regulatory standards. 
As mentioned in chapter 2 above, the implementation of new accounting standards would attract 
the attention of preparers of financial statements (e. g., MGRs). Nevertheless, the 
implementation of AAOIFi's accounting standards raises a number of issues similar to those 
raised by the existing accounting literature in Western countries where listed and unregulated 
firms operate. These issues include the reception of the standards by financial statements 
preparers, whose attitudes may have an important bearing on the success of the implementation. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to examine preparers' opinions about, and compliance with 
AAOIFi's accounting standards in Sudan where publicly-owned and regulated banks operate. In 
the light of previous academic work (theoretical and empirical) on such matters, but also taking 
into account the institutional and cultural differences between Sudan and developed Western 
countries to which this previous work relates. 
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Chapter 4 
The Evaluation of Audit Risk by External Auditors 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the research literature on factors influencing the 
evaluation of the implications of the audit risk and business risk. The limited literature on 
auditors' evaluation of the implications for the risk associated with the application of new 
accounting standards has led the researcher to use an indirect approach. The indirect approach 
includes literature on types of conventional audit risk and business risk and factors influencing 
the evaluation of such risks by EAs. The approach is based on the assumption that the 
normative audit risk and business risk are used to measure the actual evaluation of the 
implications of audit risk by the EA. Hence, it may be used to formulate theoretical 
propositions relating to EA's opinions on, and attitudes towards, the evaluation of the 
implications for the risk associated with the implementation of AAOIFI accounting standards. 
In a normative way, EAs have been asked to evaluate the elements of the audit risk and risk 
implication for audit practices in response to increasing risk that a client's financial statements 
would contain material misstatements. Misstatements, however, can arise from either of two 
sources; errors [i. e., unintentional misstatements] or irregularities [i. e., intentional 
misstatements]. On the other hand, EAs respond to the evaluation of the business risk - the 
auditor's business risk is the risk of damage to the auditor's professional practice (e. g. 
litigation and reputation) due to client's business risk. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: 
Section 2 defines the audit risk model (ARM) and business risk. Section 3 compares and 
contrasts audit risk to business risk. Related literature on factors influencing the evaluation of 
the implications of normative audit risk and business risk is examined in section 4. Section 5 
provides a summary and concluding remarks. 
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4.2 Definitions of the audit risk and business risk 
4.2.1 The audit risk model (ARM) 
According to the Statement of Auditing Standard (SAS) 300, audit risk is defined as `the risk 
that the auditors may give an inappropriate opinion on financial statements" (Scannell, (1998, 
p., 42). In other words, the auditee's assertions20 may contain material misstatements 
exceeding tolerable error at the end of the audit, and an invalid conclusion may be drawn from 
those assertions (Professional standards, AICPA, AU). Thus, an inappropriate opinion will be 
given on the financial statements, because of an undetected, undisclosed material 
misstatement due to error, fraud or irregularities. Statement of Auditing Standard No. 47 
(AICPA, 1997a) requires auditors to use the ARM as part of the audit planning process. The 
presentation of the ARM, including variable definitions, is given in Appendix 3 below. 
4.2.2 Business risk 
The business risk is the risk that an entity's business objectives will not be achieved as a result 
of the external and internal factors, pressures and forces that are brought to bear on the entity 
and, ultimately, the risk associated with the entity's survival and profitability. More 
specifically, the auditor's business risk is defined as: "the risk of loss or injury to an auditor's 
professional practice due to client relationships" (Houston, et al., 1999, p. 282). 
Business risk occurs at two levels, namely: 
At client or auditee level: business risk includes commercial risk and fiduciary (litigation) risk. 
It should be noted that business risk, which occurs at the auditee level, is outside the scope of 
the present study. 
At audit firm level: business risk includes litigation risk and reputation risk. The litigation 
risk arises because shareholders or creditors might incur a loss large enough to motivate them 
to bring a lawsuit against EAs (e. g. Pratt and Stice, 1994). The reputation risk arises if an EA 
is found to be less competent and independent than expected, the audit firm's reputation is 
damaged and the present value of the auditor's service is reduced (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986, pp., 315-1). 
20 Professional standards state five assertions relating to each account. These are completeness, existence 
accuracy, valuation and ownership. 
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4.3 Comparison between audit risk and business risk 
Based on the definition of the ARM, the model is concerned with the risks associated with 
issuing unqualified opinions on a client's financial statements that contain material 
misstatements. Business risk is concerned with risk that arises if an auditor makes a negligent 
statement, so that he or she may be liable to shareholders or creditors. The primary costs 
associated with business risk relate to litigation and reputation risk, namely whether the 
exposure leads to auditors being held liable for a client's shareholders' losses (Houston, et al., 
1999). Business risk, therefore, includes additional factors over and above the audit risk 
associated with issuing unqualified opinions on materially misstated financial statements. 
4.4 Factors influencing the evaluation of audit risk and business risk 
4.4.1 Factors affecting the evaluation of audit risk 
Scannell (1998) identified some factors that tend to influence the evaluation of audit risk. 
These factors include: 
a. Nature of client's business: 
A Company may operate in a highly competitive industry. This would place a pressure on 
staff to make sales to customers with high credit risks, and would also affect the pricing policy 
with implications for inventory valuation. For these reasons an auditor will have to carry out 
additional audit work in relation to receivables in order to reduce collectibility risk. Thus, it is 
assumed that the size of receivables is likely to affect the evaluation of the implication of audit 
risk associated with collectibility of receivables. 
b. Numerous locations: 
Scannell (1998) pointed out that a major problem with branches is their control. Auditors 
would have to consider the number of branches and their location. The auditors should ensure 
that the information kept at the branches is adequate for audit purposes. She argued that the 
number of locations presents a risk to the auditor, as it is unlikely the auditor would be able to 
visit all branches and therefore, he or she needs to rely on returns from branches. Therefore, it 
might be assumed that the number of branches will increase the audit risk associated with 
issuing unqualified opinions on financial statements that contain material misstatements. 
42 
Chapter 4 The Assessment of Audit Risk 
Hence, large number of branches may have an effect on the evaluation of the implications of 
audit risk by EAs. 
4.4.2 Factors that influence the assessment of business risk 
Pratt and Stice (1994) investigated the effect of the client's characteristics on the EAs' 
evaluation of business risk and recommendations for more audit evidence and more fees. 
They identified five independent variables, (a) client's financial condition, (b) asset structure 
(levels of accounts receivable and inventory to value of total assets), (c) sales growth, (d) 
market value of equity, and (e) variability in stock price performance. They also identified 
five dependent variables, (i ) probability of an audit failure, (ii) capital provider losses, (iii) 
audit evidence required, and (iv) audit fee. 
As for asset structure [debtors and inventories] variable, the results indicated that the 
proportion of receivables to total assets would relate positively to a high level of audit risk 
and a need for more audit evidence and fees. In other words, clients with high proportion of 
receivables to total assets were more risky to audit and consequently more audit fees were 
required (Pratt and Stice, 1994, p., 640). 
4.5 Summary and concluding remarks 
The audit risk model is designed to help EAs to manage risks associated with issuing an 
unqualified opinion on financial statements that contain undetected material misstatements. 
Nevertheless, business risk encompasses additional factors that are not explicitly reflected in 
the ARM. 
Scannell (1998) identified some factors to evaluate the implications of audit risk. These 
factors include nature of client's business and numerous locations. Scannell's study provided 
no empirical results on factors influencing the evaluation of audit risk by EAs. 
Pratt and Stice (1994) investigated the effect of client characteristics on the evaluation of the 
business risk, the level of audit evidence and fees required. The findings indicated that clients 
with high proportion of receivables to total assets were more risky to audit. Consequently, 
more audit evidence and fees are required. This suggests that the client's collectibility of 
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receivables policy is a primary consideration in the EA's actual evaluation of audit risk and in 
recommendations for additional audit evidence and fees required. 
The empirical testing of theoretical propositions derived from the normative business risk 
provides justification for their use in the present study, as a source of propositions about 
auditors' opinions on, and attitudes towards, the evaluation of the audit risk associated with 
the application of new accounting standards. On the other hand, environmental differences 
(namely culture and institutional differences), between the USA from which most theories on 
auditing are borrowed and Sudan to which these theories might be applied in present thesis, 
have implications for most of the literature reviewed and thereby on Islamic auditing. In 
particular, Sudanese banks belong to a largely nationalised and regulated banking industry that 
may be risky and expensive to audit. 
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Part III: Research Methodology and Methods of Data Analysis 
CHAPTER 5 
Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
As already mentioned in chapter 1, attitudes of preparers of financial statements toward new 
accounting standards have received much attention in the accounting research literature. This 
attention has mostly been in Western countries. With regard to the distinction and relationship 
between attitudes and opinions, it might be argued that attitudes have a reference to the 
respondents' views or feelings toward a phenomenon, whilst opinions are the verbal expression 
of such attitudes (Clark et al, 1998, p.: 117). However, individuals' expressions of opinions may 
be treated as indicators of attitudes, and this is very common in accounting research (for more 
details see section 6.2 in Chapter 6 below). This study elicits respondents' attitudes towards, and 
opinions about, the implementation of new accounting standards. A major interest of the present 
study is that it examines the issues in question in the setting of an emerging market economy, 
namely that of Sudan. The study also considers the opinions of EAs on the implementation of 
new accounting standards, an important topic on which there appears to be relatively little 
research literature. The present chapter discusses the research methodology used in this study of 
preparers' and auditors' attitudes towards opinions on, and, the implementation of the new 
accounting standards issued by the AAOIFI. 
Most textbooks (e. g. Saunders et at. 2000) describe research as a multi-stage process that ought 
to be followed in order to carry out and complete a research project. The precise number of 
research stages does vary considerably. However, these usually include formulating and 
clarifying the research topic, reviewing the related literature, selecting a research method, 
collecting data, analyzing data and writing up the thesis report (Saunders et al. 2000, p. 4). This 
study is based on a research process, which is presented in a book on research methods for 
business students (Saunders et al. 2000). What is described in the present chapter and the next 
one is a series of inter-linked stages, which led the researcher to finalize his research questions 
and to design the necessary research instrument (. See Figure 5 below, which provides an overall 
description of the research design). 
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Figure 5: The design of the present research 
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The remainder of this chapter is divided as follows: 
Section 2 defines the research questions and objectives. Section 3 provides the research design. 
Section 4 summaries reviews of related literature. Section 5 develops theoretical propositions 
regarding opinions of the bank MGRs and EAs about the implementation of AAOIFI's 
accounting standards. Summary and concluding remarks are provided in section 6. 
5.2 The research questions and objectives 
Saunders et al (2000) stated that: "before you start your research you need to have at least some 
idea of what you want to do". They added that without clarity on what you are going to research, 
it is difficult to plan how you are going to research it (Saunders et al. 2000, p. 12). Accordingly, 
identifying and clarifying a research topic is the starting point in undertaking a research project. 
Initially, this researcher started his research with the topic about the potential problems of 
implementing AAOIFI's accounting standards (hereafter referred to as accounting standards) in 
Islamic banks in Sudan. After consultation with the supervisors of this thesis, the researcher 
decided to amend the topic to explore the relationship between the characteristics of an Islamic 
bank (e. g., ownership) and the opinions of MGRs and EAs about the implementation of 
accounting standards. The study thus focuses on the opinions of preparers (MGRs) and EAs 
about the implementation of the accounting standards (as a new phenomenon) within the context 
of Islamic banks in Sudan. 
5.2.1 The research questions 
The topic of this study having been identified, it follows that research questions have to be 
addressed. Saunders et al. (2000) argued that it is often an important starting point in defining 
questions to begin with one general focus research question. The general question flows from 
the basic research ideas. This may lead to several more detailed questions. 
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As mentioned above, the topic is concerned with MGR's and EA's attitudes towards, and 
opinions on, the implementation of accounting standards. Therefore, the following general 
questions need to be addressed and investigated (See Table 5.1 below). 
> To what extent do MGRs display positive or negative attitudes towards, and opinions on, 
the implementation of the accounting standards and why? 
> How do Islamic banks differ in their actual implementation of AAOIFI's accounting 
standards and why? 
How do EAs evaluate the implications for audit risk associated with the implementation 
of AAOIFI's accounting standards and why? 
> What are the main findings of the research that could be addressed in future research? 
5.2.2 The research objectives 
Having formulated the overall research questions, what follows defines the general objectives of 
this study, which are: 
1. To examine MGRs' attitudes towards, and opinions about, the implementation of 
accounting standards. 
2. To compare and contrast the implementation of accounting standards in a number of 
Islamic banks in Sudan. 
3. To examine EAs' evaluation of the implications for audit risk associated with the 
implementation of accounting standards. 
4. To explore issues relating to the findings of the research, which could be addressed in 
future research. 
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Table 5.1 Phrasing research questions as research objectives 
Research Methodology 
Research questions Research objectives 
I- How much do MGRS agree or disagree in their ' 1. To examine MGRS attitudes towards and 
attitudes towards, and their opinions on the 
opinions about the implementation of the 
implementation of the accounting standards and 
accounting standards. 
why? 
1-a To identify variables, which influence MGRs' 
attitudes towards, and opinions about,, the 
implementation of the disclosure standard. 
1-b To identify variabless, which influence MGRs' 
attitudes to, and opinions about, the 
implementation of the measurement standards. 
2- How do banks differ in their actual compliance with 2-a To compare and contrast the implementation of 
the accounting standards and why? 
the accounting standards in a number of Islamic 
banks in Sudan. 
2-b To identify variables, which affect the banks' 
actual compliance with the accounting 
standards. 
3- How do EAs evaluate the implications for audit risk 
3a- To examine EAs' evaluation of the implications 
associated with the implementation of the accounting 
for audit risk associated with the implementation 
standards and why? 
of the accounting standards. 
3b- To identify variables, which influence EAs' 
evaluation of the implications for audit risk 
associated with the implementation of the 
accounting standards. 
4- What are the main findings of the research that could be 4- To explore issues relating to the findings of the 
addressed in future research? research, which could be addressed in future 
research 
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5.3 Research design 
Aaker et al (1998, p. 73) defined research design as "a detailed blueprint used to guide a research 
study towards its objectives and this involves a number of interrelated decisions". Moreover, 
Yin (1994, p. 19) stated that research design is a logical sequence that connects empirical data to 
its initial study questions, and ultimately, to its conclusions. Sekaran (2000, p. 121) mentioned 
that research design entails a series of rational decision-making choices. The most important 
one is to make a decision on the choice of the research strategy; that is, to determine how the 
research objectives are to be achieved. 
Research strategy 
In order to select an appropriate strategy for the present research study, the researcher examined 
possible alternative research strategies. There are several strategies for doing social science 
research, which include case studies, experiments, surveys, histories and analyses of archival 
information. Each strategy involves a different way of collecting and analyzing empirical 
evidence (Yin, 1994, p. 3). The use of each strategy depends upon three conditions: (1) the type 
of research question, (2) whether an investigator has control over actual behavioural events, and 
(3) whether the focus is on contemporary as compared to historical phenomena. The importance 
of each of the three conditions, in distinguishing among the aforementioned five strategies, is 
examined below. 
Yin (1994) pointed out that some types of "what" questions might either be exploratory (in an 
exploratory study any type of the five research strategies can be used) or about the prevalence of 
a phenomenon (in which a survey or the analysis of archival records would be appropriate). The 
second type of "what" question would be a form of a "how many" or "how much" line of 
inquiry. For instance a survey can be carried out to enumerate the "how many, " whereas a case 
study would not be the preferred strategy in this situation. He then added that "how" and "why" 
questions are likely to favour the use of case studies, experiments or histories. For example, if 
the investigator wants to know "how" a community successfully thwarted a proposed highway 
he might be better off using a case study or a history (Yin, 1994, p. 6). `How" and "why" can be 
studied by either a case study or a survey. Yin (1994) further stated that if "how" and "why" 
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questions are the focus of the study, a further distinction among case studies, experiments and 
histories can be made. That is the extent of investigators' control over behavioural events and 
whether the degree of focus is on contemporary issues. He also mentioned that histories are the 
preferred strategy when there is virtually no access or control. He stressed that the case study is 
the preferred method in examining contemporary events, when the relevant behaviour cannot be 
manipulated. In contrast, experiments are performed when an investigator can manipulate 
behaviour directly. It can also be argued that the case study approach depends on many of the 
same techniques as those of history. However, it provides additional sources of evidential 
information from participant-observation and systematic interviewing. Case studies are typically 
based on two or more methods of data collection. The use of multiple sources of evidence 
allows case studies to present more rounded and complete accounts of social issues and 
processes. Whether the case study is descriptive or explanatory, the use of multiple sources of 
evidence (e. g. in-depth interview, large-scale structured survey, participant and non- participant 
observation makes the case study one of the most powerful research designs. 
In short, the case study can be used when "how" and "why" questions are being asked about 
contemporary events over which a researcher has no control. However, more than one strategy 
can be used in any given study (e. g. a survey within a case study). In the light of the above 
discussion, preparers' and EAs' attitudes towards, and opinions on, the implementation of 
AAOIFI accounting standards can be addressed by a survey within a case study approach, as 
described in Chapter 6 below. 
The case study is a separate research strategy that has its own research designs. Yin (1994, 
pp. 38-51) cited four types of designs that are relevant for case studies, namely; 
(a) single case (holistic) designs 
(b) single case (embedded) designs 
(c) multiple case (holistic) designs and 
(d) multiple case (embedded) designs. 
For a single case study, a holistic approach involves a single unit of analysis, (i. e., if the study 
examines the nature of the whole organization, a holistic case study design is used). A single 
case (embedded) design involves multiple sub-units of analysis within a single unit. As for 
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multiple case studies, a holistic approach involves a number of single units of analysis, and 
embedded case studies involve multiple sub-units within multiple units of analysis. The 
difference between the two designs resides in the type of phenomenon being studied. When an 
embedded design is used, each individual case study may involve the collection and analysis of 
quantitative data. Thus, a survey may be used within a case study (i. e. structured questionnaire- 
based survey within case study (Yin, 1994, p. 51)). 
The decision as to which of these to select depends upon (a) the reasons for the choice of the 
research topic and (b) how much the researcher might wish to generalize from a particular case 
study (Clark et al, 1998, p. 108). These questions need to be considered seriously. Yin (1994, p. 
30) emphasized that case studies are generalizable to theoretical propositions. Moreover, Hakin 
(1987, p. 42) observed that: 
At the most rigorous level, case studies are designed to achieve experimental isolation of selected social factors or 
processes within a real life context so as to provide strong tests of prevailing explanations and ideas. 
Therefore, it is necessary to have an adequate theoretical framework to permit testing and 
making generalizations about theoretical propositions (See Section 5.5 below). 
Indeed, evidence and theoretical conclusions drawn from a multiple case study might prove to be 
far more powerful. However, the objective of a study may be to investigate a `one-off' situation. 
The single case study thus becomes an appropriate design under the following circumstances 
(Yin, 1994, pp. 38-49): 
1- When the single case represents the critical case in testing a well-formulated theory. 
2- When an investigator has an opportunity to observe and analyze a phenomenon 
previously inaccessible to scientific investigation. 
3- When the case represents an extreme or unique case. 
The present study employs a case study approach, using Sudan as a single (embedded) case study 
design. The reasons for this are as follows: 
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1- Sudan represents a critical case in testing whether the theoretical propositions 
(frameworks) developed in Western countries can help explain the accounting 
phenomenon in the context of a developing market economy. 
2- A research opportunity is provided by the introduction of a set of new accounting 
standards (AAOIFI's accounting standards) in a developing market economy like Sudan, 
where a substantial degree of state ownership exists. 
3- Sudan is the only country with both state-owned and privately owned banks in which all 
banks operate according to Islamic Shari'a rules and principles. 
4- Using Sudan as a single case (embedded) study permits an in-depth investigation when 
compared to using a survey including another country that had adopted AAOIFI 
accounting standards (e. g. Bahrain). 
These are the main reasons, which make Sudan scientifically interesting as a single case. The 
reasons for using an embedded case study design are that individual banks and audit firms in 
Sudan present themselves as appropriate sub-units of analysis for the purpose of this research 
(See also Chapter 6 Section 6.6 below). 
A research study may be cross-sectional or longitudinal. The research study may be cross- 
sectional (i. e. the study of particular phenomenon at a particular time). This is because most 
research studies undertaken for academic courses are necessarily time consuming. However, the 
main strength of longitudinal research study is the capacity that it has to study change and 
development. Due to time and budget constrains, the present research study will be cross- 
sectional, the focus being on the opinions and attitudes of MGRs and EAs towards the 
implementation of accounting standards at a particular time. 
As mentioned earlier, a major interest of this study is to see to what extent the independent 
variables, advanced in well-developed market economies (e. g. USA), are useful in explaining the 
opinions of managers and auditors about new accounting standards in Sudan. Yet, due to the 
different environment (e. g. institutional differences) between the USA and Sudan, the 
independent variables derived from Western accounting literature might not have the same 
explanatory power in Sudan, as they do in the USA.. Hence, the theoretical propositions I 
through 7, which are developed in section 5.5 below, need to be further investigated; identifying 
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the important features of the country, where regulated and nationalized Islamic banks operate, 
developing an understanding of them, and conceptualizing them for further research. 
5.4 Review of related literature 
According to Saunders et al. (2000, p. 44): 
A critical literature review will form the foundation on which the research study is built. The 
main purpose of a literature review is to help the researcher to develop a good understanding of 
relevant prior research, as well as to gain insight into emerging trends. The relevant literature 
was reviewed with the aim of summarizing the main findings of the previous research literature. 
The main sources of the literature review were books and periodical journals. For this study, the 
research literature was reviewed in chapter 3 and 4 above, and examined the following: 
1. MGRs' attitudes towards the regulatory disclosure (e. g. accounting disclosure standards). 
2. MGRs' attitudes towards accounting measurement standards. 
3. EAs' attitudes towards the actual evaluation of the Audit Risk (ARM) and business risk. 
5.4.1 Regulatory disclosure 
As noted in chapter 3 above, positive accounting researchers (e. g. Watts and Zimmerman 1986, 
and Kelly 1993) attempted to explain and predict the behaviour of MGR towards regulatory 
disclosure. The most important independent variables have been firm's size, and listing status. 
Firm's size, as measured by the value of total assets, firm's market value, or sales, has been 
found to be significantly and positively associated with MGRs' attitudes toward the level of 
disclosure (e. g. Frost and Pownal (1994). Size variable has been used as proxy for political 
costs21. As for, listing status, as used to represent capital needs, this was found to be 
significantly and positively associated with MGRs' attitudes towards the implementation of 
regulatory disclosure requirements (e. g. Leftwich, 1981, Frost and Pownal, 1994). 
21 Watts and Zimmerman (1986, pp. 251-252) cited four variables that are used as proxies for political costs. These 
are size, risk, capital intensity and industry concentration 
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5.4.2 Accounting measurement standards 
As noted in chapter 3 above, positive accounting researchers explain and predict MGRs' 
attitudes towards measurement standards. The most important independent variables are bonus 
plan and the firm's size in terms of value of total assets. With respect to the bonus plan variable, 
some prior studies showed that it was found to be significantly associated with MGRs' attitudes 
towards accounting measurement standards (e. g., Watts and Zimmerman 1978). As for firm's 
size (value of total assets) as a proxy for political costs, previous studies indicated that firm's 
size was found to be significantly positively associated with MGRs' attitudes towards the 
measurement standards (e. g. Watts and Zimmerman, 1978 and Kelly, 1982). 
5.4.3 The actual evaluation of the ARM and business risk 
As explained in chapter 4 above, there is a lack of research literature on EAs' attitudes towards 
the assessment of audit risk associated with new accounting standards. For this reason, models 
from the normative professional literature on auditing were used in order to formulate some 
theoretical propositions. These propositions concern the evaluation of audit risk associated with 
the implementation of the accounting standards. More specifically, the normative professional 
literature on the audit risk (ARM) and business risk was examined in this study. In regard to the 
ARM, the nonnative professional literature on auditing is based on the assumption that some 
variables are likely to influence the assessment of audit risk by EAs. The most important 
independent variables are the size of receivables to total assets, rapid growth in business and 
numerous locations, but prior studies have provided no empirical results. As for business risk 
(e. g., litigation risk), prior research is based on the assumption that a client's characteristics are 
likely to influence the auditors' evaluation of the implications for business risk. The most 
important factor is the proportion of receivables to the value of total assets. The proportion of 
receivables variable is found to be significantly and positively associated with the assessment of 
the implications for the business risk (e. g., Pratt and Stice 1994). The empirical testing of 
theoretical propositions derived from the business risk provides justification for its use in this 
research study, as a source of propositions about EAs' opinions on the implementation of the 
accounting standards. 
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5.5 Development of theoretical propositions 
Having reviewed related literature, what follows is the formulation of the theoretical 
propositions relating to the implementation of a new set of accounting standards by Islamic 
banks. This research study seeks to examine an Islamic bank's characteristics as independent 
variables (See Table 5.2 below) that would be helpful to explain variations in opinions of MGRs 
and EAs about the implementation of the accounting standards. The study did not include the 
religious beliefs of the respondents as an independent variable. The reason for this is that all 
respondents were Muslims and belong to Maliki school of thought, and hence this variable as 
such, would not be helpful in explaining variations between MGRs or EAs in their attitudes 
towards and opinions on, the implementation of the accounting standards. A study seeking to 
examine the role of religious belief in respondents' attitudes towards, and opinions on, 
compliance with AAOIFI's accounting standards would have been a different study and would 
have had to develop some measures of respondents' concepts of religious duty. 
A crucial issue that needs to be considered in this study is that the difference in institutional 
context between Sudan (where MGRs work in regulated and in some cases publicly-owned 
banks) and the context in which the theoretical propositions are based, namely on data about 
listed, unregulated general trading firms in the USA. Specifically, the macro economic structure 
in Sudan is characterized by a mixed market economy, where publicly and privately owned 
banks operate and the role of the state in the national economy is significant. Moreover, Islamic 
banks operate using financial instruments and Shari 'a compliant transactions, which are 
categorically different from those used by conventional banks. These bring about the need for 
AAOIFI's accounting standards to regulate financial reporting. Another major difference is that 
the study examines issues in the setting of an emerging market economy, as exemplified by the 
role of the KSE. Due to these differences, the theoretical propositions advanced in Western 
countries (e. g., USA), need to he reformulated in order to cope with the specificities of the 
banking sector in Sudan. 
The theoretical propositions are thus based on the main findings of prior research literature, as 
well as by referring to AAOIFI's accounting standards (FASI, 2,3,4,6 and 7). These 
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propositions regarding attitudes and opinions of MGRs and EAs about the implementation of the 
accounting standards are as follows: 
Propositions 1-2 concern MGRs' attitudes towards, and opinions about, the implementation 
of the disclosure standard and relate to question 2 in section A( see Appendix 4 below). 
Propositions 3-5 concern MGRs' attitudes towards, and opinions about, the implementation 
of AAOIFI's measurement standards and relate to questions 2 in section B1-B5 (see 
Appendices 5-9 below). 
Propositions 6-7 deal with EAs' evaluation of the implications for audit risk associated with 
the implementation of AAOIFI's accounting standards and relate to question2 in section C 
(see Appendix 10 below). 
5.5.1 MGRS' attitudes toward, and opinions about, the implementation of the disclosure 
standard 
Proposition I 
Cost of compliance proposition 
Intuitively, the implementation of a new disclosure standard would entail additional costs on the 
part of management. The preparation of the firm's financial statements according to new 
disclosure standards will involve additional workload on the part of the MGRs. Moreover, it 
creates a demand for training courses for the staff working for the firm. In addition, audit 
services are required to implement the new disclosure standards. Due to the costs of compliance 
associated with the requirements of new disclosure standards, the MGTs of the firms will be less 
receptive to new disclosure standards. 
The preparation of an Islamic bank's financial statements, in accordance with AAOIFI's 
disclosure standard (FAS 1), will thus create additional costs for the bank and it involves 
additional workload on the part of its management. Moreover, it creates demand for training 
courses for the staff working for the bank, as well as for audit services to implement the AAOIFI 
disclosure standard (hereafter referred to as the standard). In other words, the implementation of 
the standard requires well-trained staff working for these banks at branches, regional and office 
levels. This means that the bank incurs extra costs for training its staff. The larger the number 
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of branches the higher the costs of compliance with the standard. This implies that the MGRs of 
banks with a larger number of branches are required to spend more time and effort in 
implementing the standard than MGRs of banks with a smaller number of branches. It is 
expected that banks with a larger number of branches will be less receptive to the 
implementation of the standard. It is therefore, proposed that: 
Proposition 1: MGRs of banks with a large number of branches will show less positive attitudes 
towards, and opinions about, the implementation of the standard than MGRs of banks with a 
smaller number of branches. 
Proposition 2 
Listing status proposition 
A number of authors (e. g., Lev, 1988 and Wolk and Tearney, 1997) have argued that the ability 
of the firm to raise capital will be improved if the firm has a good reputation with respect to 
financial reporting. Moreover, good financial reporting would lower a firm's cost of capital 
since there is less uncertainty about firms that report more extensively and reliably, and 
therefore, there is less investment risk and a lower required rate of return. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986) assume that firms whose share prices are undervalued have an incentive to expend 
additional resources to signal that fact. By contrast, firms whose share prices are overvalued 
would implicitly signal that fact by disclosing no additional information (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986, pp. 165-166). Accordingly, firms with good performance send signals to the market. 
Furthermore, Leftwich et al. (1981) have argued that listed companies are induced by the market 
to disclose more information in order to raise capital at a lower cost and therefore they would be 
more receptive to the new detailed disclosure standards. 
In fact, the government has sole ownership of the equity capital of public banks in Sudan. As a 
result, these banks have no opportunity to raise equity capital through the KSE22. However, 
private banks are actively traded on the KSE and seek to raise new capital and thus need to 
consider the secondary market and the behaviour of its share prices. It is expected that MGRs of 
22 Semi-public banks are mostly owned (i. e. more than 50% of their shares) by the state and thus these banks have 
less opportunity to raise equity capital through the KSE. 
59 
Chapter 5 Research Methodology 
banks that are listed on the KSE will have an incentive to disclose more information to the 
market, since they can raise capital there. It is therefore, proposed that: 
Proposition 2: In order to raise funds in the KSE, MGRs of listed banks will show a more 
positive attitudes towards, and opinions on, the implementation of the standard than the MGRs of 
non- listed banks. 
From the discussion of the cost of compliance proposition (PI) and the listing status proposition 
(P2), it can be seen that MGRs of banks with larger number of branches are expected to be less 
receptive, while MGRs of listed banks on the secondary market are expected to be more 
receptive to the implementation of AAOIFI disclosure standard. 
5.5.2 MGRs' attitudes towards, and opinions about, the implementation of the 
measurement standards 
Proposition 3 
Bonus plan proposition 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argued that MGRs' manipulation of reported earnings would not 
be entirely restricted as long as controlling and monitoring measures by shareholders are costly. 
It is therefore, expected that MGR can adjust reported income through using alternative 
accounting measurement procedures in order to increase its compensation. A bonus plan 
variable, as a measure for compensation, was used to explain firms' cross-sectional variations in 
attitudes towards the implementation of the measurement standards. Bonus plans provide MGRs 
with incentives to use or lobby for the use of accounting measurement standards that increase 
reported income (e. g., Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) and Dhaliwal (1982)). 
Given the limitations of a wide scope of discretion in accounting choices, MGRs of firms with 
bonus plans resist new measurement standards that decrease reported earnings and/or they lobby 
for (against) proposed measurement standards that increase (decrease) reported earnings. The 
implementation of AAOIFI's measurement standards (the standards) would limit MGR's 
discretion in using alternative accounting treatments. Accordingly, MGRs of banks with bonus 
plans are expected to be less receptive to the implementation of the standards, since they would 
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have an incentive to increase their compensation through using alternative accounting treatments 
resulting from the standards. It is thus, proposed that: 
Proposition 3: MGRs of banks with bonus plans will show less positive attitudes towards, and 
opinions on, the implementation of the measurement standards than MGRs of banks with no 
bonus plans. 
Proposition 4 
Bank ownership (private-public) proposition 
Kelly (1983) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986) explain that political costs arise from both 
direct and indirect regulation of the firm. In general, MGRs of politically sensitive firms believe 
that high reported earnings imply abnormal returns, increasing the chance of government action. 
Specifically, government intervention is related to the firm's membership of a politically 
sensitive industry. For instance, in the oil and gas industry, windfall profit, combined with the 
national goal to find alternative energy sources, motivated the US government to enact higher 
taxes on that industry. Given a wide scope of discretion in measurement accounting standards, a 
firm's membership of a politically sensitive industry would have an incentive to use accounting 
procedures that reduce reported earnings. However, the limitation on accounting measurement 
choices influences MGRs' attitudes towards new measurement standards and their lobbying for 
the proposed measurement standards that reduce reported income. 
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The government in Sudan could ask the banking sector, in particular the state-owned banks to 
provide risky Salam facilities to agriculture. As in the case of firm membership in a politically 
sensitive industry, public banks expect that a high reported income would increase the chance of 
government intervention, because the government requires public banks with high profitability to 
invest in high risk projects, such as Salant finance to agriculture23. Given choices in accounting 
treatments, public banks would have an incentive to use accounting treatments that reduce 
reported income. Yet, the implementation of the measurement standards limits the choices in 
accounting treatments and therefore public banks are expected to be less receptive to such 
implementation and this is relevant to the political costs theory. It is therefore proposed that: 
Proposition 4: MGRs of public banks with high reported income will have a more negative 
attitude towards, and opinions on, the implementation of the measurement standards than MGRs 
of private banks with high reported income. 
Proposition 5 
Bank size variable (total assets) proposition 
As mentioned in chapter 3 above, size measured by a firm's total assets can also be used as a 
proxy for political costs. In this context firms with a larger value of total assets are more 
politically visible and thus more exposed to the attention of industry regulators. Firms with a 
larger value of total assets provide government or other regulators with incentives to impose 
more restrictions on them. Therefore, such firms are expected to use alternative accounting 
measurement procedures to reduce reported income in order to avoid any sort of restrictions by 
politician and/or regulators. This makes them sensitive to new accounting measurement 
standards and induces such firms to resist or lobby against the standards. 
23 There are a number of counter-party risks in the Salan: contract. These range from failure to supply al-muslam fihi (Al-Nfuslam fihi is defined as the commodity to be delivered on Salam contract) on time, or even at all, to failure 
to supply the agreed quality and quantity. Moreover, the counter- party risk in Salan: does not depend only on factors that are only in the suppliers' own control, but also on factors that are beyond their control, like natural disasters and other reasons for crop failure. Banks may hedge such risks by entering into a parallel Salam contract (forward contract) , 
however any such forward contract must be legally independent of the original contract. 
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As in the case of other firms with a large value of total assets, Islamic banks with a larger value 
of total assets are more politically visible and susceptible to government restriction. This 
provides the government with an incentive to impose additional taxes on profitable banks with a 
larger value of total assets or to put pressure on them to invest in risky but nationally beneficial 
projects. Hence, it is expected that MGRs of banks with a large value of total assets will be less 
receptive to regulatory measurement standards that reduce choices in accounting treatments. It is 
therefore, proposed that. 
Proposition 5: MGRs of banks with a larger value of total assets will show a more negative 
attitudes towards, and opinions on, implementation of the measurement standards than MGRs of 
banks with a smaller value of total assets. 
Based on the arguments discussed in the ownership proposition, the size proposition and the 
bonus plan proposition, it can be noted that MGRs of public banks and those of banks with larger 
value of total assets are expected to be less receptive to regulatory measurement standards. 
Moreover, MGRs of banks with bonus plans are expected to be less receptive to regulatory 
measurement standards 
5.5.3 EAs' evaluation of the implications for audit risk associated with the implementation 
of the accounting standards 
Proposition 6 
Shari'a non-compliance risk proposition 
A major objective of auditing financial statements of Islamic banks is to enable the EAs to 
express an opinion as to whether the financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in 
accordance with the rules and principles of Islamic Shari 'a24. However, Shari 'a compliance 
would entail a risk of misstatement (intentional or unintentional) on the part of management, 
specifically, regarding non-disclosure of earnings from Haram (non-permitted) transactions. An 
EA may fail to detect or discover such misstatement. 
24 See AAOIFI, Auditing Standard for Islamic Financial Institutions (ASIFI) No 1,1996a. 
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Another type of Shari 'a compliance risk is the risk associated with Murabaha and Salam. For 
example, in the Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer, transactions between the parties of the 
Murabaha contract may not be visible to the Shari 'a supervisor and/or the EA of the bank. 
Hence, an EA might provide an inappropriate assurance that all Murabaha sales are free from 
non-compliant transactions25. In other words, it is a requirement for Shari'a compliance that the 
bank must be the owner of the asset at the time of its sale to the purchase orderer (AAOIFI, 
1996a). It is not permissible for the supplier to sell the asset directly to the purchase orderer with 
the bank merely supplying credit in return for a charge. However, such non-permissible 
transactions may not be easy to detect by the EA of the Islamic bank. This represents part of the 
audit risk associated with Islamic Shari'a authentication. An EA's evaluation of implications for 
audit risk associated with Shari 'a authentication would be higher, as the proportion of Murabaha 
and Salim to total assets is greater. It is therefore, proposed that: 
Proposition 6: EAs of banks with a larger proportion of Murabaha and Salam to total assets will 
consider the implications for the audit risk associated with Shari'a non- compliance as being 
greater than the EAs of Islamic banks with a smaller proportion of Murabaha and Salam. 
Proposition 7 
Collectibility of receivables risk proposition 
As noted in chapter 4 above, receivables require subjective judgement in determining their 
values and accordingly, are difficult and risky to audit (Pratt and Stice, 1994). MGR of a 
company may intentionally or unintentionally overstate or understate receivables, and this would 
lead to misstatements in the company's financial statements. An EA may fail to detect such 
misstatement. Similarly, compliance with the accounting standards could entail a risk of 
misstatement (intentional or unintentional) on the part of management, namely, the risk 
associated with collectibility of Murabaha and Safran receivables. In other words, Murabaha 
and Salam sales require subjective judgement in determining their values, provision of doubtful 
debts of Murabaha receivables and/or that of estimated deficit of al-Muslam fihi26. As the 
25 The forni of contract of Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer involves three parties; the purchase orderer, the bank, 
and the supplier of the asset. 
26 Al-Muslan: fthi is defined as the commodity to be delivered. 
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proportion of Murabaha and Salani to total assets is high, it is hypothesized that the assessment 
of the implications for audit risk associated with collectibility of receivables will be greater as 
long as the proportion of Murabaha and Salani to total assets is high. It is expected that, the 
assessment of the implications for the audit risk associated with collectibility of receivables will 
be high, as the proportion of Murabaha and Salant to total assets is high. It is therefore proposed 
that: 
Proposition 7: EAs of banks with a higher proportion of Murabaha and Salam will 
consider the implications for the audit risk associated with collectibility of receivables 
as being greater than the EAs of Islamic banks with a smaller proportion of Murabaha 
and Salam. 
Table 5.2: The relationship between independent and dependent variables 
Independent variables: 
1- cost of compliance; number of branches 
(larger/smaller) 
2- Listing status (listed /non-listed) 
Dependent variables 
Bank MGRs' attitudes towards, and 
opinions on, the implementation of the 
disclosure standard. 
1- Bank size; total assets (larger /smaller) 
2- Ownership (public/private) 
3- Bonus plan (with bonus/with no bonus) 
1- Level ofMurabaha and Salam to total assets 
Bank MGRs' attitudes towards, and 
opinions on, the implementation of the 
measurement standards. 
The assessment of the implications for 
audit risk associated with Shari'a 
compliance. 
The assessment of the implications for 
audit risk associated with collictibility of 
receivables. 
64 
Chapter 5 Research Methodology 
5.6 Summary and concluding remarks 
This chapter has focused on the research methodology used in this study. The chapter 
considered the research process up to the point where the decision on formulating theoretical 
propositions was made. The topic of the research study was clearly identified; the research 
questions and objectives were then defined. Sudan was chosen as a critical case in testing 
whether the theoretical propositions (frameworks) developed in Western countries that can help 
explain the accounting phenomenon in the context of a developing market economy. Due to the 
different environment (e. g. institutional differences) in Sudan and USA some of the independent 
variables might be considered as different from some of those derived from Western accounting 
literature. Hence, the theoretical propositions 1 through 7 needed to be further investigated, 
identifying the important features of the country, where regulated and nationalized Islamic banks 
operate, developing an understanding of them, and conceptualizing them for further research. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Methods of Data Acquisition and Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
Having discussed the research process up to the formulation of the theoretical propositions in the 
previous chapter, what follows deals with the type of data, methods of data acquisition and analysis. 
The required information plays a very important role in the selection of methods of data acquisition 
and analysis. It can help identify the sub-units of analysis within the case study, the type of methods 
of acquiring data to be used and the appropriate methods of analyzing data. As mentioned earlier in 
the present study, the information required consists of banks' actual compliance, as well as the 
MGRs' and EAs' opinions on the implementation of the accounting standards in Sudan. The 
remainder of this chapter is set out as follows: 
Section 2 focuses on the type of data. Section 3 points out types of the scale. Measurement 
techniques are presented in section 4. Section 5 deals with the research instrument. The selection of 
banks and audit firms is given in section 6. Section 7 describes the conduct of a pilot case study. 
Section 8 discusses methods of acquiring data. Section 9 presents methods of data analysis. 
Summary and some concluding remarks are provided in section 10. 
6.2 Type of data 
Having discussed the research questions and objectives, research design and theoretical propositions 
in chapter 5 above, the discussion moves to the type of data and methods of data acquisition and 
analysis. 
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Attitudes and opinions 
As discussed earlier, it is helpful to distinguish between attitude and opinion. The Oxford Dictionary 
provides a clear distinction between "attitude" and "opinion". "Attitude" is a way of thinking about 
somebody or something. It cones before behaviour and affects how a person will act. "Opinion" is 
a belief or judgement about somebody or something, which can be verbally expressed 27. Moreover, 
Allport ((1935) as mentioned by Clark et al (1998)) defined an attitude as `a mental state of 
readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon individual's 
response to all objects and situations to which it is related', (Clark et. al., 1998, p. 118). The study of 
attitude has a long and complex history in psychology. Most researchers appear to agree that an 
attitude is a state of readiness, a tendency to respond in a certain manner when confronted with 
certain stimuli, (Oppenheim, 1992, p. 174). 
Belief questions can be distinguished from those that aim to establish the individual's attitudes. 
Whereas belief questions ascertain what the individual thinks is true, attitude questions (open-ended 
questions) attempt to establish what he thinks is desirable (de Vaus, 1996, p. 82). In a questionnaire, 
attitudes have to be inferred from expression of opinions or belief. There are many ways of getting 
evidence about a person's attitude, other than verbal expression, such as body language or other 
forms of non-verbal behaviour. Moreover, Clark et al (1998, p 117)) argued that: 
Attitudes reveal themselves because they have a quality of being positive or negative. This quality can be observed. It is 
also a quality that attitudes share with another aspect of human behaviour -the opinion. Consequently one leads to 
judgement of the other and more often than not the two concepts become coterminous. 
Indeed, an individual's opinions on matters often provide evidence of his attitudes, but this does not 
mean that an opinion is the same as an attitude. There should be some consistency between 
respondents' verbal expressions of their attitudes towards a particular phenomenon and their 
27 Sec Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, fifth edition, 1995. 
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behaviour towards it, (Ibid., p. 117). A major distinction between attitudes and opinions is presented 
in Table 6.1 below. 
Table 6.1: A major distinction between attitudes and opinions 
Characteristic Attitudes Opinions 
Focus and fixity They tend to be focused on an object, a They are relatively changeable. 
person, group, specific behaviuor and 
particular ideas. They also tend to be 
fairly fixed over time. They are fairly 
stable in the short and medium run. 
They are closely related to feelings 
Feeling Opinions may or may not carry 
connotations of feelings. 
Attitudes are reinforced by beliefs (the cognitive component) and often attract strong feelings (the 
emotional component), which lead to particular behavioural intents (the action tendency component), 
[Oppenheim, 1992, p. 175]. However, in accounting research, persons' expressions of opinions are 
typically treated as indicators of attitudes. This study is mainly concerned with the analysis of verbal 
expression, which are opinions as proxies for attitudes towards the implementation of new 
accounting standards. More specifically, the present research study aims to elicit the respondent's 
opinions about the implementation of the accounting standards, from the perspective of Islamic 
banks. The opinions of the respondents provide an indication of their attitudes. Thus the degree of 
`agreement' or `disagreement' as expressed in their opinion indicates positive or negative attitudes 
towards the implementation of the standards. 
How can a researcher measure something that is in a person's mind? The simple answer is to ask 
people. Researchers depend on this approach and often use questionnaires, where respondents are 
asked to indicate whether they agree or disagree with a set of statements (items) in connection with 
the implementation of the accounting standards. In other words, researchers look at the direction of 
opinion (positive or negative) about some set of statements. 
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6.3 Types of'scale 
Another important aspect to consider prior to deciding on methods of analysis is that variables may 
be measured by using different levels of scales. According to de Vaus (1996) there are three main 
levels of measurement scales. These are: 
a) Nominal scale, in which a distinction between categories of a variable can be made, but one 
cannot rank the categories in any order (e. g., the color of eyes) 
b) Ordinal scale, in which it is meaningful to rank the answers by categories, but it is not possible 
to quantify precisely how much difference there is between categories. 
c) Interval/ratio scale, in which ranking of categories can be made and it is possible to quantify the 
differences between the categories precisely. 
Depending on the scale, different types of statistical tests and measures are applicable to a particular 
set of data. Clark et al. (1998, pp. 153-154) presented the following common types of the scale data: 
i) Nominal and ordinal scale data 
Nominal data assumes no natural ordering, i. e. there is no particular ordering that suggests itself. In 
contrast, ordinal data assumes ordering. An example of ordinal data is `Rating Scales'. They can be 
used to describe a respondent's opinions on a particular phenomenon. It can be noted that nominal 
and ordinal data are essentially categorical in nature. Saunders et al (2000, p. 328) defined 
categorical data as "data whose values cannot be measured numerically". Yet, categorical data can 
be either classified into sets (categories) according to the characteristics in which one is interested or 
placed in rank order. They can be further subdivided into descriptive and ranked data. Nominal data 
equate to descriptive data, for which it is impossible to measure values numerically or to rank them. 
Descriptive statistics (mode, frequency counts) arc appropriate for nominal scaled data because they 
focus on frequencies in categories (Siegal and Castellan, 1988, p. 25). 
Ordinal data equate to ranked data. Ordinal data are more precise, in which one knows the definite 
position of each element within the data set. The statistic most appropriate for describing the central 
tendency of scores in an ordinal scale is the median. With ordinal scaled data , propositions can 
be 
tested by using nonparametric statistical tests which are sometimes called ranking statistics. Sekaran 
(2000, p. 180) stated that the ordinal scale provides no indication of the magnitude of the difference 
among the ranks. 
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ii) Interval and ratio scale data: 
Interval scaled data assumes that values progress both in order and according to a series of equal 
steps. In other words the distances (intervals) between numbers can be measured precisely. An 
interval scale is characterized by a common and constant unit of measurement, which assigns all 
numbers to all pairs of objects in the order set. In this sort of measurement, the ratio of any two 
intervals is not independent of the unit of measurement and of the zero point. In an interval scale, the 
zero point and the unit of measurement are arbitrary. Hence, interval scales need not include a zero 
point. By contrast, there is an absolute zero point on the ratio scale. In a ratio scale, the ratio of any 
two-scale points is independent of the unit of measurement. Interval scale data may be continuous or 
discrete and the same is true for cases that display ratio scale properties. Continuous data 
theoretically take any value on the continuum of real numbers (0,1-100), provided that one can 
measure them accurately. Discrete data, by contrast, may have only a finite countable number of 
values (0,1-100) that can be measured precisely. In other words each case takes one of a finite 
number of values from a scale, which measures changes in discrete units (Saunders et al, 2000, 
p.. 328). Data measured in interval or ratio scales may be analyzed by parametric statistical tests if all 
of the assumptions of the parametrical statistical model are appropriately satisfied. Although rating 
scales (such as the Likert scale as discussed in Section 6.4 below) are ordinal in nature, they are often 
viewed as having interval scale properties. This may be attributed to the fact that researchers 
calculate average scores for rating scale data, which indicate that they are being treated as interval 
scale i. e. cardinal data. As part of the present research study, MGRs and EAs of Islamic banks were 
asked to rank their opinions about a set of statements regarding the implementation of the accounting 
standards. 
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6.4 Measurement techniques 
A scale must satisfy the conditions of linearity and uni-dimentionality; it must be reliable 
(consistent); it must have units of measurement. The scale must be valid, (Oppenheim, 1992, p. 155). 
Most research textbooks mention the main four types of measurement techniques in connection with 
questionnaires (e. g. de Vaus, 1996, Punch, 1998 and Clark et al. 1998). These are: 
1) Thurstone technique: 
The basis of this scale is that respondents are asked to express to what extent they favour a 
defined item. The poles of the scale are "strongly approve" and "strongly disapprove" separated 
by a seven-point scale in which point 4 is neutral. The scale is based on the assumption that the 
intervals between the numbers are equal. 
2) The Cuttman scale: 
The Cuttman scale assumes that an attitude can be measured along a single continuum 
represented by a set of statements, which are ordered in terms of degrees of acceptability. That 
is to say the scale moves in one direction towards greater acceptability and in the opposite 
direction towards greater unacceptability. In Cuttman's technique (semantic differential format), 
the format consists of choosing objectives to represent the two extremes on a continuum and 
asking the respondent to put a mark between the two extremes. 
3) Checklists: 
These consist of a list of items and the respondent is asked to circle each relevant item. 
4) Likert's technique: 
This technique is called attitude or opinion rating. It involves providing people with statements 
and asking them to indicate how strongly they agree or disagree (Alreck and Settle, 1995). 
The Likert scale provides answers in the form of coded data that is comparable and can readily be 
manipulated. Moreover, the scale is flexible in the sense that items (statements) can be only a few 
words, or they can consist of several lines. The scale is economical because one set of instructions 
can be used and the scale can serve many statements, and once the respondent understands what is 
required he or she can complete the items very quickly and easily, particularly when the issues have 
been articulated in advance as statements. Although the Likert scale has many advantages, it also has 
some disadvantages. According to Oppenheim (1992, p. 200), one of the main such disadvantages is 
that a question arises as to whether one can assume equal intervals within the same scale, i. e. whether 
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the distance between scale points 2 and 3 is the same as that between 4 and 5. Secondly, there is an 
uncertainty over the inter-subject judgement of the scale. In other words, does "strongly agree" from 
respondent X mean exactly the same as an "strongly agree" from respondent Y for the same items. 
Thirdly, there is a problem with the position of the middle point called often "neutral", the question 
at stake is to what extent the middle point can be seen as the real midpoint between the two extremes 
of agreement and disagreement: is it really a neutral point? Despite the reservations expressed by 
Oppenheim, Likert scales are commonly treated as interval scales. Likert scale, whereby a 
respondent responds to each item according to a simple response scale, rather than a dichotomy, and 
responses to the items can then be summed. This implies that the scale is seemed to be an interval 
scale. According to Sekaran (2000, p. 198) the interval scale is used and the differences in the 
responses between any two points on the scale remain the same 
In consideration of both advantages and disadvantages of the Likert scale, however, the simpler 
procedures of Likcrt came over time to be used as more relevant for attitudes and opinions' 
measurement. Alreck and Settle (1995) contended that the Likert's summated rating procedure is 
widely used in social science today. They added that it is the form of scaling most often seen in 
questionnaires used in research. 
The Likert scale utilizes, typically the range of "strongly agree", "agree". "neutral", "disagree" and 
"strongly disagree" (Alreck and Settle, 1995), though as few as 3-scale points are often used, and as 
many as 7-points. If one had too few response categories, each would be very diverse, grouping 
people with quite different opinions or different levels of commitment into the same category. On 
the other hand, if too many categories were used, the respondent would not be able to distinguish 
between adjacent categories and might get frustrated and refuse to answer (Bailey, 1978, p. 115). For 
this study respondents were asked to give their views, on the implementation of set of statements 
issued by AAOIFI's, according to scale of 1-5 where: 
strongly disagree =1, disagree = 2, neutral = 3, agree =4 and strongly agree = 5. The use of 5-point 
scale was preferable to allow respondents to indicate a degree of agreement or disagreement28. 
28 The number of respondents was too small to allow statistical tests of significance to be applied to the data from the 5- 
point scales. Hence for statistical tests (tests of significance), the 5-point scales was collapsed into a 3-point scales. 
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Reliability of scale measurement 
The purpose of conducting reliability tests is to determine consistency of the scale measurement. A 
reliable measurement is one where the same results on the same occasions (de Vaus, 1996, p. 54). 
There are two aspects of reliability: 
1. External reliability, which refers to the degree of consistency of a scale measurement 
over time. This can be assessed by a number of well-established methods of testing, 
including the test- retest method. Due to time and budget constrains; the researcher 
could not apply this. 
2. Internal reliability, which is an indicator of how well several different items measure the 
same variable. The internal reliability can be assessed through a number of methods in 
S1'SS software. The most common methods are: 
a. Split-half reliability, which splits the items in scale into two groups and examines the 
relationships between respondents' scores for the two halves. 
b. Cronbach's alpha, which calculates the average of all possible split-half reliability 
coefficients. Cronbach's alpha ranges in value from 0 to 1 because it can be interpreted 
as a correlation coefficient. The higher the value of alpha the more reliable the scale. As 
a rule of thumb alpha should be at least 0.7 29. 
For the present study, the Cronbach's alpha and split half reliability were used to measure the internal 
consistency of the scale. The results of the two tests are presented below. 
Table 6.5 indicates that for Questions 2 and 3 in Section A, Questions 2 in Sections B1-B5 and 
Question2 in Section C both alpha and split-half methods produce high coefficients (See Appendix 
13a-13c). This means that each scale in the study questionnaire measures a single 
concept and the items that make up the scale are internally consistent. That is to say, the scale 
measurement of this questionnaire is internally reliable. It was not applicable to calculate the 
Cronbach's alpha and Cuttman split-half methods for question 1 in Section A, questions 1 in Sections 
B1-B5 and question 1 in Section C, for the reason that no linear, numeric scale was used. 
29 Sec Dc Vaus, 1996,255- 57. 
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Table 6.2: Reliability analysis of the questions 
Research Methodology 
Question # Alpha Split-Half 
[Q2 (Section A) 0.9798 0.8835 
[Q2 (Section A) 0.9400 0.7733 
[Q2 (Sections B1-B5) 0.9454 0.8501 
[Q2 (Section C) 0.7106 0.8024 
6.5 The research instrument 
The data can be obtained by questionnaires, in-depth interviews and or by a range of other 
techniques. 
6.5.1 Questionnaire 
The most widely used technique is the questionnaire. Questionnaires can be filled out by 
respondents and returned to the researcher or administered by interviewers. The questionnaire is a 
highly structured data acquisition method, whereby each respondent is asked the same set of 
questions (de Vaus, 1996, p. 80). 
The advantages of using questionnaires include (Oppenheim, 1992, p. 102): 
1- Low cost of data collection. 
2- Low cost of data processing. 
3- Ability to reach respondents who live at widely dispersed addresses or abroad. 
However, the use of questionnaires has limitations. The main limitation of the questionnaire is the 
possibility of a low response rate and consequent biases. This can be minimized by careful thinking 
and pilot tests (de Vaus, 1996). 
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Type of the question 
According to de Vaus (1996), the choice between open-ended (attitude questions) or closed-ended 
(opinion questions) depends on many factors such as the question content, the respondents' 
motivation, method of administration, type of respondent, and the amount of time available to 
develop a good set of unbiased responses. Likert scale questions are necessarily closed-ended 
questions, i. e., asking for respondents' opinions on a set of statements. 
The main advantages of closed-ended questions are: 
(1) The answers are standard, and can be compared from one respondent to another. 
(2) The respondent is often clearer about the meaning of the question; i. e. a respondent who 
is unsure about the meaning of the question can often tell from the answer categories 
what is expected. 
(3) The answers are much easier to code and analyze and often can be coded directly from 
the questionnaire. 
(4) The answers are relatively complete and the minimum of irrelevant responses is 
received. 
(5) The questions are often easier for a respondent to answer, as he or she merely has to 
choose a category. 
However, the main disadvantages of the closed-ended question are: 
(1) it is very easy for a respondent who does not know the answer or has no opinion to 
"guess" an answer; 
(2) The respondent may feel frustrated because the appropriate category for his or her 
answer is not provided at all or not provided in sufficient detail. 
(3) There may be too many answer categories so that the respondent could not remember 
them. This causes rereading and repetition, and can lead to errors. 
(4) Differences in interpretation of what was meant by the question may go undetected. 
(5) There is some likelihood of a clerical error as the respondent may, for example, circle 
"three" when he or she meant to circle "two". 
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Despite these disadvantages, closed-ended questions are generally self-contained, can be answered 
quickly and require fewer instructions than open-ended questions. Thus, closed-ended questions can 
be used with respondents that have a lower educational level and are considered to be more 
appropriate for mail-out and self-administered questionnaires. (Bailey, 1978, p. 104). 
6.5.2 Interview 
Though questionnaires may be used as the only data collection method, it is usually useful to link 
them with other methods in a multiple-method approach. For example, a questionnaire to discover 
respondents' opinions can be complemented by in-depth interviews to explore and understand their 
attitudes. The interview is the most useful method of collecting qualitative data, when it gives 
insight into how individuals or groups think about their world, and how they construct the reality of 
the world (Clark, (1998, p. 132). The interview often provides extra comments and observations to be 
made by the interviewee, who helps the researcher to assess respondents' attitudes towards, and 
opinions on, the implementation of the accounting standards 
6.5.3 Documentary sources 
Documentary information is relevant to case study topic. The type of information takes many forms, 
e. g., letters, agenda, reports. The most important of documents is to corroborate and augment 
evidences from other sources. (Yin, 1994, p. 81). This can be carried out in order to obtain a better 
understanding of the banks' actual implementation of the accounting standards. 
6.6 The selection of banks and audit firms 
MGRs of Islamic banks and their EAs are used as sub-units of analysis. This is because the 
information required is about opinions of preparers (MGRs) and EAs on the implementation of the 
accounting standards as indicators of their attitudes. The number of banks and audit firms in Sudan 
was limited, thus making the question of sampling approach problematic. Despite the fact that there 
are no general criteria for selecting units of analysis within the case study, the researcher attempted to 
select a number of banks in the following way. 
During the same visit in April-July 1998, the researcher made several personal visits to the CBS and 
examined documentation related to banks in Sudan. Based on this examination, there were 28 banks 
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in the banking sector in Sudan (excluding the Bank of Sudan)30. According to the CBS, banks were 
classified into the following three categories31: 
1- Twelve public (state-owned) banks 
2- Twelve privately-owned banks 
3- Four foreign branches 
Since the number of banks was small, the selection of seven banks was considered to be sufficient for 
this study. The seven banks were selected as follows 32: 
1. Three out of twelve state-owned banks: Alpha and Zubra are publicly owned banks with 
a larger number of branches, they had no bonus plans and they were not listed on the 
local stock market. Frasa is a semi publicly-owned bank with a smaller number of 
branches and it was listed on the local stock market. Alpha, Frasa and Zubra banks are 
therefore suitable for treatment as public banks. 
2. Three out of the twelve privately- owned banks: Beta, Hadatha and Sayada banks had 
bonus plans and were listed on the local stock market. Beta, Hadatha and Sayada banks 
are therefore suitable for treatment as private banks 
3 One out of four branches of foreign banks: Asdar bank had a bonus plan and it was not 
listed on the local stock market. Asdar bank is therefore suitable for treatment as a 
foreign operation. 
30 In the year 2000 the number of banks decreased from 28 to 25 due to the liquidation of two private banks and one 
foreign branch. 
31 For statistical purposes both 100% publicly owned banks and semi-publicly owned banks (in which the state owns 
more than 50% of the bank's shares) were treated as publicly owned banks, where privately owned banks and foreign 
branches were treated as privately owned banks. 32 The names of the banks have been disguised for the realm of confidentiality. 
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Table 6.3 presents the main characteristics of the selected banks. 
Research Methodology 
Table 6.3: Banks' characteristics for the financial year 1997 (Amount in US $(000)") 
Banks 
(1) 
Bank 
class 
(2) 
Total assets 
US S 000 
(3) 
Receivables 
US S 000 
(4) 
% of receivable 
to total assets 
(5) 
(4: 3) 
Revenue 
US S 000 
(6) 
Profit after 
payment to 
depositors 
(7) 
% 
(8) 
(7: 6) 
Number of 
branches 
(9) 
Listing 
status 
10) 
Alpha PNB 108001 L 21262 20 Fl 6924 123 2W 41 L Non Iistei 
Beta RB 69105 S 7029 10 W 3659 154 4W 20 S Listed 
Zubra PNB 148246 L 35504 24 H 16955 1189 7W 112 L Non lister 
Frasa PNB 25184 S 166 6W 3776 196 5W 21 S Listed 
Hadatha RB 108076 L 10368 10 W 11104 2468 22 L 18 S Listed 
Sayada RB 33580 S 5115 15 H 4075 420 10 W 45 L Listed 
Asdar RB 8398 S 442 5W 867 240 27 L IS Non lister 
Total 500590 258 
PNB : nublic hank with no hont-, RR- nrivate hank with hnmic T" laroPr C" crnnllar T-1 hinhar W. ý 9 i 5 
lower. 
The subjects of the study (respondents) included the General Manager or his Deputy (GM), the 
Financial Manager (FM), the Investment Managers (IM) and the EAs of each selected bank in Sudan. 
However, the number of EAs was 5 instead of 7, owing to the fact that the three public banks were 
audited by the Auditor General. 
The reasons for the choice of each group of the respondents were: 
GMs: they have overall responsibility for the preparation of financial statements of Islamic banks, 
and they have a responsibility to ensure that the financial statements are prepared in accordance with 
AAOIFI accounting standards. 
FMs: they have financial functional responsibility for the implementation of the disclosure and 
measurement standards including Equity of Investment Account Holders. 
IMs: they have particular responsibility for the implementation of the measurement standards for 
Murabaha, Mudaraba, Musharaka and Salant. 
EAs: they express their opinions as to whether the financial statements are prepared in accordance 
with AAOIFI's accounting standards. 
 Source: The Economic Review 1998, Ministry of Finance and National Economy; "Government and Public entities". Figures were converted from SDD to US S at official rate (1 US$= 1684). 
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6.7 The conduct of pilot case study 
Each question and the questionnaire as a whole must be evaluated rigorously before final 
administration of the questionnaire (de Vaus, 1996). The research questions and questionnaires were 
first pretested during May-July 1998 on two sites (Islamic banks) and one audit firm. This served the 
following purposes: 
1. To ascertain the nature of any available records, documents, and other sources of 
evidence that might be drawn upon, in addition to information created by new data 
collection exercises such as questionnaire, interviews and observation. 
2. To check whether respondents understand the language used in the questionnaire. 
3. To check whether questions used generated answers relevant to the purpose of the study. 
4. To discover whether there are a major topic omissions. 
5. To provide an idea of the validity of the questions those are being asked. 
6. To provide an idea of the reliability of the questions by checking responses from 
individual respondents to similar questions. 
7. To provide limited test data so that one can check that the proposed analysis will work. 
To work out which statements legitimately belong to the scale, the steps below were followed: 
1- Questions were designed using a Likert-type scale in which a respondent is asked how 
strongly lie agrees or disagrees with each statement. The statements (items) were 
selected to reflect the direction of the respondents' opinions on the implementation of 
AAOIFI accounting standards. 
2- The questions then were answered by individuals (e. g. GMs, IMs, FMs and EAs. ). 
3- For positive statements, strongly agree would get a high score, while strongly disagree 
would get a low score. 
Finally, respondents were asked about the following general questions: 
1- Were the instructions clear? 
2- Were any of the statements (items) unclear or ambiguous? 
3- Did they object to answering any of the questions? 
4- Was the lay out of the questionnaire clear and attractive? 
5- If they have any comments and suggestions. 
79 
Chapter 6 Research Methodology 
The respondents were contacted over the telephone asking them to arrange for a meeting in their 
banks. During the meeting, the questions were discussed face to face with GM or Deputy (DGM), 
IM, FM in each bank, and an EA from reputable audit firm, and their responses were recorded 
simultaneously. The discussion was held in Arabic and accordingly the questions were discussed in 
Arabic too. Although the original version of the questions was in English, the interviewees preferred 
to have discussion in Arabic in order to minimize misinterpretation of the questions. 
Table 6.4: The distribution of the questionnaires in the pilot testing 
Group Number 
GM 2 
IM 2 
FM 2 
EA I 
Total 7 
The main findings of the pilot testing were as follows: 
I- Based on the findings from the initial interviews; GM and DGM were found to be more concerned 
with the requirements of the disclosure standard than those of the measurement standards. On the 
other hand, IM and FM were found to be more concerned with the requirements of the measurement 
standards than those of the disclosure standard. This suggested to the researcher to separate the 
disclosure standard (FAS 1) from the measurement standards. Accordingly, the GMs or DGMs were 
asked about statements (items) relating to the requirements of the disclosure standard and the 
evaluation of the associated costs of compliance, whereas the FMs and IMs were asked about items 
pertaining to the requirements of the measurement standards. 
2- All of the respondents confirmed that the instructions were clear. 
3- All of the respondents confirmed that the statements were clear and not ambiguous. 
4 None of the respondents objected to answering any question 
5 Respondents confirmed that the layout of the questionnaires was clear. 
6 Suggestions were given to omit items relating to the financial statement of the Zakat fund since 
the responsibility of collection and the distribution of Zakat funds rest with the State (Chamber of 
Zakat). As a result, items related to the statement of Zakat funds were omitted. 
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The analysis of the findings from the pilot study: 
Cross-sectional comparisons indicated that there was no difference in banks MGRs' attitudes 
towards, and opinions on, disclosing information, in accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS 1, to the board 
of directors and the CBS34. However, the findings indicate that there was a significant difference in 
bank MGRs' attitudes towards, and opinions on, disclosing information, in accordance with 
AAOIFIs' FAS 1, to shareholders, investment account holders, current account holders, Khartoum 
stock exchange and the general public. For measurement standards, the 
cross-sectional comparisons indicate that there was a significant difference in bank MGRs' attitudes 
towards, and opinions on, the implementation of the measurement standards35 (See Appendix 11). 
With regard to the evaluation of audit risk by the EA, the Deputy Auditor General was asked to 
evaluate the implications of new accounting standards for audit risk associated with implementation 
of the accounting standards. An EA from a private audit firm was requested to test the questionnaire. 
Accordingly, the questionnaire was redesigned to include questions about the audit risk associated 
with Shari 'a non-compliance (See Chapter 5, Section 5.3 above). 
6.8 Methods of data acquisition 
Having discussed the pre-testing of the questions and questionnaires, the discussion moves to cast 
light on the administration of the questionnaires, face to face interviews and examination of 
document. 
6.8.1 Questionnaire Administration 
For the aim of this research study, structured questionnaires were designed in order to elicit the 
opinions of MGRs and EAs of banks on the implementation of the accounting standards in Islamic 
banks in Sudan. The administration of the questionnaires was conducted from October 1998 to 
December 1998, during a personal visit by the researcher to Sudan. Prior to the personal visits to the 
banks in Sudan, three key persons working in each selected bank were contacted over the telephone 
34 Because Islamic banks in Sudan are required to disclose all necessary information to the bank's board of directors and 
the CBS, which is the body that regulates banks. Therefore, the statements (items) relating to those users were omitted 
from the original questionnaire. 
35 Measurement standards include Murabaha and Murabaha to Purchase orderer, Mudaraba Financing, Musharaka 
Financing, Salam and Parallel Salam and Equity of Investment Accounts. 
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asking them to arrange for a meeting. During the meeting the questionnaire was introduced, details 
of the questionnaire were discussed and definitions and terminology were explained. And then the 
questionnaires were handed out with covering letter to each respondent. Depending on the topic of 
the questionnaire, the GMs or DGMs were asked to answer questions 
regarding the implementation of the disclosure standard. Moreover, IMs were asked to answer 
questions concerning the implementation of the measurement standards, namely Murabaha, 
Mudaraba, Musharaka and Salant, and the FMs were asked to answer questions pertaining to the 
measurement standard on Equity of Investment Account Holders. Furthermore, EAs were asked to 
answer questions concerning their evaluation of the implication of audit risk associated with the 
implementation of AAOIFI's accounting standards. The questionnaires were administered in the 
Arabic language, which is the mother tongue and working language of the respondents. English 
language versions of the questionnaires are included as appendices to this study. 
Data acquisition is organized as follows: 
a. A questionnaire was used for the disclosure standard. The covering letter accompanying 
the questionnaire clarified and explained the objectives of the research study. The 
questionnaire then was divided into three sections. Section (A) dealt with the 
implementation of the disclosure standard. In (A2) respondents were asked to categorize 
a set of statements (items) in connection with the implementation of the disclosure 
standard. In (A3) respondents were also asked to evaluate the cost of compliance 
associated with the implementation of the disclosure standard (See Table 6.5 below). 
Replies from the respondents were obtained by asking each one to answer questions 
using a 5-point Likert scale (ranking from strongly disagree =I to strongly agree = 5) 
(See Appendix 4 below). 
Table 6.5: The main contents of the questionnaire relating to disclosure requirements 
Section Information type No of items 
Al Familiarity with the 1 
A2 standard 21 
A3 Disclosure requirements 3 
Cost of compliance 
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b. For the five measurement standards, five questionnaires were designed to measure the 
opinions of FMS and IMS on the implementation of (i) Murabaha and Murabaha to the 
Purchase Orderer, (ii) Mudaraba Financing, (iii) Musharaka Financing, (iv) Salam and 
Parallel Salam and (v) Equity of Investment Account Holders. Each questionnaire was 
divided into three main sub sections. Subsection (1) introduced the study to the 
respondents including question about the measurement standard. In subsection (2) 
respondents were asked to categorise a set of statements with regard to the 
implementation of the measurement standard. In subsection (3) respondents were asked 
to assess the need for training relating to the implementation of the measurement 
standards. Replies from the respondents were obtained by asking each one to answer 
questions using a 5-point Likert scale36 (ranking from strongly disagree =1 to strongly 
agree = 5) (See Appendixes 5 through 9 below). 
c. With regard to the assessment of implications for audit risk associated with the 
implementation of the accounting standards, a questionnaire was designed to elicit EAs' 
opinions on the implementation of the accounting standards and the associated audit risk. 
The questionnaire was divided into two sections. Section (Cl) introduced the scenario 
about the disclosure standard. In section (C2) respondents were asked to evaluate the 
implications for audit risk associated with the implementation of the disclosure standard. 
Section (C3) dealt with the scenario concerning the implementation of the measurement 
standards (e. g., Murabaha and Salain standards). In section (C4) respondents were 
asked to evaluate the implications for audit risk associated with the implementation of 
Murabaha and Salam standards. Replies from the respondents were obtained by asking 
each one to answer questions using a 5-point Likert scale (ranking from very low =I to 
very high = 5) (See Appendix 10 below). 
36 Because of the limited amount of data, for the purpose of certain statistical tests the 5-point scales was collapsed into 3- 
point scales. 
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In total 47 questionnaires were distributed as follows: 
Research Methodology 
Group Number 
GMs 7 
FMs 7 
IMs 28 
EAs 5 
Total 47 
6.8.2 Face to face interview 
After the receipt of completed questionnaires from each selected bank, the researcher met the GM or 
DGM, the IM and the FM. During the meeting the questions were discussed face to face with 
interviewees. Follow-up questions were asked to lead the respondent to answer more fully and 
accurately. An audio recorder was used in the interview (the interview guide is presented in 
Appendix 12). The discussion was held in Arabic and accordingly the questions were addressed in 
Arabic too, although the original version of the interview guide is in English. 
6.8.3 Examining banks' annual reports 
As already stated in chapter 5 above, one of the main objectives of this thesis is to compare and 
contrast the implementation of the disclosure standard (FAS 1) in a number of Islamic banks in 
Sudan. Therefore, banks' annual reports are uniquely suitable to examine banks' implementation of 
the disclosure standard. Reviewing the bank's annual report was also used to establish the 
similarities and a difference between banks in terms of their respective accounting polices. Moreover, 
banks' annual reports were used to obtain information about certain banks' characteristics 
(independent variables including number of branches, assets size, listing status, bank ownership and 
proportion of receivables to total assets) 
6.9 Methods of data analysis 
Having chosen the appropriate method of analysis, the choice of statistics is affected by both the 
method of analysis itself, the level of measurement of variables and the complexity of research 
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questions (de Vaus, 1996). Kinnear and Gray (2000) suggested that the selection of statistical 
methods depends upon: 
> the research question 
> the plan, or design, of the research, and 
> the type of data 
Siegel and Castellan (1988, pp. 33-34) have argued that the proper interpretation of parametric tests 
is not only based on the normal distribution, but also assumes that the scores being analyzed result 
from measurement in at least an interval scale. However, as indicated earlier, most questions in this 
study's questionnaires used a five-point Likert scale in order to measure the respondents' opinions 
about sets of statements concerning the implementation of the accounting standards. Responses to 
the statements can be summed. This implies that the Likert scales are commonly treated as interval 
scales and one might still use non-parametric statistics, because of non-normality. The statistical 
methods used are described below: 
1 Descriptive statistics: 
Descriptive statistics are summaries of data, which can be tabular, numerical or graphical. Green et 
al (2000, p. 120) state that descriptive statistics involve summarization of distributions of scores by 
using tabular or graphical presentation and computation of descriptive statistical measures. With 
regard to questions 2&3 (Section [A]), 2 (Sections [BI- B5]) and 2 (Section [C]), there was a linear 
numeric scale and thus it was feasible to calculate different types of descriptive statistics such as 
mean, the mode, the percentage, etc. Due to the limited number of respondents, the researcher made 
use only of the tabular and graphical presentation. With respect to questions 1 (Section [A]), I 
(Sections [B 1-B5]) and I (Section [C]), there was no linear numeric scale 
2. Statistical analysis: Non-parametric tests of significance 
In order to analyze data acquired from the respondents, the following non-parametric tests were used. 
They are based on the nature of data, the number of groups involved in the comparison, and the 
number of dependent and independent variables. 
i- The chi-square test of significance 
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The chi-square test was used to measure the association between dependent variables and 
independent variables. Chi-square calculations are based on frequency distributions. The test is 
appropriate for testing the goodness-of-fit for variables. This is because the test can be applied to 
determine whether or not an observed set of frequencies matches some expected set of frequencies. 
Chi-square contingency tables tests are particularly valuable tests, because they are relatively simple 
to understand and apply. Moreover, the data can be of any level, [i. e., nominal, ordinal interval or 
ratio (Clark, et. al., 1998)]. For example, values from a 5-point linear, numeric scale are equal 
interval data, but the range of values is limited. There are no fractions or decimals in such data, and 
the integer values can be used to define five categories for analysis of relationship with another 
categorical variable using contingency table analysis. To ensure the validity of a chi-square test of 
significance, expected cell frequencies are supposed to be five or greater than five. However, the 
selected banks in Sudan were small in number. In order to ensure the expected cell frequencies of at 
least 5, the number of categories had to be minimized as well as the number of groups. More 
specifically, strongly disagree and disagree were amalgamated as negative response and strongly 
agree and agree were amalgamated as positive response. In this study, a Chi-square contingency 
table test was used to test the theoretical propositions (P1 through P5). 
ii- Kruskal -Wallis (K-W) test of significance 
This test is a non-parametric alternative to the one way between group ANOVA (Analysis of 
Variance) and allows one to measure the difference between two groups or more. In the present 
study, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used to test the theoretical propositions (P6 and P7 in Chapter 5 
above) concerning EAs' evaluation of implications for audit risk associated with the implementation 
of AAOIFI's accounting standards. 
6.10 Summary and concluding remarks 
A respondent's opinions on matters often provide evidence of his attitudes, but that does not mean 
opinion is the same as attitude. However, in accounting research, persons' expressions of opinions 
are typically treated as indicators of attitudes. This study is mainly concerned with the analysis of 
banks' actual compliance as well as their MGRs' opinions about the implementation of the 
accounting standards. 
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Bank MGRs and EAs' opinions on the implementation of the accounting standard can be addressed 
by a survey within a case study approach. This study used a survey questionnaire as a data 
acquisition method. The questionnaires were administered in the Arabic language, which is both the 
mother and working language of the respondents. English language versions of the questionnaires 
are included as appendices to this study. Five-point Likert scales were used to obtain the 
respondents' opinions on the accounting standards. However, for some statistical purposes (tests of 
significance) the 5-point scales were collapsed into the 3-point scales. 
As part of the present research study, MGRs and EAs of Islamic banks were asked to rank their 
opinions about a set of statements (these statements concerned the implementation of the accounting 
standards). In other words the respondents were asked how much they agreed or disagreed with such 
statements. The chapter then has focused on data acquisition and analysis. Questionnaire, interviews 
and examination of documents were used as data collection methods. A contingency table analysis 
was used to test the theoretical propositions concerning MGRs' opinions on the implementation of 
the accounting standards. The non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test was also used to test the 
theoretical propositions related to EAs' opinions on the implementation of the accounting standards. 
The findings from the case study will be analysed and discussed in the following chapters. 
Hopefully, the findings will enrich the literature with an empirical evidence of MGRs' and EAs' 
opinions about the implementation of the accounting standards. 
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Part IV Data Analysis, Discussion and Conclusion 
Chapter 7 
Bank MGRs' Opinions on the Implementation of the AAOIFI's 
(FAS 1) 
7.1 Introduction and objective 
In chapter 5 (section 5.2.1 and 5.5) above, the following research questions were developed 
to test the cost of compliance proposition (PI) and the listing status proposition; 
1- To what extent do MGRs of Islamic banks display positive or negative attitudes towards, 
and opinions on, the implementation of AAOIFI's accounting standards? 
2- How do Islamic banks differ in their actual implementation of AAOIFI's accounting 
standards? 
The two questions are supplemented by some other more specific questions. They are: 
i. How much do the MGRs of the banks studied agree or disagree in their attitudes 
towards, and opinions on, the implementation of AAOIFI's disclosure standard? 
Within this question further itemized questions were asked in order to elicit the 
opinions of respondents about the requirements (21 items within each five sub - items) 
of the disclosure standard. (.,,,, See Appendix 4 below). 
ii. How do banks differ in their actual compliance with the requirements of AAOIFI's 
disclosure standard? 
A case study approach, with cross-sectional comparisons, is used in the present chapter to test 
whether the theoretical propositions, derived from the existing research literature, fit the data. 
These theoretical propositions are related to opinions of banks' MGRs about the 
implementation of the new AAOIFI's disclosure standard (hereafter referred to as the 
standard). They include the cost of compliance proposition (P1) and the listing status 
proposition (P2). The main purpose of this chapter is therefore, to analyze and discuss the 
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findings of the single (embedded) case study (namely that of Sudan) relating to banks 
MGRs' opinions as well as their actual compliance with the standard. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: 
Section 2 presents the findings of the empirical work relating to MGRs' attitudes towards, 
and opinions on the requirements of the standard. Section 3 provides a descriptive analysis of 
similarities and differences in bank MGRs' attitudes towards, and opinions about, the 
implementation of the standard. Statistical tests of the cost of compliance proposition (P1) 
and the listing status proposition (P2) are presented in Section 4. Section 5 compares and 
contrasts banks' actual compliance with the requirements of the standard. Section 6 
discusses the main findings of the case study. Section 7 provides summary and concluding 
remarks. 
7.2 The findings of the empirical work regarding bank MGRs' opinions on 
the implementation of the standard. 
Question 2 in section A concerns the attitudes and opinions of banks' MGRs on the 
requirements of the standard. 
89 
Chapter 7 Findings and Analysis 
Question 2 in Section A: How much do you agree or disagree with the following disclosure 
requirements [items 1-21] 
1- The bank's statement of financial position, in accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS 1, should be disclosed to the 
following users: 
1.1 Shareholders. 
1.2 Investment Account Holders. 
1.3 Current Account Holders. 
1.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
1.5 General Public. 
2 Bank's statement of income, in accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS 1, should be disclosed to the following users: 
2.1 Shareholders. 
2.2 Investment Account Holders. 
2.3 Current Account Holders. 
2.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
2.5 General Public. 
. 3- Bank's cash flow statement, in accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS 1, should be disclosed to the following users: 
3.1 Shareholders. 
3.2 Investment Account Holders. 
3.3 Current Account Holders. 
3.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
3.5 General Public.. 
4- Bank's statement of changes in owners' equity or a statement of retained earnings, in accordance with AAOIFIs' 
FAS 1, should be disclosed to the following users: 
4.1 Shareholders. 
4.2 Investment Account Holders. 
4.3 Current Account Holders. 
4.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
4.5 General Public. 
5- Bank's statement of changes in restricted investment, in accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS 1, should be disclosed to 
the following users: 
5.1 Shareholders. 
5.2 Investment Account Holders. 
5.3 Current Account Holders. 
5.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
5.5 General Public. 
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6- Bank's statement of sources and uses of fund in the Quard fund, in accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS 1 should be 
disclosed to the following users: 
6.1 Shareholders. 
6.2 Investment Account Holders. 
6.3 Current Account Holders. 
6.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
6.5 General Public. 
7- Significant accounting policies, in the bank's notes to its financial statements, should be disclosed to the 
following users: 
7.1 Shareholders. 
7.2 Investment Account Holders. 
7.3 Current Account Holders. 
7.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
7.5 General Public. 
8- An unusual supervisory restrictions imposed on the bank's activities by the Central Bank of Sudan, should be 
disclosed to the following users: 
8.1 Shareholders. 
8.2 Investment Account Holders. 
8.3 Current Account Holders. 
8.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
8.5 General Public. 
9- Earnings (e. g. earnings from Haram transactions) and expenditures prohibited by Shari'a, if any, should be 
disclosed to the following users: 
9.1 Shareholders. 
9.2 Investment Account Holders. 
9.3 Current Account Holders. 
9.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
9.5 General Public. 
10- Bank's concentration of assets risk should be disclosed to the following users: 
10.1 Shareholders. 
10.2 Investment Account Holders. 
10.3 Current Account Holders. 
10.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
10.5 General Public. 
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11- Concentration of sources of unrestricted investment accounts, should be disclosed to the following users: 
11.1 Shareholders. 
11.2 Investment Account Holders. 
11.3 Current Account Holders. 
11.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
11.5 General Public. 
12- Distribution of unrestricted investment account, 
be should be disclosed to the following users: 
12.1 Shareholders. 
12.2 Investment Account Holders. 
12.3 Current Account Holders. 
12.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
12.5 General Public. 
in accordance with their respective periods to maturity, should 
13- Any material amounts the bank is obliged to deposit with others as compensating balances, should be disclosed 
to the following users: 
13.1 Shareholders. 
13.2 Investment Account Holders. 
13.3 Current Account Holders. 
13.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
13.5 General Public. 
14- Bank's risk associated with assets and liabilities which are denominated in foreign currencies, should be 
disclosed to the following users: 
14.1 Shareholders. 
14.2 Investment Account Holders. 
14.3 Current Account Holders. 
14.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
14.5 General Public. 
15 Risk associated with the bank's contingencies (e. g. letter of credits and letter of guarantee) should be disclosed to 
the following users: 
15.1 Shareholders. 
15.2 Investment Account Holders. 
15.3 Current Account Holders. 
15.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
15.5 General Public. 
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16- The nature and the amounts of the bank's outstanding financial commitments, as of the statement of financial 
position date, should be disclosed to the following users: 
16.1 Shareholders. 
16.2 Investment Account Holders. 
16.3 Current Account Holders. 
16.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
16.5 General Public. 
17- Subsequent significant events, as of bank's statement of financial position date, should be disclosed to the 
following users: 
17.1 Shareholders. 
17.2 Investment Account Holders. 
17.3 Current Account Holders. 
17.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
17.5 General Public. 
18- Nature and the amount of the bank's assets which are restricted for a particular use or used as a collateral for its 
obligation should be disclosed to the following users: 
18.1 Shareholders. 
18.2 Investment Account Holders. 
18.3 Current Account Holders. 
18.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
18.5 General Public. 
19- Nature and effects of the bank's accounting policies changes should be disclosed to the following users: 
19.1 Shareholders. 
19.2 Investment Account Holders. 
19.3 Current Account Holders. 
19.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
19.5 General Public. 
20- The method that was used by the bank to allocate investment profits or (losses) between unrestricted investment 
account holders and the bank's as Mudarib should be disclosed to the following users: 
20.1 Shareholders. 
20.2 Investment Account Holders. 
20.3 Current Account Holders. 
20.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
20.5 General Public. 
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21- The bank's related parties transactions should be disclosed to the following users: 
21.1 Shareholders. 
21.2 Investment Account Holders. 
21.3 Current Account Holders. 
21.4 Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
21.5 General Public. 
Findings and Analysis 
Table 7.1 shows that the total of 735 usable responses were received from the seven banks. 
Table 7.1: Bank MGRs' responses to question 2 in Section A 
Bank Respondent Responses 
Sent 
Received Usable 
responses 
Response 
rate % 
Alpha 1 105 105 105 100 
Beta 1 105 105 105 100 
Zubra 1 105 105 105 100 
Frasa 1 105 105 105 100 
Hadatha 1 105 105 105 100 
Sayada 1 105 105 105 100 
Asdar 1 105 105 105 100 
Total 7 735 735 735 100 
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Table 7.2 presents a summary of the main findings of the empirical work concerning bank 
MGRs' opinions on the implementation of the standards37 
Table 7.2: Bank MGRs' opinions about the implementation of the standard 
Bank Bank 
class 
SA A N D SD Total 
replies 
Alpha Public 20 22 20 28 15 105 
Zubra Public - 51 32 22 - 105 
Frasa Public 11 46 27 21 - 105 
Beta Private 78 12 13 2 - 0 
Hadatha Private 43 62 - - - 105 
Sayada Private 10 37 58 - - 105 
Asdar Foreign 55 9 2 37 2 105 
total 735 
SA= Strongly agree, A= Agree, N= Neutral, D= Disagree, SD= Strongly disagree 
For statistical analysis "strongly agree" and "agree" are combined into positive response and 
"strongly disagree" and "disagree" are combined into negative responses because the number 
of banks in Sudan is limited. 
37 The author's own computation. 
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7.3 The analysis of bank MGRs' opinions on the standard 
7.3.1 Overall Findings 
Table 7.3 shows that more positive opinions are received from MGRs of private banks (76.8) 
on the implementation of the standard than the MGRs of public and foreign banks (47.5%, 
60.9%, respectively). On the negative side, it can be seen that there are significantly more 
negative opinions from MGRs' of public and foreign banks. 
Table 7.3: Bank MGRS' opinions on the implementation of the standard according to 
bank's class38 
Bank's class Positive Neutral Negative Total 
Responses % Responses % Responses % % 
Public 42 40 20 19 43 41 105 100 
Public 51 49 32 30 22 21 105 100 
Public 57 54 27 26 21 20 105 100 
Sub total 150 47,6 79 25.1 86 27.3 315 100 
Private 90 86 13 12 2 2 105 100 
Private 105 100 - - 105 100 
Private 47 45 58 55 - 105 100 
Sub total 242 76.8 71 22.5 2 0,7 315 100 
Foreign 64 60.9 2 0.1 39 37 105 100 
38 The author's own computation. 
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7.3.2 Bank MGRs' opinions on conveying information for the perceived needs of the users 
of the bank's financial statements 
Table 7.4 present a summary of the main findings of the empirical work relating to banks MGRs' 
responses to conveying information for the perceived needs of the main users of Islamic banks' 
financial statements. 
Table 7.4: Bank MGRs' responses to convoying the perceived information need of users 
Main users 
SA A 
Bank MGRs' 
N 
responses 
D SD 
Total 
SH 103 37 7 - - 147 
KSE 22 48 33 40 4 147 
IAH 59 50 22 16 - 147 
CAH 40 41 45 21 - 147 
GP 17 49 36 32 13 147 
SH= Shareholders, KSE= Khartoum Stock Exchange, IAH= Investment Account Holders 
CAH= Current Account Holders, and GP= General Public. 
140 out of 147 of the MGRs responses i. e. 95% expressed positive opinions about disclosing 
accounting information to shareholders. This indicates that they have agreed to convey more 
information for the perceived information needs of the shareholders than other users. In other 
words the responses are significantly less positive for other categories of users, including IAHs 
(See Figure 7 below). 
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Figure 7: Bank MGRs' opinions about conveying 
information for the users 
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7.4 Factors associated with the opinions of the MGRS on the standard 
Due to the small number of the banks (studied) in Sudan, 39 the independent variables are treated 
separately and dichotomously. The dichotomised variables are (a) the cost of compliance; 
large/small (number of branches); and (b) the listing status; listed/ non-listed banks. 
7.4.1 Cost of compliance (bank's number of branches) with the standard 
a- Descriptive statistics 
Table 7.5 shows that MGRs of banks with a larger number of branches have less positive 
attitudes towards, and opinions (44.4 %) on, the implementation of the standard than those of 
banks with a smaller number of branches (75.2 %). One the neutral and negative sides, it can 
be observed that there are substantially more neutral and negative opinions from MGRs of 
banks with a larger number of branches. 
Table 7.5 Summary of positive neutral and negative responses according to bank's 
number of branches (see Table 6.3, column 9 above) 
Bank Bank's Positive Neutral Negative Total 
class Responses % Responses % Responses % % 
Alpfra Larger 42 40 20 19 43 41 105 100 
Zubra Larger 51 49 32 30 22 21 105 100 
Sayada Larger 47 45 58 55 - 105 100 
Sub total 140 44.4 110 34.9 65 20.6 105 100 
Frasa Smaller 57 54 27 26 21 20 105 100 
Beta Smaller 90 86 13 12 2 2 105 100 
Hadata Smaller 105 100 - - 105 100 
Asdar Smaller 64 61 2 2 39 37 105 100 
Sub total 318 75.2 42 1 0.1 62 14.7 420 100 
39 The total number of the selected banks was 7 out of 28, for more details see chapter 6 section 6.6 above. 
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b- Statistical analysis 
Findings and Analysis 
Chi-square test (X^2= 85.16 df = 2) indicates that the null hypothesis [i. e., there is no difference 
in MGRs' opinions between banks with a larger number of branches and banks with smaller 
number of branches on the implementation of the standard] can be rejected at the . 05 level40 (See 
Table 7.9 below). Therefore, the cost of compliance proposition (P1) is supported. 
c. The evaluation of costs of compliance with the standard 
Question 3 in Section A: Items 1-3 
3- What is the likelihood that the bank's financial statements, which are prepared, in accordance with AAOIFIs' 
FAS 1, would involve the following additional costs. 
Creating additional cost in monetary terms. 
Increasing the work load of the concerned bank staff. 
Increase the need for more training and educational courses. 
Question 3 in section A aimed to elicit bank MGRs' opinions about the evaluation of additional 
cost associated with the implementation of AAOIFI's disclosure standard. Descriptive statistics 
are only used to analyze the data. Because, there is a problem of measuring statistical test of 
significance with small number of observations regarding bank's MGRs' evaluation of cost of 
compliance. 
Table 7.6 presents the findings relating to the evaluation of the cost of compliance with the 
implementation of the standard. The table shows that banks with larger number of branches 
evaluate the total costs of compliance (in terms of money, effort and training) with the standard as 
very high, while banks with smaller number of branches rate the cost in terms of money and 
effort as high. 
40 The criteria for significance are those adopted as standard in this type of accounting research. 
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Table 7.6: The evaluation of the cost of compliance with the standard 
Bank Bank's size (branches) 
Findings and Analysis 
Cost of compliance with the standard 
Money Effort Training 
Alpha Larger 555 
Zubra 555 
Sayada 555 
Sub total 15 15 15 
Average 555 
Beta Smaller 445 
Frasa 445 
Hadatha 445 
Asdar ,445 
Sub total 16 16 20 
Average 445 
Where 5= very high, 4= high, 3= moderate, 2= low and 1= very low 
7.4.2 Benefits associated with the implementation of the standard 
The Listing status" 
Table 7.7 presents the findings of the empirical work concerning bank MGRs' responses 
(excluding their responses to conveying information to KSE. ) to the implementation of the 
standard. 
a1 Responses to conveying information, in accordance with the standard, to KSE are excluded from the analysis of 
listing status variable, because these responses are perceived to inflate the result since banks are dichotomized as 
listed and non-listed. 
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Table 7.7: Bank MGRs' responses to the implementation of the standard according to 
bank's status (see Table 6.3, column 10 above) 
Bank Bank's SA A N D SD Total 
status replies 
Alpha Non-listed 20 19 19 14 12 84 
Zubra Non-listed 
- 47 19 18 - 84 
Asdar Non-listed 55 8 12 8 1 84 
Sub total 75 74 50 40 13 252 
Beta Listed 61 10 11 2 - 
84 
Frasa Listed 11 42 14 17 - 
84 
Hadatha Listed 42 42 - - 
84 
Sayada Listed 9 30 45 - - 
84 
Sub total 336 123 124 70 19 - 
total 198 198 120 59 13 588 
= Strongly agree, A= Agree, N= Neutral, D= Disagree, SD= Strongly disagree 
For statistical analysis "strongly agree" and "agree" are combined into positive responses and 
"strongly disagree" and "disagree" are combined into negative responses because the number 
of the selected banks in Sudan is limited. 
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a- Descriptive statistic 
Table 7.8 indicates that MGRs of listed banks on the KCE have more positive attitudes 
towards, and opinions (74%) on, the implementation of the standard than those of non-listed 
banks (59%). On the negative side it can be seen that there are substantially more negative 
opinions from the MGRs of non listed banks 
Table 7.8: Banks' listing status and MGRs' opinions about the implementation of the standard 
Bank Bank's Positive Neutral Negative Total 
status Responses % % Responses % % 
Alpha Non-listed 39 46 19 23 26 31 84 100 
Zubra Non-listed 47 56 19 23 18 21 84 100 
Asdar Non-listed 63 75 12 14 9 11 84 100 
Sub total 149 59.1 50 19.8 53 21.1 252 100 
Beta Listed 53 63 14 17 17 20 84 100 
Frasa Listed 71 85 11 13 2 2 84 100 
Hadatha Listed 84 100 - - - - 84 100 
Sayada 42 Listed 39 46 45 54 - - 84 100 
Sub total 247 73.5 70 20.8 19 5.7 336 100 
Total 396 120 72 588 
42 Sayada bank is listed on KSE and also has a larger number of branches, (See table 6.3 above). 
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b- Statistical analysis 
Chi square test (X^2= 32.28, df=2) shows that the null hypothesis could be rejected at the . 05 
level. Therefore, there is a significant difference in the opinions of MGRs, between listed and 
non-listed banks, on the implementation of the standard (See Table 7.9 below). Therefore, the 
listing status proposition (P2) is supported. 
Table 7.9: Chi-square analysis of independent variables relating to MGRs' opinions about 
the standard43 
Independent Variables and statistics XA2 Critical value Result 
P= 0.05, df=2 
Listing status (listed/non-listed bank) 32.28 5.99 Significant 
Cost of compliance (large/small No. 85.16 5.99 Significant 
of branches) 
43 The author's own computation, (See Appendix 14 and 15) 
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7.5 Banks' actual compliance with the standard44 
Findings and Analysis 
It is worth noting that in 1998 the CBS ordered all Islamic banks in Sudan to comply with the 
standard. Table 7.2 presents a summary of the actual implementation of the standard. 
Table 7.10: Banks' actual implementation of the standard as reflected in the 1998 annual reports 
Bank name Statement of 
financial position 
Income 
statement 
Cash flow 
statement 
Statement of changes 
in owners' equity 
Notes to the 
financial statement 
Alpha 1 1 0 0 1 
Beta 2 2 2 2 2 
Zubra 1 1 0 0 1 
Frasa 1 2 0 0 1 
Hadatha 2 2 2 2 1 
Sayada 2 2 0 2 1 
Asdar 2 2 0 0 1 
Fully implemented = 2, partially implemented = 1, Not implemented =0 
7.5.1 Bank's number of branches 
Table 7.11 shows that banks with a larger number of branches have less compliance with the 
standard (20%) than banks' with a smaller numbers of branches (60%). According to the Chi- 
square test the difference between the two groups is significant at 0.10 level (See Table 13 
below). 
44 Applicable financial statements are four out of seven, which include statement of financial position, income 
statement, statement of cash flows and statement of changes in owners' equity. In addition to the notes to financial 
statements.. 
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Table 7.11: Banks' actual implementation of the standard according to bank's size 
Bank name Bank's size Fully implemented Partially implemented Not 
implemented 
Total 
Alpha Larger - 3 2 5 
Zubra 99 - 3 
2 5 
Sayada 91 3 1 1 
5 
Sub total 3 7 5 15 
% 20 47 33 100 
Smaller 
 1 2 2 5 
Frasa 5 - - 5 
Beta 4 1 - 5 
Hadatha 2 1 2 5 
Asdar 
Sub total 12 4 4 20 
% 60 20 20 100 
7.5.2 Bank's listing status 
Table 7.12 indicates that banks listed on KSE have more compliance with the requirements of 
the standard (65%)than non-listed banks (13%). According to the Chi-square test the difference 
between the two groups is significant at 0.05 level (See Table 13 below). 
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Table 7.12: Banks' actual implementation of the standard according to bank's listing status 
Bank name Bank's status Fully implemented Partially implemented Not 
implemented 
Total 
Alpha Non-listed - 3 2 5 
Zubra - 3 2 5 
Asdar 2 1 2 5 
Sub total 2 7 6 15 
% 13 47 40 100 
Frasa Listed 1 2 2 5 
Beta 5 - - 5 
Hadatha 4 1 - 5 
Sayada 3 1 1 5 
Sub total 
% 13 4 3 20 
65 20 15 100 
Table 7.13: Chi-square analysis of independent variables45 relating to the actual implementation of 
the standard 
Independent Variables and statistics X^2 Critical value Result 
P= 0.05,0.10 
df=2 
Listing status (listed / non-listed bank) 9.36 5.99 Significant at 0.05 level 
Cost of compliance (larger/ smaller 5.73 4.60 Significant at 0.10 level 
No. of branches) 
as The author's own computation, (See Appendix 16 and 17). 
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7.6 Discussion of the findings 
The analysis carried out on the attitudes and opinions of the MGRs on, and actual compliance 
with, the disclosure standard has produced the following findings. 
1- The overall percentages of positive opinions received from the respondents (Section 7.3.2 
above) indicate that the bank MGRs' perceived the information needs of shareholders (95% 
positive) as more important than of other users. For example, the corresponding percentage 
for IAHs was 74%. Such a situation may not be acceptable to the investment account holders 
(IAHs) who invest on a system of profit-and-loss sharing and are thus, a type of equity 
investors. Unlike shareholders, IAHs have no right to interfere with the management of the 
bank, and no right to appoint or dismiss members of the board of directors and the EAs. If 
IAHs are faced with poor financial results they can only withdraw their funds to be invested 
elsewhere i. e. they can only vote with their feet. (See Archer et al, 1998, p. 165). 
2- Descriptive statistics (See Sub-section 7.4.1. a above) show that MGRs of banks with a larger 
number of branches tend to have less positive attitudes towards, and opinions on, the 
implementation of the standard than those of banks with a smaller number of branches. 
Furthermore, the Chi-square test indicates that this difference is statistically significant (see 
sub-section 7.4.1b above). Therefore, the result supports the cost of compliance proposition 
(P1 in chapter 5 above) that MGRs of banks with a larger number of branches will have less 
positive attitudes towards, and opinions on, the implementation of the standard than MGRs of 
banks with a smaller number of branches. 
3- Descriptive analysis also indicates that MGRs of banks listed on the KSE tend to have more 
positive attitudes towards, and opinions on, the implementation of the standard than the 
MGRs of non-listed banks. The Chi- square test shows that this difference is statistically 
significant (see section 7.4.2. above). Hence, the findings provide adequate support for the 
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listing status proposition (P2 in Chapter 5 above) that listed banks will have more positive 
attitudes towards, and opinions on, the implementation of the standard. This finding is 
consistent with the findings of the studies of Leftwich et al. (1981), Singhavi and Desais 
(1974) and Frost and Pownal (1999). 
4- The results also indicate that the less positive attitudes and opinions received from the MGRs 
of banks with large numbers of branches and from those of non- isted banks are confirmed by 
a low level of disclosure in their banks' financial statements (See Sections 7.5.1 and 7.5.2 
above). 
5- Based on interviews with the general MGRs of the banks or their deputies, it is evident that 
six out of seven banks disagreed with the implementation of the disclosure of (a) unusual 
supervisory restrictions imposed by the CBS46 and (b) transactions with related parties. As an 
example, the Deputy General MGR of Alpha Bank expressed the view that the disclosure of a 
central bank's restriction on the bank's activity would have a negative effect on the bank's 
competitive position with other banks and/or similar institutions. With regard to the bank's 
transactions with related parties, the Deputy General MGR of Beta bank commented: `such 
disclosure to the general public leads to an infringement of the privacy of related parties'. 
6- As for training issues, all the MGRs of banks included in the present study rate training costs 
as very high. Moreover, in discussions and meetings with the Deputy General MGR of Alpha 
Bank, he said: "our staff badly needs training for Islamic accounting standards, in particular 
the disclosure standard". It was also observed that the concerned staff working for Alpha, 
Zubra and Asdar have had less experience than what is required by the standard. This 
indicates a pressing need for training courses and workshops for the staff working for those 
banks. 
7- With regard to other costs of compliance in terms of money and effort, almost all the 
MGRs of banks with a larger number of branches evaluate such costs as very high. 
46 The CBS can impose restrictions on a commercial bank's investments. 
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Additionally, the MGRs thought that the preparation of their banks' financial statements, 
in accordance with the AAOIFI's FAS 1, would financially involve high costs. When 
asked about the cost implications of implementing the standard, the Deputy General MGRs 
of Beta and Frasa Banks expressed the view that "the cost would be high for the first two 
years of the implementation but no more than that". 
8- It is observed that the annual reports for 1998 of the compilers indicate differences in 
accounting policies used and their level of disclosure. It follows that there is no single set 
of accepted accounting policies to which users might refer; and the diverse accounting 
policies that are available for adoption would produce different sets of financial statements 
based on the same events and conditions. The following are examples of items in which 
different accounting policies exist and, therefore, require disclosure. 
Methods of allocation of profits between the Islamic bank and IAH. 
Consolidation policy 
Translation of foreign currency, including the disposition of exchange gains and losses. 
Provisions and reserves. 
7. Summary and concluding remarks 
The overall percentage of responses received from all MGRs of banks included in the study 
indicates that bank MGRs perceived the information needs of shareholders more clearly than 
those of others users of financial statements. This raises the issue of how to protect the 
interests of other users of the bank's financial statements such as IAH. The number of 
branches is used as a variable representing the cost of compliance with the standard. The 
variable is found to be statistically significantly associated with attitudes and opinions of banks 
MGRs on the implementation of the standard. This indicates that the number of branches is 
the dominant factor in explaining the significant variation in banks MGRs' attitudes towards, 
and opinions on, the implementation of the standard. Therefore, the cost of compliance 
proposition (P1), in chapter 5 above is supported, showing that attitudes towards, and opinions 
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on, such standard are driven by similar variable in Sudan as they are in Western countries (e. g., 
USA). 
Although the Khartoum stock exchange (KSE) in Sudan is an emerging market, the banking 
sector's shares (which is predominant by privately-owned banks) are actively traded on KSE and 
its 2000 annual report proves this. The listing status variable is also found to be statistically 
significantly associated with the banks' attitudes towards, and opinions about, the 
implementation of the standard. It follows that the listing status is an important factor in 
explaining the significant differences in banks' opinions on the implementation of the standard. 
Hence, the listing status proposition (P2) is supported. This finding is consistent with findings of 
the study of Leftwich et al. (1981), Singhavi and Desais (1974) and Frost and Pownal (1994). 
Therefore, the attitudes and opinions of bank MGRs in Sudan are explained by the listing status 
variable, as they are in the USA and in some cases in the UK. 
In conclusion, banks MGRs' attitudes towards, and opinions on, the implementation of the 
standard are largely influenced by cost-benefit analysis. In addition, it was also observed that 
bank MGRs' opinions about the implementation of the standard are consistent with their actual 
compliance with the standard. For instance, banks with a smaller number of branches have 
more positive attitudes towards, and opinions about, the implementation of the AAOIFI's 
standard, and simultaneously comply more with the standard than banks with a larger number of 
branches. Thus, the expressed opinions of MGRs provide a reliable indicator of their attitudes 
towards the implementation of the standard. 
In short, banks' views on, and their actions to, the implementations of the standard are 
influenced by cost- benefit considerations. In other words enthusiastic banks perceive the 
potential benefits as greater than the potential costs; whereas non-enthusiastic banks perceive 
the cost of compliance as greater than potential benefits. Hence, the number of branches and 
listing status are the most important factors explaining differences in bank MGRs' attitudes 
towards, and opinions on, the implementation of the standard as they are those used by the US 
firms in spite of the differences between the two economic and political environments. 
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Chapter 8 
Bank MGRs' Opinions on the Implementation 
of the Measurement Standards 
8.1 Introduction and objective 
In chapter 5 section 5.2.1 above, the following research question was developed to test the bonus 
plan proposition (P3), the ownership proposition (P4) and the size proposition (P5). 
To what extent do Islamic banks display positive or negative attitudes towards, and opinions on, 
the implementation of AAOIFI's accounting standards? 
The following specific question was then addressed. 
How much do bank MGRs agree or disagree in their attitudes towards, and opinions on, the 
implementation of AAOIFI's measurement standards? 
This specific question was followed by more specific itemized questions (62 items) were asked in 
order to elicit the opinions of respondents (banks' MGRs) on the requirements of the 
measurement standards47 (See Appendix 7-11). 
As mentioned in chapter 5 section 5.3 above, a single (embedded) case study approach, with 
cross-sectional comparisons of sub-units of analysis, is used to test whether the theoretical 
propositions, derived from the existing research literature, fit the data. These theoretical 
propositions pertain to bank MGRs' opinions on the implementation of the measurement 
standards (hereafter referred to as the standards). They include the bonus plan proposition (P3), 
ownership proposition (P4) and size (value of total assets) proposition (P5). 
The main purpose of this chapter is thus, to analyze and discuss the findings of the single 
(embedded) case study relating to bank MGRs' opinions on the implementation of the standards. 
47 Measurement standards include standards on Murabaha, Mudaraba, Musharaka, Salam and Equity of Investment 
Account Holders. 
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The remainder of the chapter is set out as follows: 
Section 2 presents the main findings of the empirical study on bank MGRs' responses to the 
implementation of AAOIFI's measurement standards. Section 3 provides a descriptive analysis 
of the opinions of bank MGRs on the implementation of the standards. Section 4 tests the 
propositions derived from the existing literature review, namely bonus plan proposition (P3) 
ownership (public/private) proposition (P4) and size (value of total assets) proposition (P5). 
Section 5 evaluates the need for training courses of implementing the standards for the staff 
working for the banks. Section 6 discusses the main findings of the case study. Section 7 
provides summary and concluding remarks. 
8.2 The main findings of the bank MGRs' responses to the implementation of 
the standards 
Question 2b relates to MGRs' opinions on the requirements of the standards 
Table 8.1 shows that 398 usable responses were received from the respondents of the selected 
banks 
Table 8.1: Banks MGRs' responses to question 2b (questions 2 in sections [B1-B5]) 
Bank Bank class responses Received usable responses response rate % 
Alpha Public 62 62 62 100 
Zubra 
 62 62 62 100 
Frasa 62 62 62 100 
Beta Private 62 62 62 100 
Hadatha  62 62 62 100 
Sayada 
 62 62 62 100 
Asdar Foreign 26 26 26 100 
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Question 2 in Section B1: Items 1-13 
Findings, Analysis and Discussion 
1 The assets possessed by the bank for the purpose of selling them on the basis of Murabaha or Murabaha to 
the Purchase Orderer shall be measured at the time of their acquisition on an historical cost basis. 
2 Assets available for sale after acquisition on the basis of Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer who is obliged 
to fulfil his promise shall be measured at their historical cost. A decline in the assets value shall be reflected 
in the valuation of the assets at the end of each financial period. 
3 If the bank finds that there is an indication of possible non-recovery of the costs of goods available for sale 
on the basis of Murabaha or Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer who is not obliged to fulfil his promise, the 
asset shall be measured at the cash equivalent (i. e. net realizable) value. This shall be achieved by creating a 
provision for decline in the asset value to reflect the difference between acquisition cost and the cash 
equivalent value. 
4 If the bank obtains a discount on the asset available for sale on the basis of Murabaha to the Purchase 
Orderer, such discount shall not be considered as revenue for the bank. Instead, the cost of the relevant 
goods shall be reduced by the amount of the discount. 
5 The discount may, however, be treated as revenue for the bank if this is decided by Shria' supervisory board 
of the bank. Such revenue shall be recognized in the income statement. 
6 Short-term or long-term Murabaha receivables shall be recorded at the time of occurrence at their face 
value. Murabaha receivables are measured at the end of the financial period at their cash equivalent value 
(i. e., the amount of debt due from the customers at the end of the financial period less any provision for 
doubtful debts). 
7 Profits from Murabaha or Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer are recognized at the time of contracting i 
the sale is for cash or on credit not exceeding the current financial period. 
8 Profits of a credit sale, which will be paid for either by means of one payment due after the current financial 
period or by installments over several future financial periods, shall be recognized by proportionate 
allocation of profits over the period of the credit. Whereby each financial period shall carry its portion oý 
profits irrespective of whether or not cash is received. 
9 As and when the installments are received. This method shall be used based on a decision made by Shari 'a 
supervisory board of the bank, or if it is required by, supervisory authority. 
10 The amount paid as hamish gedyyah is considered an obligation on the bank and shall be treated as a liability 
unless the Shari'a supervisory board of the Islamic bank decides otherwise. 
11 The amount of hamish gedyyah is returned in full even if the asset is sold to another client at a lower price 
than that agreed upon by the client who was the original purchase orderer. 
12 In the case of binding promise, the amount of actual loss shall be deducted from hamish gedyyah, (i. e., the 
bank shall not carry any losses). 
13 If hamish gedyyah or other guarantees are not adequate or not available, any resultant loss to the bank shall 
be recorded as an amount due from the client provided there is evidence of his failure to fulfill his promise. 
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The questions in this section aimed to elicit the opinions of the banks' MGRs on the 
implementation of Murabaha and Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer Standard. 
Based on the descriptive statistics used to analyze this section, it can be seen that 22% strongly 
agree, 51% agree, 13% neutral, 11% disagree and 3% strongly disagree (See Table 8.2 below). 
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Question 2 in Section B2: Items 1-14 
Findings, Analysis and Discussion 
I Mudaraba financing capital (cash or kind) should be recognized when it is paid to the Mudarib or placed under his 
disposition. 
2 If it is agreed that the capital of a Mudaraba is to be paid in installments, then each installment should be 
recognized at its payment. 
Measurement of Mudaraba capital at the time of contracting: 
33 Mudaraba capital provided in cash by the bank should be measured at the amount paid or the amount placed 
under the position of Mudarib. 
4 Mudaraba capital provided in kind (trading assets) should be measured at the fair value of the assets (the value 
agreed between the bank and the client), and if the valuation of assets results in a difference between fair value 
and book value, such difference should be recognized as profit or loss to the bank. 
5 Mudaraba capital after contracting should be measured as stated in item 2 and 3 above. However, any repayment 
of the Mudaraba capital, if any, made to the bank should be deducted from the Mudaraba capital. 
6 If a portion of the Mudaraba capital is lost prior to the inception of work because of damage or other causes 
without any misconduct or negligence on the part of the Mudarib, then such loss should be deducted from the 
Mudaraba capital and should be treated as loss to the bank. However, if the loss occurs after inception of work, 
it should not affect the measurement of Mudaraba capital. 
7 If the whole Mudaraba capital is lost without any misconduct or negligence on the part of the Mudarib the 
Mudaraba should be terminated and the account thereof should be settled and the loss should be treated as a loss 
to the bank. 
8 If the Mudaraba is terminated or liquidated and the Mudaraba capital is not paid to the bank when a settlement 
of the account is made, the Mudaraba capital should be recognized as receivable due from the Mudarib.. 
9 Profits or loss in respect of the bank's share in Mudaraba fmancing transactions that commence and end during a 
single financial period should be recognized at the time of liquidation. 
10 In the case of Mudaraba financing that continues for more than one financial period, the bank's share of profits 
for any period, resulting from partial or final settlement between the bank and the Mudarib, should be recognized 
in its accounts for that period to the extent that the profits are being distributed; the bank's share of losses for any 
period should be recognized in its account for that period to the extent that such losses are being deducted from 
the Mudaraba capital. 
11 As implied in 8 above, if the Mudarib does not pay the bank its due share of profits after liquidation or 
settlement of account is made, the due share of profit should be recognized as receivable due from Mudarib. 
12 Losses resulting from liquidation should be recognized at the time of liquidation by reducing the Mudarib 
capital. 
13 The Mudarib should bear the losses incurred due to misconduct or negligence on his part. Such loss should be 
recognized as a receivable due from the Mudarib. 
14 Disclosure should be made in the notes to the financial statements for a financial reporting period if the bank 
has made during the period a provision for decline in the value of Mudaraba assets. 
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The questions in this section aimed to elicit the opinions of the banks' MGRs on the 
implementation of Mudaraba Financing Standard. 
Based on the descriptive statistics used to analyze this section, Table 8.2 below shows that 60% 
strongly agree, 21 % agree, 17% neutral and 2% disagree. 
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Question 2 in Section B3: Items 1-13 
Findings, Analysis and Discussion 
1 The bank's share in Musharaka capital (cash or kind) should be recognized when it is paid to the partner or made 
available to him on account of the Musharaka. 
2 The bank's share in Musharaka capital provided in cash should be measured by the amount paid or made available 
to the partner on the account of the Musharaka. 
3 The bank's share in Musharaka capital provided in kind (trading assets) should be measured at the fair value of 
the assets (the value agreed between the partners) and if the valuation results in a difference between fair value 
and book value, such difference should be recognized as a profit or loss to the bank. . 
4 The bank's share in the constant Musharaka capital should be measured at the end of the financial period at 
historical cost. 
5 The bank's share in the diminishing Musharaka should be measured at the end of the period at historical cost 
after deducting from the historical cost of any share transferred to the partner (such transfer being by means of a 
sale at fair value) the difference between historical cost and fair value should be recognized as profit or loss in 
the bank's income statement. 
6 If the diminishing Musharaka is liquidated before complete transfer is made to the partner. The amount 
recovered in respect of the bank's share should be credited to the bank's Musharaka financing account and any 
resulting profit or loss, namely the difference between the book value and the recovered amount, should be 
recognized in the bank's income statement. 
7 If the Musharaka is terminated or liquidated and the bank's due share of the Musharaka capital remains unpaid 
when a settlement of account is made, the bank's share should be recognized as receivable due from the partner. 
8 Profits or losses in respect of bank's share in Musharaka financing transactions that commence and end during a 
financial period should be recognized in the bank's account at the time of liquidation. 
9 In the case of a constant Musharaka that continues for more than one financial period, the bank's share of profits 
for any period, resulting from partial or final settlement between the bank and the partner, should be recognized 
in its accounts for that period to the extent that the profits are being distributed, the bank's share of loss for any 
period should be recognized in its accounts for that period to the extent that such losses are being deducted from 
its share of the Musahraka capital. 
10 Item 
.9 should apply to a diminishing Musharaka which continues for more than one financial period, after 
taking into consideration the decline in the bank's share in Musharaka capital and its profits or losses. 
11 If losses are incurred in Musharaka due to the partner's misconduct or negligence, the partner should bear the 
bank's share of such losses; such losses should be recognized as receivable due from the partner. 
12 The bank's unpaid share of the proceeds should be recorded in a Musharaka receivable accounts. A provision 
should be made for these receivables if they are doubtful. 
13 Disclosure should be made in the notes to the financial statements for a financial-reporting period if the bank has 
made during the period a provision for a loss of its capital in Musharaka financing transactions 
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The questions in this section aimed to elicit the opinions of the banks' MGRs on the 
implementation of Musharaka Financing Standard. 
Based on the descriptive statistics used to analyze this section, Table 8.2 below indicates that 
27% strongly agree, 59% agree, 8% neutral and 6% disagree. 
Question 2 in Section B4: Items 1-10 
1 Equity of unrestricted investment account holders should be measured by the amount received by the bank at the 
time of contracting. 
2 At the end of financial period, equity of unrestricted investment account holders should be measured at their book 
value. 
3 Profits of an investment jointly financed by the bank and unrestricted investment accounts holders should be 
allocated between them according to the contribution of each of the two parties in the jointly financed 
investment. 
4 Loss resulting from transactions in a jointly financed investment (that is recognized during a period other than 
that in which final settlement of the investment account is made) should in the first instance be deduced from any 
undistributed profits on the investment. 
5 Any such loss in excess of the amount of undistributed profits should be deducted from provisions for investment 
losses formed for this purpose. The remaining loss, if any, should be deduced from the respective equity shares 
in the joint investment of the bank and the unrestricted investment accounts holders, according to each party's 
contribution to the joint investment. 
6 Loss due to misconduct or negligence on the part of the bank, based on the opinion of the Shari 'a supervisory 
board of the bank, should be deducted from the bank's share in the profits of the jointly financed investment. In 
case the loss exceeds the bank's share of profits the difference should be deduced from its equity share in the 
joint investment, if any, or recognized as due from the bank. 
7 Assets and liabilities relating to equity of restricted investment account holders and their equivalent should be 
treated separately from the bank's assets and liabilities. 
8 Equity of restricted investment accounts holders should be measured by the amount received by the bank or the 
client's purchase price of the units or shares brought by him at the time of contracting. 
9 At the end of financial period, equity of restricted investment account holders should be measured at its book 
value. 
10 In the case the bank has funds invested in restricted investment accounts whether from its own equity or from 
other funds at its disposal, the bank should share in the profits earned on such funds in its capacity as provider of 
funds. 
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The questions in this section aimed to elicit the opinions of the banks' MGRs on the 
implementation of Equity of Investment Account Holders Standard. 
Based on the descriptive statistics used to analyze this section, Table 8.2 shows that 30% 
strongly agree, 62% agree and 8% neutral. 
Question 2 in Section B5: Items 1-12 
1 Salam financing shall be recognized when the capital of Salam is paid (whether in cash, kind or benefit) to al 
muslam ileihi or when it is made available to him. 
2 Parallel Salam transactions shall be recognized when the bank receives the capital of Salam (in cash, kind or 
benefit). 
3 The capital of Salam shall be measured by the amount paid at the time of contracting. 
4 Capital of Salam provided in kind, or benefit shall be measured at the fair value (the value agreed between the 
bank and the client) of the asset or provided benefit. 
5 The capital of Salam is measured at the end of a financial period as in item 4. However, if it is probable that a! - 
muslam ileihi will not deliver al-muslam fihi in full or in part, or it is probable that the value of al-muslan: fihi 
will decline, the bank shall make a provision of the amount of the estimated deficit. 
6 Assets constitutive of al-muslam fihi received by the bank in accordance with contract are recorded at their 
historical cost. 
7 If the market value (or the fair value if the market value is not available) of the received al-muslam fihi is equal 
to the value of contract al muslam fihi, the received al-muslam fihi shall be measured and recorded at book 
value. 
8 If the market value of the received al-muslam fihi is lower than the book value of contracted al-muslam fihi, the 
received al- musalm fihi shall be measured and recorded at market value (or fair value) at the time of delivery 
and the difference shall be recognized as loss. 
9 If the Salam financing contract is completely or partially cancelled and the client has failed to repay the capital 
of Salam or the required portion thereof, the amount due shall be recognized as receivable due from the client. 
10 In case the bank has securities pledged for al-muslam fihi and the profits from the sale of the securities are less 
than the book value, the different is recognized as a receivable due from the client. Alternatively, if the proceeds 
are less than the book value then the difference is credited to the client. 
11 At the end of a financial period, assets acquired through Salam financing shall be measured at the lower of 
historical cost and cash equivalent value, and if the cash equivalent value is lower, the difference shall be 
recognized as loss in the income statement. 
12 Upon delivery of al muslam fihi by the bank to the client in a parallel Salam, the difference between the amount 
paid by the client and the cost of al-muslamfihi shall be recognized as profit or loss. 
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The questions in this section aimed to elicit the opinions of the banks' MGRs on the 
implementation of Salam and Parallel Salam Financing Standard. 
Based on the descriptive statistics used to analyze this section, Table 8.2 below indicates that 
26% strongly agree, 61% agree, 6% neutral, 6%. Disagree and 1% strongly disagree 
Table 8.2 presents the main findings relating to the opinions of MGRs on the implementation of 
the standards. 
Table 8.2: The findings of bank MGRS' opinions on the implementation of individual 
standards 
measurement standards / 
managers' opinions 
SA 
% 
A 
% 
N 
% 
D 
% 
SD 
% 
Total 
Murabaha 20 22 46 51 12 13 10 11 33 91 
Mudaraba 50 60 18 21 14 17 2 2-- 84 
Musharaka 25 27 54 59 7 8 5 6-- 91 
Salam 19 26 44 61 4 6 4 611 72 
Equity of investment 18 30 37 62 5 8 - --- 60 
account holders 
SA= Strongly agree, A= Agree, N= Neutral, D= Disagree, SD= Strongly disagree 
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8.3 Overall analysis of bank MGRs' responses to the implementation of the 
standards 
Overall bank MGRs' opinions on the standards 
Figure 8 shows that all most MGRs of banks have positive attitudes towards, and opinions 
about, the implementation of the standards, with few negative opinions. 
Figure 8: Bank MGRS' opinions on individual measurement standards 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
aa 'a 
. N. A 
° 
ý 
ý°' 
Measurement standards 
  Strongly disagree 
® Disagree 
Q Neutral 
  agree 
a strongly agree 
122 
Chapter 8 Findings, Analysis and Discussion 
8.4 Factors influencing bank MGRs' opinions on the implementation of the 
standards48 
As mentioned in chapter 7 above, because of the small number of selected banks, the 
independent variables are treated separately and dichotomously. The cross-sectional comparison 
with the Chi-square contingency table test is used in order to test whether the value of the 
dichotomised variables has a significant association with that of the dependent variable. The 
dichotomised variables are (a) ownership; (public/private); (b) the existence (non-existence) of a 
bonus plan; and (c) bank's size (value of total assets). It was discovered that one of these 
dichotomised variables is co-extensive with another, In effect, all private banks have a bonus 
plan but no public bank has. 
Table 8.3 presents the main findings of the empirical study relating to the banks MGRs' opinions 
on the implementation of the measurement standards according to bank's class. 
Table 8.3: The findings of bank MGRS' opinions on the implementation of measurement standards 
according to bank's class (see Table 6.3, column 2) 
Bank class SA AND SD Total 
Public banks (with no 
bonus plans) 59 65 22 38 2 186 
Private banks (with bonus 
plan) 75 80 25 42 186 
Foreign bank (with bonus 
plan) 2 17 43 26 
= strongly agree, A= Agree, N= Neutral, D= Disagree, SD= Strongly disagree 
48 The implementation of the measurement standards by the selected (studied) banks is not observed hence, the 
opinions of respondents are only used as indication of their attitudes. 
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For statistical analysis "strongly agree" and "agree" are combined into positive response and 
"strongly disagree" and "disagree" are combined into negative responses because the number 
of banks in Sudan is limited. Moreover, private and foreign banks are combined into private 
banks. 
Table 8.4 presents the summary of positive, neutral and negative responses 
Table 8.4: Summary of positive, neutral and negative responses 
Bank's class Positive Neutral Negative Total 
Public banks (with 124 22 40 186 
no bonus plan) 
Private banks (with 174 29 9 212 
bonus plan) 
8.4.1 Ownership (public/private)Bonus plan variable 
a) Descriptive statistics analysis 
Based on the descriptive statistics used , table 8.5 shows that MGRs of private banks (with bonus 
plans) have more positive attitudes towards, and opinions on [82%], the implementation of the 
measurement standards than MGRs of public banks (with no bonus plans) [66%]. On the neutral 
and negative sides it can be observed that there are substantially more negative opinions from the 
MGRs of public banks (with no bonus plans). 
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Table 8.5: Descriptive statistics of bank's ownership (bonus plans) variable 
Bank's class % of responses 
Positive Neutral Negative 
Public banks (with no bonus plans) 66 12 22 
Private banks (with bonus plans) 82 14 4 
b) Statistical tests 
A Chi- square test (X^2= 26.94, df= 2) indicates that there is a significant difference in bank 
MGRs' opinions (See Table 8.8 below) on the implementation of the standards. In other words,. 
MGRs of public banks express significantly more negative opinions on the implementation of 
the standards than MGRs of private banks. Thus, the results provide support for the 
public/private proposition (P4 in chapter 5 above). The bonus plan variable happens, however, to 
be co-extensive with another independent variable (i. e. public/private). In any case the bonus 
plan proposition is that MGRs of banks with bonus plans will be less positive in their attitudes 
towards, and opinions on, the measurement standards. Thus, the results provide no support for 
the bonus plan hypothesis in Sudan. 
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8.4.2 Bank size (total assets) 
Findings, Analysis and Discussion 
Table 8.6 presents the summary of positive, neutral and negative responses 
Table 8.6: Summary of positive, neutral and negative responses according to bank size (see 
Table 6.3, column 3) 
Bank's size Positive Neutral Negative Total 
Banks with larger value of 108 39 39 186 
total assets 
Banks with smaler value of 190 12 10 212 
total assets 
a. Descriptive statistics analysis 
Table 8.7 indicates that MGRs of banks with a larger value of total assets have a less positive 
attitudes towards, and opinions (58 %) on, the implementation of measurement standards as 
compared to MGRs of a smaller value of total assets (89%). On the neutral and negative sides 
there are more negative opinions from the MGRs of banks with larger value of total assets. 
Table 8.7: Descriptive statistics of bank's size (value of total assets) variable 
Bank's size % of responses 
Positive Neutral Negative 
Banks with larger value of 58 21 21 
total assets 
Banks with smaller value of 
total assets. 
89 65 
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b. Statistical analysis 
A Chi square test (X^2= 52.54, df--2) indicates that there is a statistically significant difference 
in bank MGRs' attitudes towards, and opinions on, the implementation of the measurement 
standards. In other words, MGRs of banks with a larger value of total assets have significantly 
more negative attitudes towards, and opinions on, the implementation of the standards than 
MGRs of banks with a smaller value of total assets (See Table 8.8 below). The size hypothesis, 
namely that MGRs of banks with a larger value of total assets will have more negative attitudes 
towards, and opinions on, the implementation of the measurement standards than MGRs of 
banks with a smaller value of total assets, is therefore, supported by the data from Sudan. 
Table 8.8: Chi-square analysis of independent variables relating to the implementation of the 
measurement standards 49 
Independent variables: Dependent variables: 
Opinions on the implementation of measurement standards 
X^2 Critical value 
Ownership (bonus plan) 26.94 5.99 
Bank size(total assets) 52.55 5.99 
The critical value 5.9910 at the 0.05 level. 
49 The author's own computations, see Appendix 17 and 18. 
df 
2 
2 
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8.5 The evaluation of the need for training courses 
Question 3 in sections B1-5: Items 1-5 
Findings, Analysis and Discussion 
How do MGRS evaluate the need for training courses related to the implementation of the standards? 
Murabaha and Murabaha to Purchase Orderer 
Mudaraba Financing 
Musharaka Financing 
Salam and Parallel Salam 
Equity of Investment Account Holders 
Question 3 in sections B1-5 aimed to elicit bank MGRs' opinions about the evaluation of the 
need for training courses related to the implementation of AAOIFI's measurement standards. 
Descriptive statistics only were used to analyze the data, because there is a problem of 
measuring the significance of the test with a smaller number of observations concerning bank's 
MGRs' evaluation of cost of compliance. 
Table 8.9 shows that all the MGRs perceive the need for training courses relating to the 
Murabaha and Salam standards as very high 
Table 8.9: The evaluation of the need for training courses related to the standards 
Bank's The evaluation of training courses for measurement standards 
class Murabaha Mudaraba Musharaka Salam Equity of IAH 
Public banks 52251 
Private banks 52251 
Where 5= very high, 4= high, 3= moderate, 2= low and 1= very low 
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8.6 Discussion of the findings 
The analysis carried out on the attitudes and opinions of the MGRs on the measurement 
standards has produced the following results. 
1- More positive opinions were expressed on the implementation of the standards on Mudaraba, 
Equity of Investment Accounts, Musharaka, Salam and Murabaha (See Section 8.3 above). It 
follows that banks are more receptive to the implementation of the measurement standards 
than the disclosure standard. This might be attributed to the fact that there is a high cost of 
compliance (in terms of money, effort and training) associated with the implementation of the 
disclosure standard. 
2- The findings of the case study appear to indicate that MGRs of private banks (with bonus 
plans) have more positive attitudes towards, and opinions on, the implementation of the 
standards than MGRs of public banks (with no bonus plans) [Section 8.4.1 above]. However, 
as discussed above, the bonus plan variable happens to be co-extensive with another 
independent variable (i. e. public/private). At the same time, MGRs of publicly owned banks 
appeared to have less positive attitudes towards, and opinions on, the implementation of 
AAOIFI's measurement standards (See section 8.4.1 above). The ownership (public/private) 
proposition is also related in the Sudanese context to the "political costs" hypothesis, because 
MGRs of publicly owned banks are more sensitive to political pressure (i. e., a profitable 
public bank might be ordered to invest in high risky national projects). The data thus support 
the ownership (public/ private) proposition. 
3- As for the bank's size (value of total assets) variable, descriptive statistics indicate that MGRs 
of banks with a larger value of total assets have more negative attitudes towards, and opinions 
on, the implementation of the standards, as compared to those of banks with a smaller value 
of total assets. (See Section 8.4.2. above) The Chi square test also indicates that this 
difference is statistically significant. Thus, the findings provide support for the size 
hypothesis, namely the proposition that MGRs of banks with a larger value of total assets will 
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have less positive attitudes towards, and opinions on, the implementation of the measurement 
standards than MGRs of banks with a smaller value of total assets. The size hypothesis is also 
related to the `political cost hypothesis' and the result is consistent with findings from the 
studies of Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and Kelly (1982). 
8.7 Summary and concluding remarks 
It is noted that ownership (public/private) and bank size variables used as proxies for political 
costs are very important in explaining variation in banks MGRs' attitudes towards, and opinions 
on, the implementation of the standards. More precisely, the ownership variable (private/public) 
and bank size are used to explain differences in attitudes and opinions of MGRs of public and 
private banks. The variables are found to be statistically significantly associated with MGRs' 
opinions on implementation of the standards. This provides support for the ownership (public/ 
private) proposition (P4) and bank's size proposition (P5). This implies that public banks and 
banks with a larger value of total assets are more sensitive to political pressure (i. e. restrictions 
and/or obligations on those banks imposed by the government and regulators). The present study 
concludes that the opinions of preparers (Islamic banks) on the implementation of the standards 
are explained by similar (ownership and size) variables, to those in the USA. However, in this 
case bank MGRs', attitudes towards, and opinions on, the implementation of standards could not 
be explained by a bonus plan variable. This is probably due to the fact that in our selection of 
banks the bonus plan variable is found to be co-extensive with another independent variable, 
which in the Sudanese context is associated with political costs that may be faced by profitable 
public banks. This would give the latter an incentive to use profit-reducing accounting methods 
and hence resist new accounting measurement standards that restrict their ability to do this. 
Finally, the expressed opinions of the respondents provide an indication of their attitudes towards 
the implementation of AAOIFI's measurement standards. However, those opinions could not be 
confirmed by the actual implementation of the standards in the selected (studied) banks. This is 
due to the fact that the researcher could not observe the implementation of the measurement 
standards. 
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Chapter 9 
Evaluation of the Implications for Audit Risk Associated with the 
Implementation of the AAOIFI's Accounting Standards 
9.1 Introduction and objective 
In chapter 5 section 5.2.1 above, the following research question was developed: 
How do bank EAs evaluate the implications for audit risk associated with the implementation of 
the accounting standards? 
This question includes some other more specific itemized questions regarding the audit risk 
associated with Shari'a non-compliance risk (3 items) and with collectibility of receivables (3 
items), {See Appendix 12 below}. 
A single (embedded) case study approach, with cross-sectional comparisons between the sub- 
units of analysis, is used to test whether the theoretical propositions, derived from the normative 
research literature (e. g., the ARM and business risk in chapter 4 above) fit the data. The 
theoretical propositions are concerned with the attitudes and opinions of EAs on the 
implementation of AAOIFI's accounting standards (hereafter referred to as accounting 
standards). They include (1) Shari'a non-compliance50 risk proposition (P6), and (2) 
collectability of receivable risk proposition (P7). 
The main purpose of the present chapter therefore, is to analyze the findings of the case study 
relating to the opinions of EAs about the implications for audit risks associated with the 
implementation of the standards. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: 
Section 2 presents similarities and differences in EAs' evaluation of audit risks associated with 
the implementation of the standards. Section 3 tests the two above propositions (P6 and P7). 
Section 4 discusses the main findings of the audit firms surveyed. Summary and concluding 
remarks are provided in section 5. 
50 An example of Shari'a non-compliance is a supposed Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer is in fact a straight loan 
with a charge for credit, with the asset never being acquired by the bank (the supposed seller). In other words, the 
bank's audited financial statements contained a material misstatement regarding earnings prohibited by Islamic 
Shari'a rules and principles. There is a risk that this would not be detected by the EA of such bank. 
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9.2 The main findings of the evaluation of Shari'a non- compliance risk 
Question 2 in Section Ca concerns opinions of EAs on the implications for Shari 'a non- 
compliance risk. 
Question 2 in Section Ca: Items 1-3 
1. Ignoring the existence of the internal control system, what is the probability that the implementation of 
AAOIFI's accounting standards would increase the risk of material misstatement of earnings prohibited by 
Shari 'a in the bank's financial statements. 
2. What is the likelihood that additional audit investment would be planned to ensure that, the bank's financial 
statements are prepared and presented in accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS 1 (presentation and disclosure). 
3 What is the likelihood that additional audit fees would be charged for bank audit in accordance with 
AAOIFIs' FAS 1 (presentation and disclosure). 
The questions in this section aimed to elicit the opinions of the EAs on the evaluation of the 
implications for audit risk associated with Shari 'a non-compliance. 
Table 9.1 shows that 15 usable responses were received from the respondents 
Table 9.1: EAs' responses to Shari'a non compliance risk 
Audit 
Firm 
Client's 
class 
Responses Received Usable Responses Response 
Rate % 
AG Public 3 3 3 100 
AD Private 3 3 3 100 
B&G 3 3 3 100 
M 99 3 3 3 100 
HAS Foreign 3 3 3 100 
Total 15 15 15 100 
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The evaluation of implications for Shari'a non-compliance risk 
Findings, Analysis and Discussion 
Table 9.2 shows that the evaluation of the audit risk associated with Shari 'a non- compliance is 
very high by the EAs of all the banks. Consequently, the assessment of the need for more audit 
evidence and fees is very high, except in the case of the EA of private banks, where it is high. 
Table 9.2 The evaluation of implications for Shari'a non- compliance risk 
Audit firm Auditor of Shari 'a Non- Compliance 
client's class Risk Evidence Fees 
AG Public 55 
B&G Private 544 
AD 99 544 
M 
90 
5 
Sub total 
Average 
HAS Foreign 
4 
15 12 12 
544 
55 
Where 5= very high, 4= high, 3= moderate, 2= low and 1= very low 
5 
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9.3 The findings of the EAs' evaluation of collectibility of receivables risk 
Question 2 in Section C. b concerns EAs' opinions on the evaluation of the implications for 
collectibility of receivables risk. 
Question 2 in Section Cb: Items 1-3 
I- Ignoring the existence of the internal control system, what is the probability that the implementation of 
Murabaha and Salam standards would increase the risk of material misstatement of the bank's assets (e. g. 
collectibility) in the bank's financial statements. 
2. What is the likelihood that additional audit work would be planned to ensure that, the bank's balances and 
transactions are measured in accordance with AAOIFIs' measurement standards. 
. 
3- What is the likelihood that additional audit fees would be charged for bank audit in accordance with 
AAOIFIs' measurement standards 
Table 9.3 shows that 15 usable responses were received from the respondents 
Table 9.3: EAs' responses to collectability of receivable risk according to bank's class 
Audit 
firm 
Clent's 
class 
responses Received Usable Responses Response Rate 
% 
AG Public 3 3 3 100 
G&B Private 3 3 3 100 
AD 3 3 3 100 
M 3 3 3 100 
HAS Foreign 3 3 3 100 
Total 15 15 15 100 
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The evaluation of audit risk associated with collectibility of receivables 
Table 9.4 indicates that the evaluation of audit risk associated with collectibility of receivables 
(Murabaha and Salam) by the EAs is very high, except in the case of the EAs of private banks. The 
EA of public bank rates the need for more evidence as very high. However, the EAs of private banks 
rate the need for more evidence and more fees as low. 
Table 9.4: The evaluation of implications for collectibility of receivables risk according to bank's class 
Audit firm Client's class Collectibility of Receivables Risk Evidence Fees 
AG Public bank 553 
B&G Private bank 555 
AD 
5 11 
M111 99 
Sub total 11 77 
Average 3.7 2.3 2.3 
HAS Foreign bank 533 
Where 5= very high, 4= high, 3= moderate, 2= low and 1= very low 
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9.4 Factors influencing EAs' evaluation of the implication for the audit risk 
The effect of bank's proportion of Murabaha and Salam receivables on the EAs' evaluation of the 
implication for the audit risk is examined as follows: 
9.4.1 The EAs' evaluation of the implication for Shari'a non-compliance risk 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 9.5 indicates that the proposition of receivables to the value of total assets of a client bank 
makes no difference to the EAs' attitudes towards, and opinions on, the evaluation of the audit risk 
associated with Sharia's non-compliance. The EAs of banks with a lower proportion of receivables 
(Murabaha and Salam) to the value of total assets evaluate the Shari 'a non-compliance risk as the 
same high level as do the EAs of banks with a higher proportion of receivables. Therefore, there is 
no difference at all in EAs' attitudes towards, and opinions on, the evaluation of Shari 'a non- 
compliance risk Thus, proposition 6 (P6 in Chapter 5 above) is not supported. 
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Table 9.5: EAs' evaluation of of the implication for Shari'a non- compliance according to 
bank's proportion of receivables" 
Audit Firm Bank's proportion of 
receivables to total 
assets 
Rate 
Shari'a non-compliance risk Evidence Fees 
AG Higher proportion 5 5 5 
B&G  5 5 5 
Sub total 10 10 10 
Average 5 5 5 
AD Lower proportion 5 5 5 
M 5 2 2 
HAS 5 5 5 
Sub total 15 12 12 
Average 5 4 4 
Where 5= very high, 4= high, 3= moderate, 2= low and 1= very low 
31 See Table 6.3 column S. 
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9.4.2 EAs' evaluation of the implication for collectibility of receivables risk 
a. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 9.6 appears to show that the EAs of banks with a higher proportion of receivables, evaluate the 
implications for collectibility of receivables risk as greater than the EAs of banks with a lower 
proportion of receivables. Consequently, the evaluation of the need for more audit evidence by EAs 
of banks with higher proportion of receivables is very high and therefore, they would claim high 
fees. 
Table 9.6: EAs' evaluation of of the implication for collectibility of receivables risk 
Audit Firm Bank's proportion of 
receivables to total 
assets 
collectibility of 
receivables risk 
Rate 
Evidence Fees 
AG Higher proportion 5 5 3 
B&G 
 5 5 5 
Sub total 10 10 10 
Average 5 5 5 
AD Lower proportion 5 1 1 
M 1 1 1 
HAS 5 3 3 
Sub total 11 5 5 
Average 3.7 1.7 1.7 
ere 5= very high, 4= high, 3= moderate, 2= low and 1= very low 
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b- Statistical test 
A Kruskal Wallis test (X^2= 0.41 del) indicates that there is a statistically insignificant 
difference in EAs' attitudes towards, and opinions on, the evaluation of collectibility of 
receivables risk (See Table 9.7 below). The data suggest that there is a difference between the 
two categories of audit firms of the banks (See Table 9.6 above) and the difference is in the 
expected direction. However, according to Kruskal Wallis (KW) test this difference is not 
statistically significant. The lack of statistical significance may be due to sparseness of data i. e., 
small number of observations. Hence, P7 in chapter 5 above is not supported. 
Table 9.7: Kruskal-Wallis tests 
Independent variable Dependent variables: EAs' evaluation of 
implications of collectability of risk 
K-W Sig. df 
Murabaha and Salam receivables to 
the value of total assets 0.41 1 
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9.5 Discussion of the findings 
The analysis carried out on the attitudes and opinions of the EAs on the evaluation of the 
implication of audit risk associated with the implementation of accounting standards has produced 
the following findings. 
1. Descriptive statistics show (Section 9.3 above) that the evaluation of collectibility of 
receivables risk by the EA of public bank is very high, whereas the EAs of private banks 
rate such risk as high. The EA of public bank rates the need for more evidence as very 
high. However, the EAs of private banks rate the need for more evidence and more fees 
on average as low. 
2. Descriptive statistics also show (section 9.4.1 above) that the evaluation of the risk 
associated with auditing of an Islamic bank according to Shari 'a rules is high for all the 
audit firms surveyed. This means that there is no difference at all in EAs' opinions on, 
and attitudes towards, the evaluation of Shari 'a non--compliance risk associated with the 
implementation of the disclosure standard. Hence, the results provide no support for 
proposition P6 (P6 in section 5.5 above). This implies that the level of receivables has 
no effect on EAs' opinions on the evaluation of the new type of audit risk (Shari'a 
compliance risk). The findings also indicate that four out of five audit firms perceive a 
high need for substantive testing (analytical review testing and transaction testing) in 
auditing an Islamic bank's financial statements according to Sharia' rules and principles. 
The key question is whether the EAs would change conventional audit procedures to 
accommodate Shari 'a principles. It might be argued that almost all of the audit firms 
that were auditing Islamic banks, at the time of conducting this research, firmly adhered 
to conventional audit practice. For example, the auditors' reports (1998) on the audit of 
the selected banks did not give an opinion on whether the bank's activities comply with 
Sharia' rules and principles. This may be due to the fact that the surveyed audit firms 
have not yet developed an audit programme that copes with the new type of audit risk 
associated with Shari 'a non-compliance. This necessitates the need for training courses 
(e. g., in-house training for EAs of Islamic banks). 
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3. Descriptive statistics indicate (see section 9.4.2) that the EAs of banks with a higher 
proportion of Murabaha and Salam receivables evaluate the implications for audit risk 
associated with collectibility of receivables as greater than the EAs of banks with a low 
proportion of receivables. Consequently, EAs of banks with higher proportion of 
receivables evaluate the need for more audit evidence as very high and therefore they 
would claim high fees. In contrast, EAs of banks with low proportion evaluate the need 
for more evidence and fees on average as low. The findings of the present study show 
that there is a difference between the average of evaluations of EAs banks with "higher" 
and "lower" proportion categories and the differences in the expected direction. 
According to KW test, the difference is statistically insignificant and thus there is no 
association between a bank's proportion of receivables (Murabaha and Salam) to the 
value of total assets and the EAs' evaluation of collectibility of receivables risk. 
Therefore, the results provide no support for proposition 7 in chapter 5 above. The 
results are inconsistent with Pratt and Stice's (1994) findings that EAs of fines with a 
higher proportion of receivables had evaluated the implications for audit risk associated 
with collectibility of receivables as high. 
9.6 Summary and concluding remarks 
The evaluation of the audit risk associated with Shari 'a non-compliance is perceived as greater 
than for the other types of risk. This findings show that there is no difference at all in EAs' 
opinions on the implications for audit risk associated with Shari 'a non-compliance. The finding 
provides no support for the Shari 'a non-compliance risk proposition (P6) in chapter 5 above, 
indicating that EAs', attitudes towards and opinions about, the evaluation of such risk are not 
explained by the proportion of receivables (Murabaha and Salam) to total assets variable. 
Evidence indicates that the collectibility risk proposition (P7) is not supported. The case study 
concludes that the independent variable (namely the proportion of receivables to total assets) 
that helps explain auditors' opinions in countries like USA does not have explanatory power in 
Sudan. The finding, however, is subject to the problem of sparseness of data in Sudan. The 
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problem of sparse arise from the fact that there are only five audit firms in the present study i. e., 
small number of observations. Another reason might be that training and regulation are 
predominant in the USA professional bodies (e. g., AICPA), whereas the Sudanese professional 
bodies (e. g. SCCA) do not consider training and regulation in the context of auditing Islamic 
banks in Sudan. Moreover, US Statements of Auditing Standards, which were used to develop 
research propositions, are not applied in Sudan. The EA of public bank evaluates audit risk 
associated with collectibility of receivables as very high. This implies that Murabaha and Salam 
receivables are perceived as more risky to audit by the EA of public banks. This may be due to 
the fact that the staff working for the AG are less qualified than what is required or may be 
public banks have a problem of collectibility of Salam and Murabaha receivables. 
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Chapter 10 
Summary, Conclusions and Suggestions 
10.1 Introduction 
The recent phenomenon of Islamic banking represents in some ways a radical departure from 
conventional banking practices. To comply with Islamic Shari 'a rules and principles, an 
Islamic bank mobilizes funds on the system of profit sharing and uses those funds under 
Islamic modes of finance rather than interest-based modes. As an alternative to lending funds 
and charging interest thereon, Islamic banks use various modes of Islamic finance, including: 
Musharaka (profit-and-loss sharing mode), Mudaraba (equity), mark-up based modes (e. g., 
Murabaha, Salam, Istisna) and leasing modes (Ijarah and Ijarah Muntahia Bittamleek). 
Each of the above Islamic modes of financing has some characteristics that resemble those of 
financial instruments used by conventional banks. However, Islamic modes of finance have 
specific Islamic Juristic rules that have no parallels in conventional financial instruments. 
Yet, IASs do not consider the specificity of Islamic financial instruments used by Islamic 
banks. Moreover, the items in financial statements of Islamic banks do not match in a 
number of cases to the items specified in the financial statements of a conventional bank. 
This is because the financial statement items, which are mentioned in AAOIF's FAS 1, are 
largely the results of Shari'a compliant financial products and are interest-free and do not 
appear in the financial statements of conventional banks. 
Attitudes of preparers of conventional financial statements have received considerable 
attention in the accounting research literature. This attention has largely been in Western 
countries. A major interest of the present study is that it examines the same issues in the 
setting of a less-developed market economy, namely that of Sudan. Another major interest is 
that the preparers in this case are the MGRs of Islamic banks. In addition, the new accounting 
standards deal with Islamic banks' transactions using Shari 'a compliant financial instruments 
that are categorically different from those used by the conventional banks. The standards also 
have the support of the CBS as the regulator of the banking sector in Sudan. The sector 
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operates according to the rules and principles of Islamic Shari 'a. Therefore, the improvement 
of the transparency and comparability of financial reporting by means of appropriate 
accounting standards is intended to extend Shari 'a compliance into the financial reporting 
process, and this is a new development. Moreover, the present study considers the opinions 
of EAs on new accounting standards, as an important topic on which there appears to be 
relatively little existing research literature. 
In general, a number of theoretical propositions have been advanced in Western countries to 
explain and predict the attitudes and opinions of preparers of financial statements on the 
accounting standards. The present research study attempts to see how far these theoretical 
propositions can help explain the attitudes and opinions of MGRs of Islamic banks and their 
EAs in Sudan. 
The remaining part of the present chapter is organised as follows: 
Section 2 refers to the theoretical propositions, which are developed in chapter 5 above. 
Section 3 presents the use of a single (embedded) case study design. Section 4 summarises 
the main findings of the research study. Section 5 examines the limitations of the study and 
presents policy implications. Research opportunities and needs for further research are 
suggested in section 6. 
10.2 The theoretical propositions 
To date, the existing literature on the subject of Islamic accounting (in particular financial 
reporting) and auditing is very limited. Therefore, the research literature from which the 
research propositions (See chapter 3 and 4 above) were drawn was predominately that 
concerning conventional accounting and auditing, especially in the USA. According to the 
literature review, variables such as cost of compliance and listing status were particularly 
important in explaining variations in the attitudes of firms' MGRs towards disclosure 
requirements. Other variables including bonus plan and firm's size (value of total assets) 
were also used to explain difference in the attitudes of firms' MGRs towards the 
measurement standards. The present study also sheds light on variables that tend to explain 
differences in attitudes of the EAs towards the evaluation of implications for audit risk 
associated with collectability of receivables (e. g., credit risk), [See Chapter 4 above]. These 
variables include the proportion of receivables to total assets, sales growth and market value 
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of equity. The study also examines EAs' evaluation of the audit risk associated with 
potential Shari 'a non-compliance by their clients, where the clients are Islamic banks that 
have an obligation to comply with Shari 'a rules and principles. 
The present study also considered the major differences in the environments between the 
USA and Sudan such as the state of the economy, institutions, and culture. In terms of the 
economic environment, the USA is a highly developed market economy, which is based on a 
free market system, in which listed, unregulated, general trading companies play a 
predominant role. In contrast, Sudan's economy is still an emerging economy, in which a 
largely nationalized and regulated banking sector still plays a major role. As for cultural 
differences, the American culture is influenced and governed by secular laws. As an 
example, almost all disputes concerning litigation risk are solved in judicial courts. By 
contrast, Sudanese culture is influenced by religious and traditional considerations. 
Generally the disputes are solved outside courts. These differences might have implications 
for the findings of the present research study. 
10.3 The design for case study 
The main reasons for the selection of Sudan, as a single (embedded) case study, include: 
1. Sudan represents a critical case in testing whether the theoretical propositions 
(frameworks) developed in Western countries can help explain the accounting 
phenomena in the context of a developing market economy (e. g., Sudan). 
2. A research opportunity is provided by the introduction of a set of new accounting 
standards (AAOIFI's accounting standards) in a developing market economy like Sudan, 
where a substantial amount of state ownership exists. 
3. The banking sector in Sudan operates to comply with Islamic Shari 'a rules and principles 
4. Using Sudan as a single (embedded) case study permits a more in-depth investigation 
when compared to using a survey including other countries that have adopted AAOIFI 
accounting standards (e. g., Bahrain and Jordan). 
5. The number of Islamic banks and audit companies is limited therefore, the choice of 
sampling approach is problematic. A single (embedded) case study, with cross sectional 
comparisons of the sub-units of analysis, provided an alternative approach which offered 
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generalization to theoretical propositions rather than statistical generalization about the 
populations of Islamic banks and audit firms in Sudan. 
A pilot case study was conducted on two Islamic banks in order to improve reliability of the 
questionnaire and to have an idea about the differences in opinions of MGRs of banks and 
their EAs about the implementation of the new AAOIFI accounting standards. The pilot case 
study approach was used with a combination of informal interviews and questionnaires to 
provide new insight on the study. The pilot case study suggested that the questionnaires 
concerning the opinions of GMRs and EAs needed to be redesigned. 
Cross-sectional comparisons between banks indicated that the independent variables 
originally derived from the literature review were not sufficient to explain the variation in 
banks' opinions in Sudan. Other variables such as the cost of compliance were suggested to 
be included in explaining such differences. Independent variables were further identified 
according to banks' characteristics: namely, bank's size (number of branches); bank's size 
(value of total assets); listing status; bank's ownership (private /public); the existence of a 
bonus plan and proportion of receivables (Murabaha and Salam) to total assets. In this 
context, independent variables were identified to explain the difference in bank MGRs' 
opinions about the implementation of disclosure standard, namely cost of compliance (bank's 
number of branches) and listing status variables. With regard to the opinions of MGRs on the 
implementation of the measurement standards, a number of independent variables were 
identified. The independent variables include bank' (public/private) ownership, bank (value 
of total assets) size as proxies for political costs and the existence (non-existence) of a bonus 
plan. The proportion of receivables to total assets variable was used to try to explain the 
difference in EAs' opinions about the evaluation of implications for audit risk associated with 
the implementation of the new accounting standards. 
Questionnaires, interviews and examination of documents were used as methods of data 
acquisition. Acquired data consist of opinions of the MGRs and EAs and their banks' actual 
compliance with AAOIFI's accounting standards. The opinions of the respondents provide 
an indication of their attitudes towards the implementation of the AAOIFI's accounting 
standards. Thus, "agree" or "disagree" as expressed in their opinions indicates positive or 
negative attitude towards the implementation of the standards. 
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10.4 The main findings 
The overall percentage of responses received from all MGRs of banks included in the study 
indicates that banks' MGRs perceived the information needs of shareholders more clearly 
than of those others users of financial statements. This raises the issue of how to take into 
consideration the interests of others users of the bank's financial statements such as IAH.. 
Cross-sectional comparisons with the Chi-square contingency table indicate a significant 
difference in the attitudes and opinions of the MGRs of the banks with a larger number of 
branches and the MGRs of banks with a smaller number of branches. It follows that the 
findings provide support for the cost of compliance proposition 1 [(P1) in Chapter 5 above]. 
Moreover, the analysis shows significant variations in the opinions of listed banks and non- 
listed banks. Therefore, the case study findings support the listing status proposition 2 [(P2) 
in Chapter 5 above). In short, the findings indicate that the opinions on AAOIFI's standard 
were driven by similar variables as they are in the USA. 
As for training issues, all the MGRs of banks included in the present study rate training costs 
as very high. Moreover, in discussions and meetings with the Deputy General MGR of Alpha 
Bank, he said: "our staff badly needs training for Islamic accounting standards, in particular 
the disclosure standard". It was also observed that the staffs working for Alpha, Zubra and 
Asdar have had less experience than what is required by the standard. This indicates a 
pressing need for training courses and workshops for the staff working for those banks. With 
regard to other costs of compliance in terms of money including audit fees and effort, almost 
all the MGRs of banks with a larger number of branches evaluate such costs as very high. 
Additionally, the MGRs thought that the preparation of their banks' financial statements, in 
accordance with the AAOIFI's FAS 1, would financially involve high costs. When asked 
about the cost implications of implementing the standard, the Deputy General MGRs of Beta 
and Frasa Banks expressed the views that "the cost would be high for the first two years of 
the implementation but no more than that". Furthermore, more positive attitudes and 
opinions were expressed on the implementation of the standards on Mudaraba, Musharaka, 
Equity of Investment Account Holders, Murabaha and Salam (See Section 8.3 above). It 
follows that the banks are more receptive to the implementation of the measurement 
standards than the disclosure standard. This might be attributed to the fact that there is a high 
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cost of compliance (in terms of money, effort and training) associated with the 
implementation of the disclosure standard. 
The difference in bank MGRs' attitudes towards, and opinions on, the implementation of 
measurement standards could not be explained by bonus plan variable, whereas the 
ownership [i. e. public/ private variable] proposition could. This is due to the fact that in our 
selection of banks the bonus plan variable is found to be co-extensive with another 
independent variable, which in the Sudanese context is associated with political costs that 
may be faced by profitable public banks. Once again, the analyses are conducted to show a 
significant variation in opinions and attitudes of MGRs of banks with a larger value of total 
assets and those of banks with a smaller value of total assets on the implementation of 
measurement standards. These findings provide support for the size proposition since MGRs 
of banks with a larger value of total assets have less positive attitudes towards, and opinions 
on, the implementation of measurement standards than those of banks with a smaller value of 
total assets. Accordingly, the case study suggests that both the ownership (public/private) 
variable and the size variable as proxies for political costs are very significant in explaining 
variations in banks MGRs' opinions on the implementation of the new measurement 
standards. 
It can be concluded that the findings support the ownership proposition and the size 
proposition, but did not support the bonus plan proposition. These results suggest that 
political costs may be just as influential with regard to MGRs' attitudes towards, and 
opinions about, the measurement standards in Sudan as they are in Western countries (e. g., 
USA). This is an interesting result, given the political-economic differences between Sudan 
as a developing economy and advanced Western countries. It is observed that the MGRs' 
opinions about the implementation of the AAOIFI's disclosure standard are consistent with 
their actual compliance with the standard. Thus, the expressed opinions of the MGRs provide 
a reliable indicator of their attitudes towards the implementation of the standard. However, 
the opinions could not be confirmed by actual implementation of the measurement standards. 
Due to the fact that the researcher could not observe the implementation of these standards. 
With regard to the evaluation of audit risk, cross-sectional comparisons using descriptive 
statistics show no difference the opinions of EAs on the evaluation of implications for 
Shari'a non-compliance risk. All EAs rated these risks as very high, irrespectively of 
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whether their client bank had a larger or smaller proportion of receivables. The data suggest 
that there is no difference at all between the two categories of audit firms of the banks. With 
regard to collectibility of receivables risk there is a difference between the two categories of 
firms and the difference is in the expected direction. However, according to KW test this 
difference is not statistically significant. Hence the findings provide no significant support for 
the collectibility of receivables risk (P7 in chapter 5 above). In addition to, EAs of public 
banks evaluate the collectibility of receivables risk as very high. 
In light of the above findings (a summary of chapter 7,8 and 9), the following conclusions 
and suggestions are presented: 
1. The senior MGRs of the selected banks cater to the perceived information needs of the 
shareholders more than for the needs of the other external users including IAHs. 
Nevertheless, in Sudan the present governance structure provided to the IAH by 
unrestricted Mudaraba contract looks quite thin (see Archer et al., 1998). This raises the 
issue of corporate governance, such as representation of stakeholders other than 
shareholders on boards of directors or audit committees of Islamic banks in Sudan. 
2. The case study's findings indicate that the cost of compliance is a major problem for the 
implementation of AAOIFI's disclosure standard (FAS 1). Cost of compliance is highest 
for banks with a larger numbers of branches. These are the banks whose MGRs have the 
least positive attitudes towards, and opinions on the disclosure standard. Thus, the 
implementation of AAOIFI's FAS 1 has not gained general acceptance among banks with 
a larger numbers of branches. 
3. Although Khartoum Stock Exchange (KSE) in Sudan is an emerging market, the banks' 
shares listed on KSE consist predominantly of those of privately-owned banks and the 
KSE's 2000 annual report illustrates this. Bank MGRs' attitudes towards, and opinions 
on, the implementation of the standard are largely influenced by cost-benefit consideration. 
In addition, it was also observed that bank MGRs' opinions about the implementation of 
the standard are consistent with their actual compliance with the standard. For instance, 
banks with a smaller number of branches have more positive opinions about, the 
implementation of the AAOIFI's standard, and simultaneously comply more with the 
standard than banks with a larger number of branches. Thus, the expressed opinions of 
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MGRs provide a reliable indicator of their attitudes towards the implementation of the 
standard. In short, banks' views on, and their actions to, the implementation of the 
standard are influenced by cost-benefit consideration. In other words enthusiastic banks 
perceive the potential benefits as greater than the potential costs; whereas non-enthusiastic 
banks perceive the cost of compliance as greater than potential benefits. Hence, cost and 
benefit considerations used by MGRs of Sudanase banks are similar to those used by the 
MGRs of US firms, regardless of the differences between the two economic and political 
enviroments. 
4- The main purpose of Islamic bank's financial reporting is to provide information about 
financial position, performance and changes in the financial position that is useful to the 
main users (including IAH) in making economic decisions. The adoption of AAOIFI's 
accounting standards provides comparable financial statements. It also provides reliable 
and useful information, which can help investors like IAH to make wise decisions. 
AAOIFIs' accounting standards are major steps toward accounting harmonization and the 
comparability of financial statements issued by Islamic banks in Sudan. Comparable 
financial statements allow users to identify similarities and differences in banks' 
performance in relation to their own performance over time or in relation to other banks' 
performance. Yet, the case study's findings indicate significant differences in bank 
MGRs' attitudes towards, and opinions on, the implementation of the disclosure standard. 
This tends to lead to a diverse level of disclosure or limited disclosure by some banks and 
will result in non-comparable financial statements. The findings provide evidence for 
AAOIFI to work with other interested parties (e. g. the CBS and KSE) in order to have its 
present and future accounting standards fully implemented as mandatory requirements in 
Sudan. 
5 The case study's findings also show differences in accounting policies and their level of 
disclosure. As consequence, the diverse accounting policies that are presently available 
for use can produce significantly different sets of financial statements based on the same 
events and conditions. This suggests that the CBS should work with Sudanese Council of 
Chartered Accountants (SCCA) and Sudanese Banks Union (SBU) to unify accounting 
systems and policies. 
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6- The CBS, as a regulatory body of banking sector, has directed all the banks (whether state- 
owned banks or privately-owned banks) to finance priority sectors (e. g., agriculture, 
industry, export). The CBS also sets a ceiling for each sector and commercial banks have 
to abide by the directives issued by the CBS. The government could ask the banks, in 
particular the state-owned banks to provide Salam facilities to agriculture, provided that 
the price of al muslam fihi (the subject matter of the goods) is predetermined by a joint 
committee between governmental units and the banks. Although, the state-owned banks 
are profit oriented they are supposed to finance national projects for socio-political reasons 
and this is relevant to the political costs theory. The case study's findings confirm that 
bank's (public/private) ownership and bank size (as a proxies for political costs) are the 
most important factors to explain differences in the attitudes and opinions of the MGEs on 
the implementation of AAOIFIs' measurement standards in Sudan. This confirms the 
view that public banks are more sensitive to political costs than private banks. Moreover, 
banks with larger value of total assets are more sensitive than banks with smaller value of 
total assets. This suggests that the opinions of bank MGRs on the measurement standards 
are largely, but not entirely, driven by similar variables in Sudan, as they are in the USA. 
7- In general, the case study's findings demonstrate that the implementation of the 
measurement standards has gained more acceptances than that of the disclosure standard. 
This is because the implementation of the latter has been thought of as entailing high costs 
of compliance in terms of money, additional work and training courses for the staff 
working for these banks 
8- Islamic banks are not allowed to accept and use funds on the basis of interest. Therefore, 
the financial statements of Islamic banks should be audited in order to attest that they are 
free from material misstatements (intentional or unintentional) regarding earnings 
prohibited by Shari a (e. g., earnings from Haram (non-permitted) transactions). This 
represents a new type of audit risk related to non-compliance with Shari 'a, since there is a 
risk of Shari 'a non-compliance being the subject of undetected or unreported 
misstatements by management. However, in the present study the Shari 'a non-compliance 
risk proposition, namely that perceived non-compliance risk is related to the proportion of 
Islamic modes of finance (Salam and Murabaha receivables) in the balance sheet, is not 
supported. This suggests that the opinions on the implications for the audit risk associated 
with the accounting standards are not explained by similar variable (proportion of 
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receivables to total assets) as they are in the USA. Of course, in the USA the issue is 
related to the risk of misstatement of the receivables due to unrecognized collectibility 
problems, not problems due to failure to comply with requirements of Shari 'a rules and 
principles. 
9- In principle, a similar audit risk exists in Sudan, Islamic banks are exposed to a risk of 
misstatement of receivables. This may entail a risk of misstatement on the part of 
management related to the problem of unrecognized collectibility of receivables. EAs 
may fail to detect such misstatement. The findings of the present study show that there is 
a difference between the average of evaluations of EAs banks with "higher" and "lower" 
proportion categories and the difference is in the expected direction. The difference is 
found to be statistically insignificant and thus there is no significant association between a 
bank's proportion of receivables to the value of total assets and the EAs' evaluation of 
collectibility of receivables risk. The lack of significancy may be due to sparseness of 
data. The problem of sparse data arises from the fact that there are only five audit firms 
(small number of observations) in the present study. Another reason might be that training 
and regulation are predominant in the US professional bodies (e. g., AICPA), while the 
Sudanese professional bodies (e. g., SCCA) do not consider training and regulation in the 
context of auditing Islamic banks in Sudan. Moreover, US Statement of Auditing 
Standards, which were used to develop research propositions, are not applied in Sudan. 
10- The EA of the public bank evaluates audit risk associated with collectibility of 
receivables as very high. This indicates that Salam and Murabaha are perceived as more 
risky to audit by the EA of public banks. This might be due to the fact that the staff 
working for the AG are less qualified than what is required or may be public banks have 
a particular problem of collectibility of Salam and Murabaha receivables 
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10.5 Limitations and policy implications of the study 
There are some limitations in the present research study, which include: 
(a) Social desirability bias. This is defined as `The tendency for respondents to give answer 
to survey questions that are consistent with what society believes is right, proper, correct, or 
acceptable, creating bias in the results whenever the true answers are suppressed to meet 
social norms', (Alreck and Settle, (1995, p., 455). For the present study there is possibility 
of social desirability bias, since the implementation of AAOIFI's accounting standards in 
Sudan is backed by the CBS as supervisor of the banking sector, and this may introduce a 
bias into opinions expressed by respondents to the research questions. Social desirability bias 
may be reduced but not be completely removed. To minimize the social desirability bias in 
the present study, the researcher has made a clear statement within the covering letter of the 
questionnaire, to the respondents ensuring them of confidentiality and anonymity. 
(b) The research study focused on using a single (embedded) case study (Sudan), with sub- 
units of analysis (Islamic banks and audit firms). The number of Islamic banks and audit 
firms was limited, making the use of sampling problematic. The alternative approach [single 
(embedded) case study design] offered generalization to some theoretical propositions 
relating to new accounting standards rather than empirical generalization about the 
population of Islamic banks and audit firms in Islamic countries (e. g., Bahrain, Pakistan and 
Iran). 
Despite the limitations in this study, the results have some policy implications for AAOIFI 
and Sudanese regulators. The AAOIFI, CBS and KSE may find it useful to assess the 
implementation of the new set of accounting regulations issued by AAOIFI with respect to 
disclosure requirements and measurement standards that discussed in this research study. 
The findings provide evidence for AAOIFI to work with other interested parties (e. g. the CBS 
and KSE) in order to have its present and future accounting standards fully implemented as 
mandatory requirements in Sudan. It is in the interest of the CBS to pursue policies that 
promote comparability, relevance and reliability of the financial information disclosed by 
banks. Moreover, AAOIFI's accounting standards will improve the regulatory system 
established to supervise Islamic banking sector. For example, the CBS can issue a separate 
prudential regulations based on AAOIFI's accounting standards to supervise banks. 
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Furthermore, AAOIFI. s accounting standards help the CBS to promote strong measures for 
provisions, reserves, liquidity, and capital adequacy and risk management. The results also 
have implications for professional bodies in Sudan. The Sudanese Council of Chartered 
Accountants (SCCA) and Sudanese Accountants Society (SAS) may find it useful to assess 
those implications for audit risk associated with the implementation of the standards. These 
implications should be considered in decisions about formulating new training and audit 
programmes. The researcher believes that the general findings in this study if confirmed by 
other studies have important implications for setting of financial accounting standards for 
Islamic banks. 
10.6 The need for further research 
The conclusions drawn from the research study and limitations thereon suggest opportunities 
for future research, as follows: 
1- The MGRs of Islamic banks' financial statements cater for the perceived information 
needs of shareholders more than those of IAH. This necessitates the need for future 
research on additional governance structures to protect the interests of IAH. For example, 
IAH could be represented in the board of directors or audit committee of an Islamic bank. 
2- Limitations in retesting the bonus plan proposition in Sudan suggest the need for further 
research in other similar countries (e. g., Bahrain and Jordan). 
3- Wider survey is needed in other similar countries (e. g. Pakistan and Iran) to overcome the 
problem of sparse data in the present study. Moreover, other explanatory variables (e. g. 
bank's number of branches) are suggested for further research to explain auditors' reaction 
to the audit risk associated with the implementation of AAOIFI's accounting standards. 
4- Murabaha and Salam receivables are perceived as high risky areas to audit by EAs of 
public banks. This may be due to a human resource problem (unqualified audit staff), or 
may be a collectibility problem? Therefore, more in-depth investigation is needed to 
clarify this point in order to provide some possible guidance for its future solution. 
154 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Binding and Non-binding promise 
In case of a binding promise, the following rules are followed: 
a. If the purchaser (the bank) accepts the request of the orderer, it should purchase the asset 
and conclude a valid sale contract between itself and the vendor (the supplier) of the 
assets. 
b. The purchaser offers the asset to the orderer (client), who should then accept it by legally 
binding mutual promise, and should accordingly establish a sale contract. 
c. In this type of sale it is permissible to pay "Hamish Gedyyah52" when signing the original 
contract but only before the purchaser actually purchases the asset. 
d. The purchaser may have recourse to Haish Ggedyyah in case of damages when the 
orderer declines to purchase the asset. If the Hamish Gedyyah falls short of the amount of 
damages, the bank may have recourse to the orderer for the remaining amount of the loss. 
As for Non-binding promise, the following rules are followed. 
a. One of the parties (i. e., the client) asks the other party (i. e., bank) to purchase an asset 
and promises that when the latter purchases the asset, the client will purchase it at a 
price that includes a mark-up profit thereon. The request made by the client is 
53considered as an indication of willingness to buy, not an offer to do so. 
b. If the bank accepts this request it would proceed to purchase the asset under a valid sale 
contract concludes between itself and the supplier of the asset. 
c. The bank should, after taking legal possession of the asset, offer it to the client 
according to the conditions of the first mutual promise. This is considered as an offer 
from the purchaser. 
52 Hamish gedayyah is defined as the amount paid by the purchase orderer upon the request of the bank to 
make sure that the orderer is serious in his demand for the asset. 
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d. When the asset is offered to the client, he will have the option either to conclude a sale 
contract or decline to do so i. e., the orderer is not obliged to fulfil his promise. 
However, he chooses enter into a sale contract, it will be considered as an acceptance of 
the offer. A valid sale contract is thereby made between the client and the bank. 
e. If it is made a requirement that the client should pay a first instalment, payment should 
be made after the contract is signed, and the instalment shall be regarded as part of the 
price in such a sale. 
f. In the event that the client declines to purchase the asset, it will remain in the 
possession of the bank, who shall be entitled to dispose of it by any permissible means. 
However, the bank would not enter in a Murabaha contract with a non-binding promise 
from the client, if the goods ordered could not be easily sold at a similar price to 
another customer. 
In practice, specialized or thinly traded goods would not be ordered against a non-binding 
promise, since such goods cannot be easily sold at a similar price to another customer. 
Therefore, Murabaha with non-binding promise would be used only where there was a ready 
market for the goods being purchased. 
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Appendix 2: Comparison of International Accounting Standard (IAS 30 and other IASs) to Financial 
Accounting Standard (FAS 1) 
, JAS FÄSI Remarks 
lAS 30 applies to all banks and similar FASI (The standard) applies to all Islamic IAS 30 is not applicable 
financial institutions. The standard applies to banks, if the requirements of the standard 
to Islamic banks since 
their statutes prohibit 
both the separate and consolidated financial contradict the bank's charter or the laws and them to receive or 
statements (pars 1-5). regulation of the country in which it operates, a 
charge interests. 
disclosure should be made of the 
contradiction. (par 1). 
Accounting policies 
IAS 1 requires disclosure of a significant The standard requires disclosure of. accounting 
accounting policy should be made. policies, which represent a choice among 
Accounting method used for consolidation acceptable accounting methods and accounting 
should be disclosed. policies for consolidation of the financial 
statements of subsidiaries (pars 11-13). 
Income statement 
The disclosure in the income statement The standard requires disclosure of: 
Should include but not limited to, the 
following items of income and expenses. 
Interest and similar income > Investment revenues, expenses and gains 
and losses by type. 
Interest charges and similar charge. > Nature of material revenue expenses and 
gains. 
Dividend income. > Losses from other activities. 
Fees and commission income. > Estimated gains and losses from the 
revaluation of assets and liabilities 
Gains less losses arising from dealing > investment revenues, expenses, and gains 
securities. and losses. 
Gains less losses arising from investment > Revenues and gains from unrestricted 
securities. investments. 
> Income and losses from investments 
Gains and losses arising from dealing in Share of unrestricted IAH in income (loss) 
foreign currencies. from investment before the bank's share as 
Mudarib. - 
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Other operating income. The Islamic bank's share in income (loss) from 
investment. 
Losses on loans and advances. The Islamic bank's share (as Mudarib) in 
income from unrestricted investment accounts. 
General administrative expenses. General and administrative expenses. 
Other operating expenses. Other operating expenses. 
Income and expense items should not be NA 
offset except for those relating to hedges. 
Gains and losses arising from each of the NA 
following : 
Disposals and charges the amount of 
dealings securities (net). 
Disposals of investment securities (net) 
Dealing in foreign currencies (net) The standard require similar disclosure 
Net income (loss) Net income (loss) before Zakah and taxes 
Statement of financial position 
In addition to the requirements of other IAS, The standard requires disclosure of: 
lAS 30 requires disclosure of the following: 
assets (pars 18-21) assets (FAS 1, par 37) 
Cash and balances with the central bank. Cash and cash equivalent 
Treasury bills and other bills eligible for NA Islamic bank does not 
rediscounting bills with the central bank. 
deal with interest based 
treasury bills 
and interest based 
government securities 
since Islam prohibits 
interest, alternatively 
Islamic bank can invest 
in Islamic Mudaraba 
Certificate CMC. 
Government and other securities held for  
dealing purposes. 
Placements with, and loans and advances to Receivables including Murabaha, and Sa1am Islamic banks does not 
other banks specifically 
deal with 
interest based-loans and 
advances 
Other money market placements. Istisna 
Loans and advances to customers. Musharaka 
. 
Investment securities. Mudaraba investment 
IAS 2 (par 34 b) requires disclosure of total Inventories (goods purchased for Murabaha 
amounts of inventories . sale) 
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Assets acquired for leasing ([AS 17, par 43) Ijarah and Ijarah Muntahia Bitlamleek 
Tangible assets (IAS 5, par 12) Fixed assets. 
Other assets Other assets 
Liabilities: 
Deposits from other banks. FAS 1 (par 41) requires disclosure of deposits 
from other bank 
Other money market deposits. NA 
Amounts owed to other depositors. Current accounts and saving accounts. 
Certificates of deposits.. Investment accounts with separate disclosure 
of unrestricted investment accounts 
Promissory notes and other liabilities. Salam payable Promissory notes and 
other liabilities 
Other borrowed funds. Istisna Bearing interest are not 
used by Islamic banks, 
instead they use Islamic 
financial instruments. 
Declared but undistributed profits (lAS 5) The standard requires similar disclosure 
Tax payable. Zakah and Tax payable. Islamic banks are 
required to pay Zak-ah 
Other account payable. The standard requires similar disclosure 
NA Unrestricted investment accounts should be Conventional bank dose 
disclosed and presented separately between 
not specifically deal 
with unrestricted 
liabilities and owners' equity. investment accounts. 
A consolidated balance sheet discloses FAS 1 require similar disclosure. The minority 
minority interests (IAS 27). interest should be shown between unrestricted 
investment accounts and Owner's equity. 
The amount at which any asset and liability FAS I (par 32) does not permit such offset 
should not be offset by the deduction of unless there is a religious and legal right of set- 
another asset or liability, unless a legal right off.. 
Of set-off exists. (IAS 30, par 23). 
The standard does not require current and FAS 1, par. 36 also does not require such. 
non-current classification of assets and. Classification. 
Liabilities. 
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Owners' equity 
Authorized, subscribed and paid-in capital. The standard requires similar disclosure 
Number of authorized shares, number of """" 
issued shares, outstanding shares, par value 
per share and premium on issued shares. 
Legal and discretionary reserves (lAS 5, par 
17) 
Retained earnings (IAS 5) Retained earnings at the beginning and end of 
the period and amount of retained earnings 
resulting from the revaluation of assets and 
liabilities to their cash equivalent value where 
applicable (FAS 1, par 44). 
Cash flow statement 
IAS 7 requires the following disclosure: Similar disclosure is required (FAS 1, par. 54- 
Differentiation between cash flows from 57). 
operation, investing activities and financing 
activities. 
Net increase (decrease) in cash at the Similar disclosure is required. 
beginning and end of the period. 
General disclosure 
Contingencies and commitments including The standard requires similar disclosure. 
off balance sheet items (IAS 10). 
Maturates of assets and liabilities (IAS 30) """ 
Concentration of assets and liabilities and off """ 
balance sheet items (IAS 30 and lAS 14). 
Foreign currency exposures (the risk of """" 
losses arising from changing exchange rate 
(IAS 30, pars 40-42 ). 
Losses on loan and advances (IAS 30, pars NA Islamic bank does not 
43-46) deal with loans and 
advances. 
General banking risks should be separately in NA Islamic bank does not 
retained earnings statement profit not as specifically require 
such s 
disclosure, but as 
charges to and loss (lAS 30, pars 50). disclosure requirement, 
FAS 3 FAS 4 require a 
disclosure of a 
provision for loss. 
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Assets pledged as security (lAS 30, pars FAS 1 requires similar disclosure (par 25). 
53-54). 
Significant subsequent events to the date of Similar disclosure is required by the standard. 
the balance sheet (IAS 30 and IAS 10, pars (FAS 1, par 24). 
25-30). 
Related party transactions; nature of related FAS 1 requires similar disclosure (pars 28-29). 
party transaction, the types of the 
transactions and the elements of the 
transactions (IAS 30, pars 56-58 and IAS 
24).. 
Additional disclosures required only by AAOIFI's FAS 1 
Islamic banks are required to prepare specific financial statements necessitated by their different nature and 
objectives, namely: 
1. Statement of changes in restricted investment accounts (FAS 1, pars 61-64) 
2. Statement of sources and uses of funds in Zakah and charity fund (FAS 1, pars 65-68) 
3. Statement of sources and uses of Quard fund (FAS 1, paras, 69-73). 
A further distinguishing feature of FAS I is the mount and extent of The following disclosure 
I Unusual supervisory restrictions imposed by central bank (FAS 1, par 14) 
2 Amount and nature of prohibited earnings and expenditures by Islamic Shari'a. (FAS 1, par 15). 
3 Concentration of unrestricted investment accounts (FAS 1, par 17) 
4 Distribution of unrestricted investment accounts, by type in accordance with their respective to 
maturity (FAS , par 18). 
5 Any amount Islamic bank is obliged to deposit with other as compensation (FAS 1,20). 
6 Number of Shari'a Board Members and the power and responsibility of the board. 
7 Rules and regulations governing the Zakah payable by the bank, the calculation of the Zakah base for 
the year. 
8 Share of unrestricted investment accounts and of the bank in the income or loss for the year. 
The policy applied for in the calculation of the share. 
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Appendix 3: Definitions 
Audit risk (AR) is the risk that the assertion contains a misstatement exceeding tolerable 
error at the end of the audit. 
Occurrence Risk (OR) is the risk that the assertion contains a misstatement prior to the audit. 
Inherent risk (IR) is defined as: `the susceptibility of an account balance or class of 
transactions to material misstatements, irrespective of related internal control' (Scannel, (op. 
cit., p., 42). In other words, the auditee's assertion contains a material misstatement that can 
not be related to the client's internal control system. Material misstatements may occur due 
to the client's environment or the nature of the item in the absence of controls (internal 
control system). 
Inherent risk is considered at two levels: 
Entity level; Auditors will have to consider certain attributes of the companies that are going 
to be audited. Moreover, auditors need to consider factors both outside and within the 
control of the company. 
Factors outside the control of the company include: the economic and industrial 
environment in which the company operates, as well as the legislation, regulation and 
accounting practices affecting the industry. 
Factors occurring within the control of the company include the nature of the company's 
business and its products, the size and numbers of locations of the company and the 
experience and integrity of the management and personnel. 
Account level; Auditors will also have to consider the risk factors such as complexity 
involved in accounting for an item in the financial statements, e. g., balances or transactions 
subject to judgement (provisions, accruals) that can be overstated or understated in the 
company's financial statements (Ibid. p. 43). 
Control risk 
Control risk (CR) is defined as: `the risk that controls fail to prevent or detect misstatement' 
(Waller, 1993, p., 785). In other words, there is a possibility that a material misstatement 
would not be detected or prevented by internal control systems. 
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Control risk is considered at two levels: 
General level; Auditors need to consider the environment in which the company operates, 
the structure of the company, and the existence of internal audit. Moreover, auditors will 
have to take into consideration control procedures set up (inter-alia) to prevent and detect 
errors and material misstatements in the financial records, (e. g., bank reconciliation). 
Furthermore, the auditor will carry out an initial assessment of the company's accounting 
system and its internal control system. If the initial assessment indicates that the internal 
control is likely to be effective, the auditor may decide to review the operation of the internal 
control system (ICS) in details, in order to confirm the initial assessment. If the preliminary 
assessment indicates that the ICS is poorly designed, the auditor will not proceed to test the 
operation of the control system (Scannel, op. cit., 43). 
Detection risk (DR) is defined as: "the risk that the auditor's substantive procedures (tests of 
details of transactions and balances or analytical procedures) do not detect a misstatement 
that exists in an account balance or a class of transactions" (Ibid. p., 43). In other words, 
detection risk is the probability that material misstatements will not be detected by 
substantive testing. 
Detection risk is likely to occur at two levels, sampling risk and non- sampling risk. For 
sampling risk, the sample may not give a true representation of the whole population (e. g., 
account balances) from which it is drawn. 
Non-sampling risk is the risk that could arise from the application of inappropriate 
procedures or misapplication of appropriate procedures by audit staff. 
Presentation of ARM: 
Audit Risk (AR) = Occurrence Risk (OR)* Detection Risk (DR) (Waller, 1993). 
Furthermore, OR is decomposed into Inherent Risk (IR) and Control Risk (CR). 
DR = AR/(IR * CR) 
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Appendix 4: Questionnaire: Bank MGRs' opinions about the implementation of the 
disclosure standard 
The Implementation of accounting standards for Islamic banks" 
a Case Study of Preparers' and Auditors' Opinions in Sudan 
To: The General manager ................................. 
Dear respondent, 
Assalam Alaikcum wa Rahmat Allah, 
I am a postgraduate research student at School of Management Studies for the Service Sector - The 
University of Surrey- UK-. Currently am undertaking Ph. D. Research project on "the implementation 
of accounting standards for Islamic banks in Sudan", under supervision of Professor S. Archer and 
Professor R. Karim. 
As part of the research, please find herewith the enclosed questionnaire. It concerns issues related to 
"Preparers and Auditors Opinion on the Implementation of AAOIFIs Disclosure Standard". The 
questionnaire has been formulated so that it can be quickly and easily completed. You are only 
required to circle the appropriate number -from scale-which best describe your agreement or 
disagreement with each statement. 
It is highly appreciated if you could complete and return this questionnaire within two weeks of the 
date of receipt. Finally, I assure that the information you provide will be treated as highly 
confidential. 
Many thanks in advance for your co-operation. 
Yours sincerely 
Badreldin Gurashi Mustafa 
Postgraduate Researcher 
School of Management Studies for the Service 
Sector, University of Surrey 
Guildford, Surrey, UK. Post Code GU2 5XH 
TEL: 0044 1483 876378. FAX: 0044 1483 259387 
E- mail b. mustafa@surrey. ac. uk 
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Definitions of the Terminology Used 
The external users of financial statements include; shareholders (SH), current account 
holders (CAH), investment account holders (IAH), Khartoum Stock Exchange (KSE) and 
general public (GP). 
Islamic bank's financial statements include; statement of financial position, income 
statement, cash flow statement, the statement of changes in owners' equity or the statement 
of retained earnings, statement of changes in restricted investment, statement of sources and 
uses of funds in the Quard fund. 
List of abbreviations: - 
AAOIFI: The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions. 
FAS 1: Financial Accounting Standard No 1: General Presentation and Disclosure in the 
Financial statements of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions. 
SH: Shareholders. 
IAH: Investment Account Holders. 
CAH: Current Account Holders. 
KSE: Khartoum Stock Exchange. 
GP: General Public. 
Questionnaire 
Section A 
Please tick (/) the appropriate answer 
1-Are you familiar with AAOIFIs' FAS 1? 
Yes () No () 
If yes, please answer the following questions. 
Please circle a number from the scale to show how much you agree or disagree 
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2.1- How much do you agree or disagree with the bank's statement of financial position, in 
accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS 1, should be disclosed to the following users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
2.2- How much do you agree or disagree with the bank's statement of income, in accordance 
with AAOIFIs' FAS 1, should be disclosed to the following users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
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2.3- How much do you agree or disagree with the Bank's cash flow statement, in accordance 
with AAOIFIs' FAS 1, should be disclosed to the following users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
2.4- How much do you agree or disagree with the bank's statement of changes in owners' 
equity or a statement of retained earnings, in accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS 1, should be 
disclosed to the following users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial Statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
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2.5- How much do you agree or disagree with the bank's statement of changes in restricted 
investment, in accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS 1, should be disclosed to the following 
users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
2.6- How much do you agree or disagree with the bank's statement of sources and uses of 
fund in the Quard fund, in accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS 1, should be disclosed to the 
following users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
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2.7- How much do you agree or disagree with significant accounting policies, in the bank's 
notes to its financial statements, should be disclosed to the following users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
2.8- How much do you agree or disagree with an unusual supervisory restrictions imposed 
on the bank's activities by the Central Bank of Sudan, should be disclosed to the following 
users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
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2.9- How much do you agree or disagree with earnings (e. g. earnings from Haran: 
transactions) and expenditures prohibited by Shari 'a, if any, should be disclosed to the 
following users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
2.10- How much do you agree or disagree with the bank's concentration of assets risk53, 
should be disclosed to the following users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
53 Disclosure is made in the bank's financial statements of the magnitude of assets invested, deposited or used 
in any of the following concentrations; 
a) An economic sector (e. g. the agriculture sector, the service sector, the manufacturing sector, the real state 
sector, etc. ) 
b) A customer, including another bank or a financial institution without stating the customer's name 
c) A domestic geographical area with unique economic characteristics 
d) Foreign countries 
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2.11- How much do you agree or disagree with concentration of sources of unrestricted 
investment accounts, should be disclosed to the following users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
2.12- How much do you agree or disagree with the distribution of unrestricted investment 
account, in accordance with their respective periods to maturity, should be disclosed to the 
following users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
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2.13- How much do you agree or disagree with any material amounts the bank is obliged to 
deposit with others as compensating balances, should be disclosed to the following users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
2.14- How much do you agree or disagree with the bank's risk, associated with assets and 
liabilities which are denominated in foreign currencies, should be disclosed to the following 
users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
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2.15- How much do you agree or disagree with risks associated with the bank's 
contingencies (e. g. letter of credits and letter of guarantee) should be disclosed to the 
following users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
2.16- How much do you agree or disagree with the nature and the amounts of the bank's 
outstanding financial commitments, as of the statement of financial position date, should be 
disclosed to the following users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
2.17- How much do you agree or disagree with the subsequent significant events, as of 
bank's statement of financial position date, should be disclosed to the following users. 
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The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
2.18- How much do you agree or disagree with the nature and the amount of the bank's 
assets which are restricted for a particular use or used as a collateral for its obligation should 
be disclosed to the following users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
2.19- How much do you agree or disagree with the nature and effects of the bank's 
accounting policies changes should be disclosed to the following users. 
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The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
2.20- How much do you agree or disagree with the method that used by the bank to allocate 
investment profits or (losses) between unrestricted investment account holders and the 
bank's as Mudarib should be disclosed to the following users. 
The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
2.21- How much do you agree or disagree with the bank's related parties transactions54 
should be disclosed to the following users. 
sa Related parties mean; members of the board of directors, members ofShari'a supervisory board, the bank's 
external auditor, its general manager and his deputies. Any natural person or entity which directly or indirectly 
owns a percentage of the bank's voting ownership, units and relatives of natural person to the second degree, 
and any entity in which any person in the above either directly or indirectly owns the percentage refereed to 
subsidies and other affiliates of the bank, (AAOIFI 1993) 
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The scale 
Users of the bank's 
financial statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
SH 1 2 3 4 5 
IAH 1 2 3 4 5 
CAH 1 2 3 4 5 
KSE 1 2 3 4 5 
GP 1 2 3 4 5 
Please circle a number from the scale below 
3- What is the likelihood that the bank's financial statements, which are prepared, in 
accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS 1, would involve the following additional costs. 
The scale 
1 very low 2 3 4 5 very high 
Creating additional cost in 
monetary terms 
1 2 3 4 5 
Increasing the work load of the 1 2 3 4 5 
concerned bank staff 
Increase the need for more 1 2 3 4 5 
training and educational 
courses. 
Section B1 
Appendix 5: Islamic bank MGRs' opinions on the implementation of Murabaha standard 
1.1 Are you familiar with Murabaha and Murabaha to Purchase Orderer (Standard No. 2) ? 
Please tick (n the appropriate answer 
Yes () No () 
" If your answer is yes, please answer the following questions: 
2.1 How much do you agree or disagree with the following accounting treatments? 
Please pick the best answer from the scale and jot it to the right side of each statement 
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The scale 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 The assets possessed by the bank for the purpose of selling them on the basis of Murabaha or Murabaha to the 
Purchase Orderer shall be measured at the time of their acquisition on an historical cost basis ..................... 
2 Assets available for sale after acquisition on the basis of Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer who is obliged to 
fulfil his promise shall be measured at their historical cost. A decline in the assets value shall be reflected in the 
valuation of the assets at the end of each financial period. ................ 
3 If the bank finds that there is an indication of possible non-recovery of the costs of goods available for sale on 
the basis of Murabaha or Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer who is not obliged to fulfil his promise, the asset 
shall be measured at the cash equivalent (i. e. net realizable) value. This shall be achieved by creating a provision 
for decline in the asset value to reflect the difference between acquisition cost and the cash equivalent value. 
4 If the bank obtains a discount on the asset available for sale on the basis of Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer, 
such discount shall not be considered as revenue for the bank. Instead, the cost of the relevant goods shall be 
reduced by the amount of the discount. ............... 
5 The discount may, however, be treated as revenue for the bank if this is decided by Shria' supervisory board of 
the bank. Such revenue shall be recognized in the income statement. ............... 
6 Short-term or long-term Murabaha receivables shall be recorded at the time of occurrence at their face value. 
Murabaha receivables are measured at the end of the financial period at their cash equivalent value (i. e., the 
amount of debt due from the customers at the end of the financial period less any provision for doubtful debts). 
7 Profits from Murabaha or Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer are recognized at the time of contracting if the 
sale is for cash or on credit not exceeding the current financial period. ............. 
8 Profits of a credit sale, which will be paid for either by means of one payment due after the current financial 
period or by installments over several future financial periods, shall be recognized by proportionate allocation of 
profits over the period of the credit. Whereby each financial period shall carry its portion of profits irrespective 
of whether or not cash is received. ........... 
9 As and when the installments are received. This method shall be used based on a decision made by Shari 'a 
supervisory board of the bank, or if it is required by, supervisory authority. ............ 
10 The amount paid as hamish gedyyah is considered an obligation on the bank and shall be treated as a liability 
unless the Shari'a supervisory board of the Islamic bank decides otherwise. .............. 11 The amount of hamish gedyyah is returned in full even if the asset is sold to another client at a lower price than 
that agreed upon by the client who was the original purchase orderer. ................ 12 In the case of binding promise, the amount of actual loss shall be deducted from hamish gedyyah, (i. e., the bank 
shall not carry any losses). .............. 
13 If hamish gedyyah or other guarantees are not adequate or not available, any resultant loss to the bank shall be 
recorded as an amount due from the client provided there is evidence of his failure to fulfill his promise...... 
Appendix 6: Islamic bank MGRs' opinions on Mudaraba financing standard Section B2: 
1.2 Are you familiar with Financial Accounting Standards No. 3 "Mudaraba Financing'?. 
Yes( ) No( ) 
If yes please answer the following questions. 
2.2 How much do you agree or disagree with the following accounting treatments? 
Please pick the best answer from the scale and jot it to the right side of each statement. 
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The scale 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
5 
Strongly agree 
11 2I3I4 
I 1 The bank's share in Musharaka capital (cash or kind) should be recognized when it is paid to the partner or made 
available to him on account of the Musharaka. ....................... 
2 The bank's share in Musharaka capital provided in cash should be measured by the amount paid or made available 
to the partner on the account of the Musharaka. ....................... 
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3 The bank's share in Musharaka capital provided in kind (trading assets) should be measured at the fair value of the 
assets (the value agreed between the partners) and if the valuation results in a difference between fair value and 
book value, such difference should be recognized as a profit or loss to the bank . ....................... 
4 The bank's share in the constant Musharaka capital should be measured at the end of the financial period at 
historical cost. 
5 The bank's share in the diminishing Musharaka should be measured at the end of the period at historical cost after 
deducting from the historical cost of any share transferred to the partner (such transfer being by means of a sale at 
fair value) the difference between historical cost and fair value should be recognized as profit or loss in the bank's 
income statement. 
6 If the diminishing Musharaka is liquidated before complete transfer is made to the partner. The amount recovered 
in respect of the bank's share should be credited to the bank's Musharaka financing account and any resulting 
profit or loss, namely the difference between the book value and the recovered amount, should be recognized in 
the bank's income statement. 
7 If the Musharaka is terminated or liquidated and the bank's due share of the Musharaka capital remains unpaid 
when a settlement of account is made, the bank's share should be recognized as receivable due from the partner. 
8 Profits or losses in respect of bank's share in Musharaka financing transactions that commence and end during a 
financial period should be recognized in the bank's account at the time of liquidation ........................ 
9 In the case of a constant Musharaka that continues for more than one financial period, the bank's share of profits for 
any period, resulting from partial or final settlement between the bank and the partner, should be recognized in its 
accounts for that period to the extent that the profits are being distributed, the bank's share of loss for any period 
should be recognized in its accounts for that period to the extent that such losses are being deducted from its share 
of the Musahraka capital. 
10 Item .9 should apply to a diminishing Musharaka which continues 
for more than one financial period, after taking 
into consideration the decline in the bank's share in Musharaka capital and its profits or losses. 
11 If losses are incurred in Musharaka due to the partner's misconduct or negligence, the partner should bear the 
bank's share of such losses; such losses should be recognized as receivable due from the partner. ......... 
12 The bank's unpaid share of the proceeds should be recorded in a Musharaka receivable accounts. A provision 
should be made for these receivables if they are doubtful. 
13 Disclosure should be made in the notes to the financial statements for a financial-reporting period if the bank has 
made during the period a provision for a loss of its capital in Musharaka financing transactions.......... 
Appendix 7: Islamic bank MGRS' opinions to Musharaka financing standard Section 133: 
1.3 Are you familiar with financial accounting standards No. 4 "Musharaka Financing"? 
Yes( ) No( 
If yes please answer the following questions: 
2.3 How much do you agree or disagree with the following accounting treatments? 
Please pick the best answer from the scale and jot it to the right side of each statement. 
The scale 
Strongly disagree disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 The bank's share in Musharaka capital (cash or kind) should be recognized when it is paid to the partner or made available to 
No( ) 
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him on account of the Musharaka. 
2 The bank's share in Musharaka capital provided in cash should be measured by the amount paid or made available to the 
partner on the account of the Musharaka. ....................... 
3 The bank's share in Musharaka capital provided in kind (trading assets) should be measured at the fair value of the assets (the 
value agreed between the partners) and if the valuation results in a difference between fair value and book value, such 
difference should be recognized as a profit or loss to the bank ........................ 
4. The bank's share in the constant Musharaka capital should be measured at the end of the financial period at historical cost. 
5. The bank's share in the diminishing dfus/zaraka should be measured at the end of the period at historical cost after deducting 
from the historical cost of any share transferred to the partner (such transfer being by means of a sale at fair value) the 
difference between historical cost and fair value should be recognized as profit or loss in the bank's income statement. 
6.1f the diminishing Musharaka is liquidated before complete transfer is made to the partner. The amount recovered in respect of 
the bank's share should be credited to the bank's Musharaka financing account and any resulting profit or loss, namely the 
difference between the book value and the recovered amount, should be recognized in the bank's income statement..... 
7. If the Musharaka is terminated or liquidated and the bank's due share of the Musharaka capital remains unpaid when a 
settlement of account is made, the bank's share should be recognized as receivable due from the partner . ................. 
8 Profits or losses in respect of bank's share in Musharaka financing transactions that commence and end during a financial 
period should be recognized in the bank's account at the time of liquidation. ....................... 
9 In the case of a constant Musharaka that continues for more than one financial period, the bank's share of profits for any 
period, resulting from partial or final settlement between the bank and the partner, should be recognized in its accounts for 
that period to the extent that the profits are being distributed, the bank's share of loss for any period should be recognized in 
its accounts for that period to the extent that such losses are being deducted from its share of the Musahraka capital. ...... 
10 Item .9 should apply to a diminishing Musharaka which continues for more than one 
financial period, after taking into 
consideration the decline in the bank's share in Musharaka capital and its profits or losses. 
11 If losses are incurred in Musharaka due to the partner's misconduct or negligence, the partner should bear the bank's 
share of such losses; such losses should be recognized as receivable due from the partner. .................. 
12 The bank's unpaid share of the proceeds should be recorded in a Musharaka receivable accounts. A provision should be made 
for these receivables if they are doubtful. ....................... 
13 Disclosure should be made in the notes to the financial statements for a financial-reporting period if the bank has made 
during the period a provision for a loss of its capital in Musharaka financing transactions. ..................... 
Appendix 8: Islamic bank MGRs' opinions about the implementation of Equity of Investment Account 
Holders standard Section B4: 
1.4 Are you familiar with Financial Accounting Standards No. 6 "Equity of Investment Account Holders? " 
Yes() No() 
If yes please answer the following questions 
2.4 How much do you agree or disagree with the following accounting treatments? 
Please pick the best answer from the scale and jot it to the right side of each statement: 
The scale 
Strongly disagree disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
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I Equity of unrestricted investment account holders should be measured by the amount received by the bank at the time of 
contracting. ....................... 
2 At the end of financial period, equity of unrestricted investment account holders should be measured at their book value..... 
3 Profits of an investment jointly financed by the bank and unrestricted investment accounts holders should be allocated between 
them according to the contribution of each of the two parties in the jointly financed investment . ............... 
4 Loss resulting from transactions in a jointly financed investment (that is recognized during a period other than that in which 
final settlement of the investment account is made) should in the first instance be deduced from any undistributed profits on 
the investment. ....................... 
5. Any such loss in excess of the amount of undistributed profits should be deducted from provisions for investment losses 
formed for this purpose. The remaining loss, if any, should be deduced from the respective equity shares in the joint 
investment of the bank and the unrestricted investment accounts holders, according to each party's contribution to the joint 
investment. ....................... 
6 Loss due to misconduct or negligence on the part of the bank, based on the opinion of the Shari'a supervisory board of the 
bank, should be deducted from the bank's share in the profits of the jointly financed investment. In case the loss exceeds the 
bank's share of profits the difference should be deduced from its equity share in the joint investment, if any, or recognized as 
due from the bank. ....................... 
7 Assets and liabilities relating to equity of restricted investment account holders and their equivalent should be treated 
separately from the bank's assets and liabilities. ....................... 
8 Equity of restricted investment accounts holders should be measured by the amount received by the bank or the client's 
purchase price of the units or shares brought by him at the time of contracting. ....................... 
9 At the end of financial period, equity of restricted investment account holders should be measured at its book value. 
10 In the case the bank has funds invested in restricted investment accounts whether from its own equity or from other funds at 
its disposal, the bank should share in the profits earned on such funds in its capacity as provider of funds. .......... 
Appendix 9: questionnaire: Islamic bank MGRs' opinions on the implementation of Salam standard 
Section B5: 
1.5 Are you familiar with Salam and Parallel Salam Standard (FAS 7) 
Yes( ) No () 
If yes please answer the following questions 
2.5 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
Please pick the best answer from the scale and jot it to the right side of each statement. 
1 Salam financing shall be recognized when the capital of Salam is paid (whether in cash, kind or benefit) to al 
muslam ileihi or when it is made available to him. ....................... 2 Parallel Salam transactions shall be recognized when the bank receives the capital of Salam (in cash, kind or 
benefit). 
3 The capital of Salam shall be measured by the amount paid at the time of contracting ........................ 
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4 Capital of Salam provided in kind, or benefit shall be measured at the fair value (the value agreed between the 
bank and the client) of the asset or provided benefit. ....................... 
5 The capital of Salan: is measured at the end of a financial period as in item 4. However, if it is probable that al- 
muslam ileihi will not deliver al-muslam fihi in full or in part, or it is probable that the value of al-muslam fihi 
will decline, the bank shall make a provision of the amount of the estimated deficit . ....................... 
6 Assets constitutive of al-muslam fihi received by the bank in accordance with contract are recorded at their 
historical cost. ....................... 7 If the market value (or the fair value if the market value is not available) of the received al-muslam fihi is equal 
to the value of contract al muslam fihi, the received al-muslam fihi shall be measured and recorded at book 
value. ....................... 
8 If the market value of the received al-muslam fihi is lower than the book value of contracted al-muslam fihi, the 
received al- musaam fihi shall be measured and recorded at market value (or fair value) at the time of delivery 
and the difference shall be recognized as loss. ....................... 
9 If the Salam financing contract is completely or partially cancelled and the client has failed to repay the capital 
of Salam or the required portion thereof, the amount due shall be recognized as receivable due from the client .. 
....................... 
10 In case the bank has securities pledged for al-muslam fihi and the profits from the sale of the securities are less 
than the book value, the different is recognized as a receivable due from the client. Alternatively, if the proceeds 
are less than the book value then the difference is credited to the client. ....................... 
11 At the end of a financial period, assets acquired through Salam financing shall be measured at the lower of 
historical cost and cash equivalent value, and if the cash equivalent value is lower, the difference shall be 
recognized as loss in the income statement. ....................... 
12 Upon delivery of a! muslam fihi by the bank to the client in a parallel Salam, the difference between the amount 
paid by the client and the cost of al-muslam fihi shall be recognized as profit or loss . ....................... 
Question 3 
How do MGRs evaluate the need for training courses related to the implementation of the 
measurement standards? 
The scale 
1 very low 2345 very high 
Murabaha and Murabaha to Purchase Orderer 
Mudaraba Financing 
............. 
Musharaka Financing 
Salam and Parallel Salam 
Equity of Investment Account Holders 
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Appendix 10: Questionnaire: The assessment of implications for audit risk associated 
with the implementation of AAOIFI's accounting standards. 
A Survey Study as a part of the case Study of the Implementation of accounting standards 
for Islamic banks: Preparers' and Auditors' Opinions in Sudan 
To: The External Auditor of .................... 
Dear respondent, 
Assalam Alaikcum Wa Rahmat Allah, 
I am a post graduate researcher at school of Management studies for the Service Sector, - 
The university of Surrey - UK. Currently am undertaking Ph. D research project on the 
"Preparers and Auditors Opinions on the Implementation of AAOIFI's accounting standards 
in Sudan", under supervision of Professor S. Archer and Professor R. Karim. 
As part of the research, please find herewith the enclosed questionnaire. It concerns issues 
related to the assessment of the implications for audit risk associated with the 
implementation of the new standards. The questionnaire has been formulated so that it can 
be quickly and easily completed. You are only required to circle the appropriate number- 
from scale-which best describe your opinion on each statement. 
It is highly appreciated if you could complete and return this questionnaire within two weeks 
of the date of receipt. Finally, I assure that the information you provide will be treated as 
highly confidential. 
Many thanks in advance for your co-operation 
Yours sincerely, 
Badreldin Gurashi Mustafa, 
Foreign Exchange Dept. 
Bank of Sudan, Khartoum 
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List of abbreviations used: - 
AAOIFIs: Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions. 
FAS 1: Financial Accounting Standard No 1: General Presentation and Disclosure in the 
Financial statements of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions. 
AAOIFI measurement standards include Murabaha and Murabaha to the purchase order and 
Salain and parallel Salam. 
Inherent risk (IR): IR is the likelihood that the financial statements contain material 
misstatements, before considering the possible prevention or detection of such 
misstatements by the internal control system. 
IR can be considered at two levels: 
" Entity level and 
" Account balance level 
At entity level, the auditor needs to consider that there are certain characteristics of the bank 
or its environment that increase the likelihood that the financial statements contain material 
misstatements. For example, a bank operates in a highly competitive market, increasing the 
pressure on management for disclosing good results and disguise bad results. The pressure 
on the management increases and subsequently, the likelihood that the financial statements 
contain material misstatements increases. 
Control risk (CR): CR is the likelihood that, if the financial statements contain material 
misstatements that would not be prevented or detected by the internal control system. 
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Questionnaire: 
Section CA: 
Please tick (q) the appropriate answer 
. I- Are you familiar with AAOIFIs' FAS 1 
(General presentation and disclosure 
standard) ? 
Yes ( ) No () 
If yes, please answer the following questions 
Scenario 1: Irregularity: - 
The auditor of the bank issued an unqualified audit report and then competent audit staff 
discovered that the bank's audited financial statements contained a material misstatement 
regarding earnings prohibited by Islamic Shari 'a (i. e. earnings that are inconsistent with 
Shari 'a rules and principles and AAOIFI accounting standards). Moreover, they verified that 
the accounting treatment of prohibited earnings was intentional and resulted from a 
deliberate miscommunication between the investment department and the Shari 'a 
Supervisory Board (SSB). Subsequently, competent audit staff suspect that it is highly 
likely that management was aware that this treatment was inconsistent with Shari'a rules 
and principles and AAOIFI accounting standards and nevertheless supported it. 
Based on the above scenario please answer the questions 2.1 - 2.3 by picking the 
appropriate number from the scale which best describes your answer and jot it in the space 
to the right of the item 
Scale 
1 very low 2345 very high 
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2.1 Ignoring the existence of the internal control system, what is the probability that the 
implementation of AAOIFI's accounting standards would increase the risk of material 
misstatement of earnings prohibited by Shari 'a in the bank's financial statement. ...... 
Scale 
1 very low 2345 very high 
2.2 What is the likelihood that additional audit investment would be planned to ensure that, 
the bank's financial statements are prepared and presented in accordance with AAOIFIs' 
FAS 1 (presentation and disclosure). ................. 
2.3 - What is the likelihood that additional audit fees would be charged for bank audit in 
accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS 1 (presentation and disclosure). ............... 
Section CA 
Please tick (') the appropriate answer 
I- Are you familiar with AAOIFIs' measurement standards (e. g. Murabaha and 
Murabaha to the purchase order, and Salam and Parallel Salam)? 
Yes () No () 
If yes, please answer the following questions 
Scenario 2: 
The auditor of the bank issued an unqualified audit report and then competent audit staff 
discovered that the bank's audited financial statements contained a material misstatement 
regarding understatement of provision of doubtful debts of Murabaha receivable and/or that 
of estimated deficit of al-Muslam fihi (i. e. the understatement of provision that is 
inconsistent with AAOIFI accounting standards and international accounting standards). 
Moreover, they verified that the understatement of the provision was intentional and 
resulted from a deliberate miscommunication between the financial department and the 
186 
internal audit department. Consequently, competent audit staffs suspect that it is highly 
likely that management was aware that this treatment was inconsistent with AAOIFI 
accounting standards and nevertheless supported it. 
Based on the above scenario please answer the questions 3.1 - 3.3 by picking the 
appropriate number from the scale which best describes your answer and jot it in the space 
to the right of the item 
Scale 
1 very low 2345 very high 
3.1- Ignoring the existence of the internal control system, what is the probability that the 
implementation of Murabaha and Salam standards would increase the risk of material 
misstatement of the bank's assets (e. g. collectibility) in the bank's financial statements. ----- 
3.2- What is the likelihood that additional audit work would be planned to ensure that, the 
bank's balances and transactions are measured in accordance with AAOIFIs' measurement 
standards. --------- 
3.3 - What is the likelihood that additional audit fees would be charged for bank audit in 
accordance with AAOIFIs' measurement standards. ---------- 
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Please pick a number from the scale which best describes your answer and jot it in the 
space to the right of the item 
Scale 
1 very low 2345 very high 
4.1 - What is the likelihood that an audit of your client bank, in accordance with Islamic 
Shari 'a principles and AAOIFIs' disclosure standard, would entail training and educational 
courses for the audit staff. --------------- 
4.2 - What is the likelihood that an audit of your client bank, in accordance with AAOIFIs' 
measurement standards, would entail training and educational courses for the audit staff. ---- 
If your answer of the above two statements was number 4 or 5, please specify a relevant 
training and educational courses that would be needed for the audit staff: .......... 
1- ............................................................... 
2. ............................................................... 
3. ............................................................... 
4. ............................................................... 
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Appendix 11: Analysis of the pilot case study 
1 Overall analysis 
In general, table (a) shows that the MGR of Beta bank had a more positive attitude towards, 
and opinions on , the 
implementation of AAOIFI's disclosure standard (hereafter the 
disclosure standard) than the MGR of Alpha bank. 
Table a: Bank MGR's opinions about the implementation of the disclosure standard 
Banks 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
Alpha 27% 26% 17% 21% 
Beta 80% 10% 9% 1% 
9% 
2 Bank MGRS' opinions on conveying accounting information to the board of 
directors 
Table (a2) indicates that MGRs of Alpha and Beta bank had agreed to convey almost all 
information, in accordance with the disclosure standard, to the perceived need of the board 
of directors. Therefore, there was insignificant difference in bank MGRs' attitudes towards, 
and opinions on, disclosing the information to the board of directors. 
Table a2: bank MGRs' opinions on conveying information to the board of directors 
Banks 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
Alpha 83% 11% 6% 0% 0% 
Beta 100% ---- 
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3 Banks MGRr' opinions on conveying accounting information to shareholders 
Table (a3) shows that MGR of Beta bank had more positive attitudes towards, and opinions 
on furnishing shareholders with information, in accordance with AAOIFI's FAS 1, than 
MGR of Alpha bank. Thus, there was a significant difference in banks' attitude towards, and 
opinions on, disclosing the information to the perceived need of shareholders. 
Table a3: Bank MGRs' opinions on conveying information to shareholders 
Banks Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
Alpha 61% 11% 22% 6% 0% 
Beta 94% 6% 0% 0% 0% 
4 Bank MGRs' opinions on conveying accounting information to investment account 
holders (IAH) 
Table (a4) indicates that MGR of Beta had more positive attitude towards, and opinions 
about, conveying accounting information, in accordance with the disclosure standard, to 
IAH than MGR of Alpha. It follows that, there was a significant difference in bank MGRs' 
attitude towards, and opinions on, disclosing the information to the perceived need of IAH. 
Table a4: Bank MGRs' opinions on conveying information to investment account holders 
Banks Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
Alpha 11 22% 33% 33% 0% 
Beta 94% -- 6% 0% 
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5 Banks MGRS' opinions on conveying accounting information to current account 
holders (CAH) 
Table a5 shows that MGR of Beta had more positive attitude towards, and opinions about, 
conveying information, in accordance with the disclosure standard, to CAH than MGR of 
Alpha. Hence, there was a significant difference in bank MGRs' attitude towards, and 
opinions on, disclosing the information to the perceived need of CAH 
Table a5: Bank MGRs' opinions on conveying information to current account holders 
Banks Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
Alpha 6% 28% 33% 33% 0% 
Beta 50% 22% 22% 6% 0% 
6. Bank MGRS' opinions on conveying accounting information to the Central Bank 
of Sudan 
Table (a6) shows that MGRs of Alpha and Beta banks had agreed to conveying information, 
in accordance with the disclosure standard, to the perceived need of the Central Bank of 
Sudan. This implies that there was insignificant difference in bank MGRs' attitude towards, 
and opinions about, disclosing the information to the Central Bank of Sudan. 
Table a6: Bank MGRs' opinions on conveying information to the Central Bank of Sudan 
Banks Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
Alpha 17% 78% 6% 
Beta 100% -- 
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7 Bank MGRs opinions on conveying accounting information to KSE 
Table (a7) indicates that the MGR of Beta had more positive attitude towards, and opinions 
about, conveying accounting information, in accordance with the disclosure standard, to 
KSE than the manager of Alpha Therefore, there was a significant difference in bank 
MGRs' attitude towards, and opinions on, disclosing the information to the perceived need 
of KSE. 
Table a7: Bank MGRS' opinions on conveying information to the KSE 
Banks Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
Alpha 0% 17% 11% 56% 17% 
Beta 83% 6% 11% 0% 0% 
8. Bank MGRs' opinions on conveying accounting information to the general public 
Table (a8) shows that MGR of Beta had more positive attitude towards, and opinions about, 
conveying accounting information, in accordance with the disclosure standard, to the 
general public than MGR of Alpha. It follows that, there was a significant difference in bank 
MGRs' opinions on disclosing the information to the perceived need of general public. 
Table a8: Bank MGRs' opinions on conveying information to the general public 
Banks Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
Alpha 
Beta 
11% 
39% 
17% 6% 22% 0% 
33% 28% 0% 0% 
Overall, the pilot case study, with cross-sectional comparison, indicated that there was 
insignificant difference in bank MGRs' attitudes towards, opinions about, disclosing 
information, in accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS 1, to the Board of Directors and the CBS55. 
The findings from the pilot studies showed that there was a significant difference in opinions 
between the two banks in disclosing information, in accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS 1, to 
ss This is because Islamic banks are required to disclose all necessary information to the bank's Board of 
Directors and the CBS as regulatory body. Accordingly, the statements (items) relating to those users were 
omitted from the original questionnaire. 
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shareholders, investment account holders, Khartoum stock exchange and the general public. 
Thus, this necessitates the need to reformulate the questionnaire. 
As for measurement standards, the finding from the pilot studies showed that there was a 
significant differences in bank MGRs' attitude towards, opinions on, the implementation of 
AAOIFIs' measurement standards56. The following table shows the bank MGRs' attitudes 
towards, and opinions on, the implementation of the measurement standards. 
Banks Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
Alpha 23% 61% 6% 10% 0% 
Beta 83% 11% 6% 0% 0% 
With regard to the assessment of audit risk by the external auditor, questions were asked to 
the Deputy Auditor General about the implications for audit risk associated with the 
implementation of AAOIFI's accounting standards. An external auditor from private audit 
firm was requested to test the questionnaire. Accordingly, the questionnaire was redesigned 
to include questions regarding the audit risk associated with Shari 'a compliance. 
56 Measurement standards include Murabaha and Murabaha to purchase orderer, Mudaraba financing, 
Musharaka financing, Salam and Parallel Salam and Equity of Investment Accounts. 
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Appendix 12: Agenda 
1- Whether the financial accounting disclosure, in accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS: 1, to 
the external users would infringe the bank's privacy ?. 
2- Whether the financial accounting disclosure, in accordance with AAO1FIs' FAS: 1, to 
the external users would reduce the bank's capabilities to compete with similar banks or 
other banks such as conventional banks at regional or international levels?. 
3- Whether the preparation and presentation of the bank's financial statements, in 
accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS: 1, would increase executive management's 
responsibilities?. 
4- Whether the financial accounting disclosure, in accordance with AAOIFIs' FAS: 1, 
would expose the bank's executive management to additional accountability? 
5- Whether the bank's compliance with AAOIFIs' FAS: 1, would support the autonomy 
of executive management? 
6- Would you please specify additional financial costs incurred as a result of the 
implementation of AAOIFIs disclosure standard? 
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Appendix 13a: Question regarding disclosure requirements (FAS1) 
Reliability analysis (Alpha) 
Reliability coefficient 105 items 
Alpha = 0.9798 
Reliability analysis (Spilt-half) 
Reliability coefficient 105 items 
Correlation between forms = 0.8026 Equal-length Spearman-Brown = 0.8905 
Guttman Split-half = 0.8835 Unegual-length Spearman-Brown = 0.8905 
Alpha for part 1=0.9657 Alpha for part 2=0.9651 
53 items in part 1 52 items in part 2 
Appendix 13 b: Question concerning cost implications for disclosure standard 
Reliability analysis (Alpha) 
Reliability coefficient 3 items 
Alpha = 0.9400 
Reliability analysis (Spilt-half) 
Reliability coefficient 3 items 
Correlation between forms = 0.8122 Equal-length Spearman-Brown = 0.8963 
Guttman Split-half = 0.7733 Unegual-length Spearman-Brown = 0.9095 
Alpha for part 1=0.9600 Alpha for part 2=1.0000 
2 items in part 11 item in part 2 
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Appendix 13c: Question regarding measurement standards 
Reliability analysis (Alpha) 
Reliability coefficient 62 items 
Alpha 
Reliability analysis (Spilt-hal, f) 
Reliability coefficient 62 items 
Correlation between forms = 0.7422 Equal-length Spearman-Brown = 0.8520 
Guttman Split-half = 0.8501 Unegual-length Spearman-Brown = 0.8520 
Alpha for part 1=0.9406 Alpha for part 2=0.8687 
31 items in part 1 31 items in part 2 
Appendix 14: MGRS' opinions and the computation of Chi-square test concerning the bank's 
size 
Responses/ type of Banks with larger Banks with smaller 
bank Numbers of branches numbers of branches 
Fo Fe Fo Fe Total 
Positive 140 195.43 316 260.57 426 
Neutral 110 65.14 42 86.86 152 
Negative 65 54.43 62 72.57 127 
Total 315 420 735 
Fo Fe (Fo - Fe) (Fo - Fe)^2 (Fo - Fe)^2/Fe 
140 195,43 -55.43 3o72.48 15.72 
110 65.41 +44.86 2.012.42 30.89 
65 54.43 +10.57 111.72 2.05 
316 260.57 +55.43 3.072.48 11.79 
42 86.86 -44.86 2.012.42 23.17 
62 72.57 -10.57 111.72 1.54 
X^2 85.16 
= 0.9454 
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Appendix 15: Computation of Chi-square test regarding the listing status proposition 
Responses/ type of Listed banks Non-listed banks 
bank Fo Fe Fo Fe Total 
Positive 247 226.29 149 169.71 396 
Neutral 70 68.57 50 51.43 120 
Negative 19 41.41 53 30.86 72 
Total 336 252 588 
Fo Fe (Fo - Fe) (Fo - Fe)^2 (Fo - Fe)-12/Fe 
247 226.29 +20.71 428.90 1.89 
70 68.57 +1.43 2.. 04 0.03 
19 41.41 -22.14 490.18 11.91 
149 169.71 -20.71 428.9 2.53 
50 51.43 -1.43 2.04 0.04 
53 30.86 +22.14 490.18 15.88 
X^2 32.28 
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Appendix 16: Banks' actual implementation of the standard and the computation of Chi- 
square test according to bank's size 
Actual implementation/ Banks with larger Banks with smaller 
bank size Numbers of branches numbers of branches 
Fo Fe Fo Fe Total 
Fully implemented 3 6.43 12 8.57 15 
Partially implemented 7 4.71 4 6.29 11 
Not implemented 5 3.86 4 5.14 9 
Total 15 20 35 
Fo Fe (Fo - Fe) (Fo - Fe)^2 (Fo - Fe)^2/Fe 
3 6,43 -3.. 43 11.76 1.83 
7 4.71 +2.20 5.24 1.11 
5 3.86 +1.14 1.29 0.34 
12 8.57 +3.43 11.76 1.37 
4 6.29 -2.29 5.24 0.83 
4 5.14 -1.14 1.29 0.25 
X^2 5.73 
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Appendix 17: Banks' actual implementation of the standard and the computation of Chi- 
square test according to bank's listing status 
Actual implementation/ Listed banks Non-listed 
bank's listing status Fo Fe Fo Fe Total 
Fully implemented 13 8.57 2 6.43 15 
Partially implemented 4 6.29 7 4.71 11 
Not implemented 3 5.14 6 3.86 9 
Total 20 15 35 
Fo Fe (Fo-Fe) (Fo-Fe)A2 (Fo - Fe)^2/Fe 
2.29 
0.83 
13 8,57 4.. 43 19.62 
4 6.29 
3 5.14 
2 6.43 
7 4.71 
6 3.86 
X^2 
-2.29 5.24 
-2.14 4.58 0.89 
-4.43 19.62 3.05 
2.29 5.24 1.11 
2.14 4.58 1.19 
9.36 
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Appendix 18: Computation of Chi-square test according to ownership (bonus plan) 
proposition 
Responses/ type of Private banks (with bonus plan) Public banks (with no-bonus plan) 
bank 
Fo Fe Fo Fe Total 
Positive 174 158.73 124 139.27 298 
Neutral 29 27.17 22 23.83 51 
Negative 9 26.10 40 22.90 49 
Total 212 186 398 
Fo Fe (Fo - Fe) (Fo - Fe)112 (Fo - Fe)^2/Fe 
174 158.73 +15.27 233.17 1.47 
29 27.17 +1.83 3.35 0.12 
9 26.10 -17.10 292.41 10.76 
124 139.27 -15.27 233.17 1.67 
22 23.83 -1.83 3.35 0.15 
40 22.90 +17.10 292.41 2.77 
X" 26.94 
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Appendix 19: Computation of Chi-square test according to the bank size (value of total assets) 
proposition 
Responses/ type of Banks with large value of total assets Banks with small value of total assets 
bank Fo Fe Fo Fe Total 
Positive 108 139.27 190 158.73 298 
Neutral 39 23.83 12 27.17 51 
Negative 39 22.90 10 26.10 49 
Total 186 212 398 
Fo Fe (Fo - Fe) (Fo - Fe)^2 (Fo - Fe)^2/Fe 
108 139.27 -31.27 977.81 7.02 
39 23.83 +15.17 230.13 9.66 
39 22.90 +16.10 259.21 11.32 
190 158.73 +31.27 977.81 6.16 
12 27.17 -15.17 230.13 8.45 
10 26.10 -16.10 295.21 9.93 
X^2 52.54 
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